The macroeconomic sources of credit risk by Groba Domínguez, Jonatan
UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID
TESIS DOCTORAL
The Macroeconomic Sources of Credit Risk
Autor:
Jonatan Groba
Directores:
Antonio Díaz
Pedro Serrano
Doctorado en Economía de la Empresa y Métodos Cuantitativos
Departamento de Economía de la Empresa
Mayo de 2013

Os artistas novos [. . . ] Queren chegar a xenios profundando.
Pensan que o arte está nos miolos i estruchan a cachola
Castelao

Contents
Acknowledgements iv
Resumen vi
Abstract vii
1. Introduction 1
2. What drives corporate default risk premia? Evidence from the CDS market 7
2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1. Understanding the sources of risk premia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.2. Pricing the default swap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.3. Distress risk premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3. The characteristics of the European CDS data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1. Some features of the CDS market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2. Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4. Risk-neutral default intensity estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.1. Econometric framework and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.2. Distress risk premia across sectors and ratings . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.3. Principal components analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5. Macroeconomic sources of risk premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.1. Variable descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.2. OLS estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
i
Contents
2.5.3. Public-to-private risk transference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.6. Jump-at-default risk premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.1. Denition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.6.2. Estimation procedure and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.7. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3. The impact of distressed economies on the EU sovereign market 44
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2. Data analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.1. The dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.2. Univariate volatility analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2.3. Factor analysis of CDS spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3. Volatility transmission between the peripheral and the non-peripheral areas 54
3.4. The determinants of credit spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.1. Control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.2. OLS estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5. Decomposing the CDS spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.1. The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.2. Estimation procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.3. Maximum likelihood estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.4. Disentangling the impact on risk premia and default components . 70
3.5.5. Is the impact stable over time? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4. Foreign monetary policy and rms' default risk 78
4.1. Contribution to the existing literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2. The data set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.1. Monetary policy variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.2. Default probability variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.3. Control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
ii
Contents
4.3. Crossover eects of monetary polices: a rm level approach . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.1. Measuring the exposure to foreign monetary policies . . . . . . . . 90
4.3.2. Sample descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3.3. Research design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3.4. Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3.5. Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.4. Unexpected monetary policy shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.5. The endogenous relationship between MP and aggregate default risk . . . 116
4.5.1. Measures of systemic risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.5.2. Modeling framework and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.5.3. Monetary policy and systemic default risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5. Final Remarks 125
A. Risk-Neutral and actual estimates 126
A.1. Risk-Neutral intensity estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
A.2. Summary statistics for the EDF measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
A.3. Actual intensity estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.4. Panel data model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
iii
Acknowledgements
I rst decided to study a Ph.D. at the University Carlos III after Josep Tribó visited
the University of Vigo to promote the postgraduate program of Business Administration
and Quantitative Methods.
This thesis would not be possible without the help, support and patience of my advi-
sors Pedro Serrano and Antonio Díaz. It all started after Pedro, Antonio and I attended
a course in credit risk at CEMFI taught by David Lando. After that, they were always
available for anything I needed and were working with me side by side to develop new
ideas. I will always remember the long conversations over the internet with Juan A.
Lafuente and Pedro Serrano while I was doing my research visit in Tilburg University.
I am grateful to Marco Da Rin and Steven Ongena for allowing me to visit the nance
department of the Tilburg School of Economics and Management. There, the conversa-
tions with Alberto Manconi, Olivier De Jonghe, Frank De Jong, Joost Driessen, Louis
Raes, among others, widened my scope in the elds of banking and credit risk.
I also wish to thank the faculty and colleagues at the University Carlos III. I thank
David Martínez-Miera for introducing me into the eld of monetary policy and allowing
me to present innovative research in the Corporate Finance and Banking Reading Group.
Additionally, I greatly appreciate the valuable discussions with Ricardo Correia, Emre
Ekinci, Jose Penalva, Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, Josep Tribó and Sergio Vicente.
I have had very helpful advice from participants of the XVIII, XIX and XX Finance
Forums of the Spanish Finance Association, the 18th and 19th Annual Conference of
the Multinational Finance Society, the 2012 FMA European conference, the 4th Inter-
national IFABS conference, the 11th CREDIT conference, and the XXXVII Spanish
iv
Acknowledgements
Economic Association symposium. Finally, I acknowledge nancial support from the
University Carlos III of Madrid and the Spanish government grant ECO2011-28134.
My family is the only reason I am here today. I dedicate this thesis to them. I will
always look up to my mom and dad. They are an example of entrepreneurship that
someday I expect to live up to. They taught me that rectitude, honesty and hard work
always pays o. Thanks to my sisters for always nding any triing thing to drive me
crazy, annoy me and keep me busy; which I adore. And thanks to my little nieces,
because I am always their Tío Ñoñi regardless of being so far away from Fornelos da
Ribeira.
v
Resumen
Esta tesis estudia las fuentes macroeconómicas del riesgo de crédito, proporcionando un
análisis en tres dimensiones: corporativa, soberana, y política. El primer capítulo estudia
las fuentes macroeconómicas de los excesos de rendimiento de los bonos corporativos. La
evidencia empírica sugiere la existencia de un riesgo sistemático que está siendo valorado
en las primas de crédito corporativas, así como la existencia de una transferencia de riesgo
público-a-privado entre los mercados de crédito soberano y corporativo. El segundo
capítulo explora la transferencia de riesgo soberano entre economías pertenecientes a
una misma área monetaria. Encontramos que el mercado soberano de crédito permite
un canal de trasferencia de riesgo desde los países con problemas de nanciación hacia
el resto de países a través del precio del riesgo de crédito. Finalmente, el tercer capítulo
discute el papel de las autoridades monetarias en cuanto a la gestión del riesgo sistémico.
Documentamos una respuesta asimétrica del riesgo sistémico a las actuaciones de las
diferentes autoridades monetarias.
vi
Abstract
This thesis studies the macroeconomic sources of credit risk, providing an analysis in
three dierent dimensions: corporate, sovereign, and policy. The rst chapter addresses
the macroeconomic sources of corporate bond excess returns. The empirical evidence
suggests the existence of a systematic risk being priced in the corporate spreads, and
a public-to-private risk transfer between the sovereign and corporate credit markets.
The second chapter explores the risk spillovers between nancially distressed and non-
distressed economies. I nd that the sovereign credit market enables a risk transmission
channel from riskier to healthier economies through the default risk premia. Finally, the
third chapter discusses the role of monetary authorities on managing systemic risk. I
document an asymmetric response of systemic risk to actions from dierent monetary
authorities.
vii
Chapter 1.
Introduction
The consequences of the nancial crisis that started in August 2007 are still present
in the current time. The illiquidity shock associated to the mortgage subprime crisis
in the US led to large losses in bank balance sheets that resulted in the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Along with the mortgage crisis, a sovereign crisis
in Europe has disturbed the borrowing cost of the main European economies. This
scenario of high credit constraints has deteriorated the ability of rms to raise external
nancing and made investors more risk-averse about the ability of rms to repay their
debts.
In light of those events, some important questions arise both from an asset pricing
and policy perspective. From an asset pricing view, the borrowing cost of rms within a
nancially distressed context is a question of enormous interest. For example, how are
investors translating the default probabilities into prices? What are the main drivers of
corporate default premia during those stressed periods? Also, the impact of sovereign
economies is relevant. Do investors care about sovereign risk when pricing the corporate
bonds? Should they be concerned with the sovereign risk of other economies?
From a policy point of view, the monetary authorities have started an evolutionary
process towards more nancial risk awareness and macro-prudential oversight by creating
new nancial institutions as, for example, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). These new institutions are
1
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designed to monitor, assess, and mitigate systemic risk, which may lead to adverse
consequences in the real economy. In this scenario, what is the role played by monetary
authorities to manage the systemic risk? Have they controlled for the default risk of the
rms?
This thesis studies the determinants of credit risk during nancially distressed periods.
In particular, I focus on the eect of nancial and macroeconomic variables on the
borrowing cost of corporate rms and sovereign economies. The objective of the thesis is
to provide a thorough description of the credit risk prices at three levels of analysis using
the information contained in the credit derivatives market. Firstly, at the corporate level,
I focus on corporate expected excess returns and their macroeconomic sources. Secondly,
at the sovereign level, I study the risk transfer from distressed towards healthier sovereign
debt. Thirdly, at the policy level, I explore the potential eect of monetary policy on
rms' default and systemic risks. Each of the chapters of the thesis is related to these
three levels of analysis.
It is crucial for this analysis to quantify the credit risk. In this way, the instrument
used for measuring credit risk comes from the credit derivative markets. Among those
markets, the Credit Default Swaps (CDS, hereafter) are the most extensively used con-
tracts for credit risk transferring. CDSs are nancial instruments that allow debt holders
to hedge against the default risk. For the purpose of this thesis, the CDS contracts are
suitable for measuring the credit risk prices because they are more liquid than the cor-
responding bond market, they are designed without complex guarantees or embedded
options, they provide a simple way to short credit risk, and the information disseminates
faster in the CDS market than in the bond market (Pan and Singleton, 2008; Blanco
et al., 2005; Forte and Peña, 2009).
After appearing in the US in the late 1990s, the CDS market exploded over the subse-
quent decade to over 45 trillion US dollars in mid-2007, as reported by the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA, 2007). Although the notional outstanding
CDS decreased during the nancial crisis, it reached approximately $26 trillion at mid-
year 2010 (ISDA, 2010). Default swaps focused primarily on municipal bonds and cor-
2
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porate debt during the 1990s, but after 2000, the CDS market expanded internationally
into sovereign bonds and structured nance products, such as asset-backed securities.
The increasing trading volume of the CDS market could be attributed to several aspects
such as the lack of regulation (CDS are traded on over-the-counter markets) or the po-
tential for speculative investors and hedge fund managers to manage these insurance
contracts without going long on the underlying asset.
As previously mentioned, this thesis is structured in three chapters. Chapter 2 studies
the economic factors behind corporate default risk premia in Europe during the nancial
crisis. Instead of studying the determinants of credit spread changes (e.g. Elton et al.,
2001; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). I employ information embedded in Credit Default
Swap contracts to quantify expected excess returns from the underlying bonds during
market-wide default circumstances. This chapter provides a general overview of the
prices of default risk and their measurement. The empirical analysis disentangles (i)
the compensation for the future changes in the creditworthiness of the bond issuer that
might vary from expectations from (ii) the remuneration for the surprise jump in the
bond price at the event of default. The former is called the distress risk premium and
has been studied by Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longsta et al. (2011) for emerging
sovereign debt. The later is usually referred to as jump-at-default premium and has been
previously studied by Jarrow et al. (2005), Driessen (2005) and Berndt et al. (2005).
The results show that the risk premia associated with systematic factors inuencing
default arrivals represent approximately 40% of the total CDS spread (on median).
These premia also exhibit a strong source of commonality; a single principal component
explains approximately 88% of their joint variability. This factor signicantly covaries
with aggregate illiquidity and sovereign risk variables. Empirical evidence suggests a
public-to-private risk transfer between the sovereign credit spreads and the corporate
risk premia. Finally, the compensation in the event of default is approximately 14 basis
points of the total CDS spread. This nding is of interest for portfolio managers as a
signicant amount of jump-at-default risk may not be diversiable.
3
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The Chapter 3 studies the default risk transmission of sovereign debt in a context
where sovereign default risk is not perceived as a rare event. The related literature
studies the connections between the CDS market and the bond and/or stock markets
 for example, Blanco et al., 2005; Forte and Peña, 2009; Norden and Weber, 2009; or
Delatte et al., 2012. And Favero and Missale (2012) analyze the relationships between
the sovereign yield spreads of the main European economies, nding empirical evidence
for substantial transmission eects. Relatively little is known about the nature of default
risk transmission in sovereign credit markets. Under a scenario where the government
bonds have lost their previous role as a domestic safe asset (Dötz and Fisher, 2011) and
the expected scal policy plays an important role in long term interest rates (Laubach,
2009), it becomes crucial to understand the linkages between changes and the volatility
of sovereign credit spreads, in particular, among the Eurozone countries.
The methodological approach of this chapter consists of three parts. First, I estimate
two bivariate BEKK-GARCH models to analyze the spillover eects between distressed
and non-distressed debt. Second, I use the decomposition technique described by Pan
and Singleton (2008) to break the CDS spread down into two drivers: (i) the distress
risk premium and (ii) its default component. Lastly, I conduct a regression analysis of
the components of sovereign CDS spreads for non-distressed economies against a risk
factor that is representative of the behavior of the distressed countries.
The contribution of the chapter is threefold. First, I document a market fragmentation
in the European sovereign credit markets between the non-distressed and the distressed
countries in terms of their CDS levels and their conditional volatilities. Second, the
analysis based on the use of the GARCH methodology suggests a unidirectional volatil-
ity transmission pattern from the distressed to the non-distressed economies inside the
Eurozone. Third, the regression analysis supports the fact that the sovereign credit mar-
ket enables a risk transmission channel from distressed to non-distressed debt mainly
through the price of default. The countries suering distress do not represent a major
source of default risk for the healthier countries. The ndings of the chapter are relevant
for policy measures aimed at mitigating the market fragmentation between distressed
4
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and non-distressed sovereign debt markets that share the same currency.
Lastly, the Chapter 4 explores the role of monetary policy as a mechanism to treat
disruptions in the credit derivatives markets. The monetary authorities face the new
responsibility of preventing default events that can trigger disastrous economic condi-
tions. In this chapter I stress the importance of foreign monetary policies in integrated
economies.
There are two main strands of literature regarding the role of foreign monetary policies.
The rst strand of literature has focused on the reaction of the nancial markets. In the
cross-section, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) nd that rms with nancial constraints
are more aected by monetary policy. The stock markets more nancially integrated
with the foreign economic region and the stocks of rms with larger foreign sales have
larger reactions to foreign monetary policy shocks (Wongswan, 2006, 2009; Hausman and
Wongswan, 2011; Ammer et al., 2010). The second strand of literature has explained
that monetary policy cooperation can be counterproductive (Rogo, 1985), and that
inward-looking monetary policy is not necessarily problematic (Obstfeld and Rogo,
2002). Pappa (2004) argues that for the Federal Reserve and the ECB to cooperate, one
has to assume a high degree of trade links of the US and the Eurozone.
This chapter investigates the eects of monetary policy on the rms' default probabil-
ity and systemic risk measures. In a micro perspective, foreign monetary policy possibly
aects the rm's specic default risk. I nd that the rms' foreign monetary policy ex-
posure depends on the rms' degree of internationalization. In a macro perspective, the
monetary policy can aect the systemic default risk of all rms. The ubiquitous nature
of systemic default risk and the dierent monetary policies across countries add up dif-
culties for monetary authorities to eectively tackle it. The ndings indicate dierent
responses of rm-specic default risk and systemic risk to the stance of US and Eurozone
monetary policies. These results claim the need by the systemic risk supervisors to join
eorts in the struggle against large default events.
This thesis, while providing a broad description of the European credit derivatives
5
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market during stressed scenarios, corroborates that there is a signicant risk transfer
from the public environment towards the private environment  or public-to-private
risk transfer. Most notably, the results suggest that the sovereign risk raises the price
demanded by corporate debt investors and that the monetary policy plays a signicant
role in the credit derivatives market. This leaves open the question of whether or not the
international authorities should agree to coordinate policies to circumvent credit market
disruptions.
6
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What drives corporate default risk premia?
Evidence from the CDS market
2.1. Introduction
What are the main drivers of corporate default risk premia? Do they change during
periods of nancial distress? Do investors care about factors such as sovereign risk or
aggregate illiquidity when pricing the excess return of corporate bonds? These questions
are of paramount importance in the scenario in which market-wide defaults and liquidity
restrictions have signicantly raised corporate and sovereign borrowing costs. Several
answers have been provided from the sovereign side (Longsta et al., 2011), but a com-
prehensive analysis of the corporate risk premium and the nature of its relationship with
the public sector has not yet been performed.
This chapter analyzes the macroeconomic factors behind the corporate default risk
premium. Our objective is to examine what are the sources of excess expected return,
instead of studying the determinants of credit spread changes (e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al.,
2001). As opposed to previous analyses on corporate credit spreads, we focus on the
default risk premium embedded in such spreads. We employ information in credit default
swap (CDS) prices in an innovative manner to learn how investors assess the risk of
changes in corporate bond returns under widespread default circumstances. Consistent
7
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with Longsta et al. (2011) in the case of sovereign default risk, our approach relies on
the information content of corporate default swaps to obtain fairer estimates of credit
spreads instead of bonds, which are usually traded in frictional markets. Our analysis
disentangles the compensation for those future changes in the creditworthiness of the
bond issuer that might vary from expectations (Pan and Singleton, 2008)  the distress
risk premium  from the remuneration for the surprise jump in the bond price at the
event of default  the jump-at-default premium.1 In this way, we explore common factors
across rms that might aect those premia and which portion of this co-movement
is attributable to macro-nancial variables. Additionally, we stress the link between
corporate and sovereign default risks, quantifying the eect of shocks in sovereign risk
on corporate risk premia. To this end, an analysis of the European debt crisis during the
period 2006-2010 would provide a unique position to observe the possible risk channels
between public and corporate sectors.2 To our knowledge, this is the rst article drawing
a complete picture of the default risk premia in European rms while searching the main
drivers of these premia.
Our empirical ndings contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First,
our results show that compensation for changes in the default environment accounts
for approximately 40% of total CDS spreads (on median). Moreover, a strong source
of commonality among European distress risk premia is revealed by a principal com-
ponent (PC) analysis showing that one factor explains appoximately 88% of their joint
variability. When examining the loading coecients, this rst PC represents an equally
weighted contribution of rms and is interpreted as an aggregate level of distress risk
premium. Notably, we nd positive and signicant beta coecients when projecting this
1Jump-at-default risk premium (Pan and Singleton, 2006) is indistinctly named default event (Driessen,
2005), credit event (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2010) or jump-at-event (Longsta et al., 2011) premium.
For purposes of clarication, we reserve the term default risk premium to indicate the entire com-
pensation for default embedded in credit spreads. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, our default risk
premium is the sum of distress plus jump-at-default premia.
2Europe comprises a signicant share of the global CDS market in terms of geographical focus of
products  approximately 40% of CDS index products are based on European entities , market
share of dealers  66% and 50% of the dealers contributing to calculation of the iTraxx Europe
indices and the CDX indices are domiciled in Europe, respectively , and currency denomination 
approximately 39% of CDS are denominated in Euros (ECB, 2009).
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PC onto aggregate illiquidity and sovereign risk variables. The adjusted-R2 coecients
of the regressions are close to 70% for the entire period, rising to appoximately 75% after
the Lehman's bankruptcy in September 2008. These results suggest that aggregate illiq-
uidity and sovereign risk may act as pricing factors of European corporate CDS. Along
these lines, recent articles focus on the importance of liquidity in credit markets (Bon-
gaerts et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 2013), but there is not much evidence on the study
of sovereign risk and its relevance in the credit derivative pricing and risk management.
Second, we study the dynamic relationship between the distress risk premium and
macro-nancial variables. We shed light on the documented public-to-private risk trans-
ference (see Dieckmann and Plank, 2012) quantifying how nancial shocks aect the
distress risk premium. We show that shocks in the sovereign CDS market lead to shocks
in the aggregate level of distress risk premium demanded by corporate investors and that
illiquidity also plays an important role as a driving factor of the distress risk premium.
Third, the compensation at the event of default is approximately 3.82 for the rms
under study. This jump-at-default premium estimate is consistent with those previously
reported in the literature for the US market (Driessen, 2005). Economically, the median
jump-at-default premium is approximately 14 basis points (bps). Within the context of
our theoretical framework, the empirical evidence suggests that a signicant amount of
jump-at-default risk may not be diversiable.3 Further results suggest that a systematic
factor may be behind jump-at-default compensation; for example, a PC analysis reveals
that one (two) factor(s) explain approximately 59% (78%) of the total co-movement in
jump-at-default premia. These PC factors co-vary signicantly with aggregate illiquidity
and stock market variables.
Finally, our ndings corroborate the relationship between CDS and liquidity found
in Tang and Yan (2007) and Bongaerts et al. (2011), among others. Liquidity is a
puzzling component of the CDS market; protection buyers become more risk-adverse
3Under the conditionally diversiable hypothesis of Jarrow et al. (2005) for a large portfolio of bonds,
the jump-at-default risk premium will only be diversied away if such premium is equal to one or,
equivalently, if actual and risk-neutral default probabilities are equal. However, a small number of
bonds in the portfolio and/or the possibility that some rms default simultaneously may make it
impossible to diversify away the jump-at-default risk.
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during nancially distressed periods, having induced demand pressure beginning with the
onset of the nancial turmoil in August 2007. However, this hedging pressure pushes up
expected returns, increasing the speculative demand of other investors (Bongaerts et al.,
2011). Thus, either a high level of liquidity or lack of liquidity can widen CDS premia.
Our results show that distress and jump-at-default risk premia widen during periods of
vanishing market liquidity. We document a positive and signicant relationship between
aggregate default risk premia and the rst principal component of 5-year CDS bid-ask
spreads, particularly during distressed periods.
The drivers of CDS returns and CDS spreads have received increasing attention in the
empirical literature, but such attention is still scant.4 Literature analyzing the European
case is even scarcer, but see, for example, Dieckmann and Plank (2012) and Berndt and
Obreja (2010) for examinations of the default swaps written on European government
debt and European rms. In this context, we take a step forward by exploring the risk
premia embedded in CDS prices instead of using the plain CDS spreads. On the one
hand, this chapter analyzes the degree of variation over time in the distress risk premia
and their determinants during a deep nancial and economic crisis. On the other hand,
we also explore the reward for changes in the bond price in the event of default, following
Jarrow et al. (2005), Driessen (2005) and Berndt et al. (2005). All studies previously
referred to have focused primarily on U.S. rms and they covered periods before the
nancial crisis started in August 2007. The extension to European rms or more recent
time span is nonexistent. As opposed to those studies, our sample involves CDS data for
almost one hundred European rms over a broad period from 2006 to 2010, which covers
the recent nancial crisis. The dataset consists of biweekly spreads of the most liquid
1-, 3- and 5-year CDS contracts for senior unsecured debt of European investment-grade
rms.5 Our portfolio is composed of a well-diversied set of investment grade rms
across ten industries and dierent countries.
This chapter adopts the intensity approach of Lando (1998) and Due and Singleton
4See, for instance, Tang and Yan (2007), Cremers et al. (2008), Das and Hanouna (2009), Ericsson
et al. (2009), Zhang et al. (2009) or Bongaerts et al. (2011).
5In the market, 91% of single-name CDS contracts refer to non-sovereigns in terms of amount out-
standing and 67% of these single-name CDS contracts are investment grade.
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(1999) for studying the default risk premium.6 Our estimation strategy follows a two-step
procedure, such as that developed by Driessen (2005). First, we obtain the maximum
likelihood (ML) estimates of the risk-neutral mean of default arrival rates
 
Q

from
a sample of corporate CDS spreads of 85 rms from 2006 to 2010. Assuming that the
default event is diversiable, a rst estimate of the default premium  a fully distress risk
premium  is obtained. In this case, our modeling proposal may underestimate expected
excess corporate bond returns (Driessen, 2005). However, the absence of defaults in the
sample and the high quality of the rms in our study seem to suggest the suitability of
this approach; moreover, the robustness in the estimation of more parsimonious models
is also appraised. We then employ this rst-stage risk premium estimate to analyze
its relationship with a set of macro-nancial variables. This procedure was previously
implemented by Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longsta et al. (2011) to extract the
compensation for unexpected default arrivals from a sample of sovereign CDS spreads.
Second, we exploit information at our disposal on the actual probabilities of default
as those provided by Moody's KMV expected default frequencies (EDFs). From this
database, we calculate the ML actual default intensity
 
P

estimates to analyze the
compensation for the surprise jump in the bond price at the event of default. This
jump-at-default risk premium is computed by the ratio Q=P, as shown by Yu (2002),
Driessen (2005) or Pan and Singleton (2006).
Thus, this chapter fully characterizes the corporate default risk premium embedded
in European CDS, analyzing its relationship with nancial variables and emphasizing
the sovereign and liquidity variables. The remainder of this chapter is organized as
follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical framework of the default risk premium.
Section 2.3 shows the main features of European CDS data. Section 2.4 estimates the
distress risk premium, and its relationship with macroeconomic variables is explored in
6As suggested by one referee, an alternative would be a structural modeling approach. Intensity and
structural models are theoretically connected by an imperfect information argument. Due and
Lando (2001) show that a structural model with asymmetric information of a rm's asset value
results in the existence of a default intensity for outsiders to the rm. Additional references on
intensity pricing models for bonds and CDS are Due and Singleton (1999), Duee (1999) or
Longsta et al. (2005), among many others.
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Section 2.5. Section 2.6 analyzes the jump-at-default premium. Finally, Section 2.7
draws conclusions.
2.2. The model
This section presents the theoretical approach to the default risk premium. The dis-
cussion and notations here are primarily taken from Jarrow et al. (2005) and Singleton
(2006).
2.2.1. Understanding the sources of risk premia
To illustrate the dierent sources of risk premia embedded in a defaultable security,
consider the price P (t;Xt) of a credit-sensitive instrument that depends on a set of state
variables Xt. These variables follow a diusion process,
dXt = 
P
X(Xt; t)dt+ X(Xt; t)dB
P
t ; (2.1)
where PX and X are the drift and instantaneous volatility, respectively, under the
actual measure P. Girsanov's theorem permits a representation of equation (2.1) under
the risk-neutral measure Q,
BQt = B
P
t +
Z t
0
tds; (2.2)
so that the risk-neutral process for the state variables results,
dXt =
 
PX(Xt; t)  X(Xt; t)t

dt+ X(Xt; t)dB
Q
t ; (2.3)
where t is the price of risk and the drift 
Q
X under the risk-neutral measure is
QX = 
P
X(Xt; t)  X(Xt; t)t : (2.4)
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We are interested in the excess return of the defaultable security. Because the price
P (t;Xt) is a function of the state variables Xt, we apply Ito's lemma under Q and P
measures, respectively,
dP (Xt; t) =
@P (Xt; t)
@t
dt+
@P (Xt; t)
@Xt
rtdt+
@P (Xt; t)
@Xt
X(Xt; t)dB
Q
t
+
1
2
@2P (Xt; t)
@X2t
2X(Xt; t)dt+ (wt   P (Xt; t))Qt dt; (2.5)
dP (Xt; t) =
@P (Xt; t)
@t
dt+
@P (Xt; t)
@Xt
(rt + X(Xt; t)t) dt+
@P (Xt; t)
@Xt
X(Xt; t)dB
P
t
+
1
2
@2P (Xt; t)
@X2t
2X(Xt; t)dt+ (wt   P (Xt; t))
 
Qt +  t
P
t

dt; (2.6)
where the risk-neutral drift in expression (2.5) is the risk-free rate rt and wt is the
recovery value. Former terms come from Ito's lemma for jumps and Girsanov's theorem,
MQt = Nt  
Z t
0
 t
P
sds : (2.7)
Finally, the expected excess return et is dened as the dierence of expectations under
Q and P measures,
et  EP

dP (Xt; t)
P (Xt; t)

  EQ

dP (Xt; t)
P (Xt; t)

=
1
Pt
@Pt
@Xt
X(Xt; t)t +
wt   P (Xt; t)
P (Xt; t)
Pt  t : (2.8)
Expression (2.8) contains an economically important result. According to this equa-
tion, investors are rewarded two ways. The rst reward is compensation for the volatility
of state variables Xt. Not surprisingly, t represents the price of risk (risk premium per
unit of volatility), and it multiplies the volatility X(Xt; t) of risk factors. Economically,
this term accounts for changes in the risk environment and is named the distress risk
premium. Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longsta et al. (2011) have previously analyzed
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the distress risk premium in the context of sovereign default swaps.
Jarrow et al. (2005) note that investors compensate both for changes in the credit
environment and against the event of default itself. The second reward referred to above
comes from the term (wt P (Xt; t))=P (Xt; t)P t, and it represents the expected payo
associated with a (downward) jump in the price of the bond if the reference entity does
restructure (Pan and Singleton, 2006). We refer to this as the jump-at-default premium.
The market price of risk at the event of default is  t, which we will analyze in Section
2.6. The jump-at-default premium has been previously studied by Yu (2002), Driessen
(2005) and Berndt et al. (2005).
Finally, the excess return equation (2.8) is zero if there is no compensation for distress
or jump-at-default risks (t =  t = 0).
2.2.2. Pricing the default swap
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a contract between two parties to receive insurance
against the default of a certain bond (the reference entity). In a CDS, the insured (the
protection buyer) is willing to pay a certain percentage (spread) over the total amount of
the bond (notional) to the insurer (the protection seller). This annual spread is usually
paid quarterly up to the maturity of the contract, if there is no default. In the event
of a default, the protection seller receives the defaulted bond, and restores its amount
to the protection buyer. Longsta et al. (2005) and Pan and Singleton (2008) provide
the following formula for the price of a CDS contract CDSt(M) with maturity M in an
intensity based setting,
1
4
CDSt(M)
4MX
i=1
EQt
h
e 
R t+:25i
t (rs+
Q
s )ds
i
= LQ
Z t+M
t
EQt
h
Qu e
  R ut (rs+Qs )dsi du; (2.9)
where rt, 
Q
t and L
Q
t are the risk-free interest rate, default intensity and loss given default
(under the recovery of face value assumption) of the referenced bond under theQmeasure
at t, respectively. The risk-neutral loss given default is 60%, a standard assumption in the
14
Chapter 2. What drives corporate default risk premia? Evidence from the CDS market
literature.7 The left-hand side of expression (3.10) indicates the (quarterly) premium
on the sum of expected discounted cash ows received by the protection seller. The
right-hand side is the expected discounted payo received by the protection buyer if the
bond defaults. Single-name CDS contracts are written without upfront payments, which
equals both sides of equation (3.10).
2.2.3. Distress risk premium
Expression (2.8) permits us to formalize our estimation strategy. In the rst step, we
assume no compensation for the event of default itself ( t = 0). This assumption is
the conditionally diversiable hypothesis of Jarrow et al. (2005), stating that jump-at-
default risk is purely idiosyncratic when risk-neutral and actual default probabilities
are equal, conditional to the existence of an innite number of bonds in the economy
and independence between default processes. As a rst approach to our problem, these
conditions seem to be reasonably satised because, in practice, (i) the probability of a
simultaneous default in our sample is negligible as a result of the high quality of rms
involved and, (ii) the number of bonds employed here may be considered high enough.
Previous arguments had led to the conclusion that investors are rewarded for unex-
pected risk-neutral default arrivals because of changes in the credit environment. To
further hone our denition of the distress risk premium, we introduce additional as-
sumptions about the default intensity process into expression (3.10). We impose an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for the logarithms of the default intensity Qt under the
risk-neutral measure Q,
d lnQt = 
Q  Q   lnQt  dt+ dBQt ; (2.10)
7One referee raised the issue of whether the xed recovery rate assumption could be a source of model
risk. We note that papers, as Houweling and Vorst (2005), show that CDS spreads are relatively
insensitive to the assumed recovery rate. Longsta et al. (2005) mention that their estimation results
are virtually identical when other recovery values are employed. Recent literature assumes a xed
recovery rate when pricing default swaps as Pan and Singleton (2008) or Longsta et al. (2011),
which is consistent with industry standard assumptions.
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where parameters Q, Q and  capture the mean-reversion rate, the long-run mean,
and the volatility of the process, respectively. By adopting this framework, the intensity
is ensured to be positive. Unfortunately, expectations in (3.10) have no solution in a
closed-form, so we implement a Crank-Nicholson scheme on the associated Feynmann-
Kac equation.
Assuming a market price of risk t from P to Q of the form,
t = 0 + 1 ln
Q
t ; (2.11)
the risk-neutral intensity Q under the actual measure P results in
d lnQt = 
P  P   lnQt  dt+ dBPt ; (2.12)
with P = Q 1 and PP = QQ+0. Within this framework, the drift adjustment
from the diusive part must compensate the risk factors (such as changes in economic
fundamentals, etc.) that inuence the intensity process.
To measure the size of the distress risk premium, we employ the strategy in Longsta
et al. (2011). Because expressions (2.12) and (2.10) are equal when there is no risk
premium (t = 0) in CDS contracts, any departure of CDS spreads using risk-neutral
CDSt equation (3.10) and actual CDSPt ,
4MX
i=1
EPt
h
e 
R t+:25i
t (rs+
Q
s ) ds
i
CDSPt (M) = 4L
Q
Z t+M
t
EPt
h
Qu e
  R ut (rs+Qs ) dsi du; (2.13)
quanties the distress risk premium in CDS spreads.
16
Chapter 2. What drives corporate default risk premia? Evidence from the CDS market
2.3. The characteristics of the European CDS data
2.3.1. Some features of the CDS market
In addition to serious concerns about transparency and counterparty risk from the -
nancial crisis, credit derivatives have increased in popularity and liquidity during the
last decade. Credit derivatives in general, and CDS in particular, have become a market
standard for assessing the creditworthiness of a large number of corporations. These
instruments have made credit risk trading swift and easily accessible. The credit deriva-
tive market has grown much faster than other derivative markets, with the size of the
credit derivatives market increasing from US$900 billion in June 2000 to US$32 trillion
in June 2011 (although it had reached US$62 trillion in December 2007).8 The size of
the CDS market has shrunk signicantly since the second half of 2008. Several major
participants have left the market, such as Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Bears
Stearns. Banks participate in termination cycles, leading to the compression of re-
dundant positions through multilateral terminations. Additionally, the activity in the
market for structured credit has also dropped.9 A more detailed analysis about the
structure of the European CDS market can be found in ECB (2009) and in Berndt and
Obreja (2010).
Default swap spreads approximate the spreads of referenced bonds. This fact comes
from the replicating portfolio of a CDS, whose payments can be reproduced by a long
position in a defaultable bond and a short position in a riskless bond (Berndt and Obreja,
2010). Then, the CDS spread is close to the dierence between the yields of a risky
and a risk-free bond. Recent empirical literature suggests that CDS spreads are better
measures of default risk than bond spreads. Several reasons support this argument:
rst, the corporate CDS market is more liquid than the corresponding bond market,
8Notional amounts outstanding in all surveyed contracts, according to ISDA Market Survey 2010 (BIS,
2011).
9After the failure of Lehman Brothers, legislators in the U.S. and the European Union began developing
regulatory reform. The debate focuses on protocols to standardize CDS documentation and on
introducing central counterparties and making central clearing mandatory for CDS. The proposed
legislation aims to enhance the stability and eciency of the market and to reduce systematic risk.
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maybe because CDS contracts provide a simple way to short credit risk (Blanco et al.,
2005). Second, the primary corporate debt market began to dry up since the early
stages of the nancial crisis. At the same time, the CDS corporate market has been
maintained as a reasonably liquid market.10 Third, there are diculties to construct
bond spreads in practice. Bond spreads can be computed as the dierence between the
yield-to-maturity of the corporate and the sovereign bonds. The benchmark sovereign
bond should have similar cash-ows (at least same term-to-maturity) to obtain the
yield spread. Fourth, the European core countries were aected by ight-to-liquidity
and ight-to-quality eects; on the contrary, European peripheral countries were under
pressure. Finally, the CDS market has a leading role in the price discovery process. This
is consistent with the hypothesis that market-wide new information disseminates faster
in the CDS than in the bond markets (Blanco et al. (2005), Forte and Peña, 2009).
2.3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Our data are taken from Markit Group Ltd., a comprehensive database that is becoming
increasingly and extensively employed in academic articles as a result of its high quality
standards to create a composite CDS spread. This spread is computed as the midpoint
between the bid and the ask quotes provided by dierent contributors after removing
stale data, outliers, and other quotes that fail the data quality tests. The sample is
composed of the single-name CDS spreads contained in the Markit iTraxx Europe index.
This index comprises the 125 most liquid European corporate CDS names. We have
taken the default swaps belonging to Senior Unsecured Debt, denominated in Euros and
with a modied-modied (MM) restructuring clause,11 which is standard in European
10An increasing amount of literature (e.g., Tang and Yan, 2007; Das and Hanouna, 2009; Bedendo
et al., 2009; Bongaerts et al., 2011) has been analyzing the relevant role that liquidity is playing in
the CDS market. Nevertheless, the expected liquidity premium is small for investment grade rms
as those under study (Bongaerts et al., 2011).
11The three most commonly used credit events are failure to pay, bankruptcy and restructuring. Because
restructuring can occur in several ways, the restructuring clause standardizes what is qualied as
a credit event and its settlement conditions. Under a MM clause, restructuring agreements are
considered credit events, and deliverable bonds must have a maturity less than 60 months for
restructured obligations and 30 months for other obligations.
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contracts (see Berndt and Obreja, 2010). To ensure the quality of our sample, we have
xed high standards to the data following the criteria of Schneider et al. (2010). As
an additional criterion, we discard those rms without available bid-ask quotes from
CMA database. Then, our sample results in 85 European rms from 14/Jun/2006 to
31/Mar/2010 with 1-, 3- and 5-year spreads at biweekly frequency.
As shown in Table 2.1, our sample covers a wide number of high quality rated com-
panies across dierent sectors and countries. Firms are distributed along ten dierent
industries, including Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials,
Health Care, Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technological, Telecommunications and Utilities.
Financials and Consumer Services represent approximately the 35% of the total number
of rms. There are rms from 13 dierent countries. The United Kingdom, Germany
and France are the countries with the larger population of rms. As for credit quality,
45% of the sample is AA- or A-rated companies, and the rest are rated BBB.12 Thus,
our conclusions mainly concern investment-grade companies.
To provide a clearer picture of the data, Table 2.2 includes a summary of the main
statistics for 5-year CDS spreads (other maturities are available upon request). An aver-
age rm in the sample has a mean spread of 84 basis points (bps). The market perceives
utility rms as rms with better credit quality than nancial rms, even though the
latter rms have higher ratings in general. By contrast, an average rm from the Basic
Materials sector has the highest mean and volatility in CDS spreads. With respect to
the time series behavior of spreads, autocorrelation coecients for the spread changes
are not generally persistent. Consumer Goods and Industrials exhibit autocorrelations
higher than 0.14 on average, indicating that past changes in the spreads of these sectors
may be an important source of information when determining current spreads. In non
reported statistics we observe that rms domiciled in peripheral countries do not show
higher spread volatilities than those from the remaining European countries. In sum-
mary, our sample consists primarily of high credit quality companies that mainly belong
12Markit provides a composite rating measure named average rating. Because companies are rated by
dierent agencies, Markit transforms the alphabetic scale to numerical using a table of equivalences
when more than one rating is available. Then, scores are added and the sum divided by the number
of ratings. A noninteger result is rounded to the nearest integer.
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Table 2.1.: Distribution of rms across sectors, ratings and countries
BM CG CS Fin HC Ind OG Tech TC Util Total
Panel A.- Rating AA
France 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
Germany 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Italy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Spain 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
Panel B.- Rating A
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
France 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4
Germany 1 2 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 10
Italy 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Netherlands 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Portugal 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
United Kingdom 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 6
Total 2 4 2 8 1 3 0 0 3 9 32
Panel C.- Rating BBB
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
France 0 1 3 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 9
Germany 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3
Netherlands 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3
Sweden 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Switzerland 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3
United Kingdom 2 1 7 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 13
Total 4 4 13 1 0 10 2 1 9 2 46
Panel D.- All Ratings
Total 6 8 15 15 1 13 3 1 12 11 85
The distribution of rms across dierent sectors, ratings and countries. Ratings vary
from AA to BBB. Sectors correspond to Basic Materials (BM), Consumer Goods (CG),
Consumer Services (CS), Financial (Fin), Health Care (HC), Industrials (Ind), Oil &
Gas (OG), Technological (Tech), Telecommunications (TC) and Utilities (Util).
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to the Consumer Services, Financial and Industrial sectors.
Table 2.2.: Average summary statistics for 5-year CDS spreads
Mean Median Std Skew Kurt Min Max s Acorr(s)
(bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (1st lag)
Basic Materials 112.33 79.66 109.76 1.49 5.03 22.66 532.83 0.4275 0.0135
Consumer Goods 73.28 65.60 53.80 0.94 3.36 16.23 235.07 0.4183 0.1455
Consumer Services 99.43 84.07 68.99 1.18 4.40 26.27 316.64 0.4021 0.1184
Financials 72.25 74.67 56.69 0.45 2.56 7.07 227.59 0.8568 -0.0279
Industrials 96.52 79.43 81.49 1.37 5.14 18.87 381.39 0.5944 0.1547
Telecommunications 80.41 73.40 45.58 0.79 2.92 25.40 213.44 0.3853 -0.0420
Utilities 65.71 56.63 52.00 0.85 3.40 10.91 234.53 0.5714 0.0231
Others 69.99 55.80 57.88 1.51 5.05 15.97 268.85 0.3747 0.1010
Overall 83.86 72.93 64.02 1.00 3.84 17.83 290.40 0.5330 0.0573
Average of the main statistics for the 5-year CDS spreads: the mean, median, standard deviation,
skewness, kurtosis, minimum, maximum, mean of the dierenced spreads, and 1st lag autocorrelation
coecient for the dierenced spreads. Others group contains Health Care, Oil and Gas, and Technol-
ogy sectors. The sample consists of biweekly CDS spreads for 85 European rms included in the Markit
database, covering from 14/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010.
2.4. Risk-neutral default intensity estimates
This section estimates the distress risk premium. We introduce the econometric method-
ology for the risk-neutral intensity Q parameter estimates and results about the distress
risk premium.
2.4.1. Econometric framework and data
We employ the CDS sample of 85 European rms across dierent sectors previously de-
scribed, and our estimation procedure is taken from Pan and Singleton (2008). Roughly
speaking, we maximize the likelihood of the joint density of the Qt process and a vec-
tor of mispricing errors conditional to a given set of parameters. We briey review its
main steps. First, we assume that three-year CDS contracts are perfectly priced.13 We
13Our sample is not signicatively aected by dierential liquidity across the CDS curve. The liquidity
across maturities does not seem to be a major concern for our sample of investment grade companies,
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conjecture a time series for Qt conditional to a parameter set
 
Q; Q; 

by inversion
of expression (3.10). Second, mispricing errors of one (1y) and ve-year (5y) CDS con-
tracts are normally distributed with zero mean and standard deviations 1y and 5y,
respectively. Third, we also employ the 1-, 3-, 6-, 9- and 12- months of Euribor rate and
2-, 3-, 4- and 5-year maturities of the Euro-swap rate to construct the risk-free curve,
consistent with and similar to US studies, such as Berndt et al. (2005).14 Intermediate
periods have been bootstrapped from the previous curve. Euribor rates and interest
rate swap quotes are obtained from IHS Global Insight. Fourth, expectation (3.10) is
computed using a Crank-Nicholson discretization scheme for the corresponding partial
dierential equation. Finally, we maximize the density function,
fP(; Qt ) = f
P(1yj(1)) fP(5yj(5)) fP(lnQt jP; PP; )
 @CDSQ(Qt jQ; QQ; )=@Qt  1 ; (2.14)
with parameter vector  = (Q; QQ; ; P; PP; 1y; 5y), fP() as the density function
of the Normal distribution and t equal to 1/26. This estimation method has been also
employed in a similar context by Berndt et al. (2005) and Longsta et al. (2011).
2.4.2. Distress risk premia across sectors and ratings
Table 2.3 provides the summary statistics of ML estimates.15 On average, mean-reversion
rates are higher under actual than under risk-neutral measures (P > Q). Additionally,
because bid-ask spreads are typically higher for lower-rated rms (Bongaerts et al., 2011). Moreover,
Longsta et al. (2011) point out that the liquidity and bid-ask spreads of the 1-, 3-, and 5-year
contracts are reasonably similar although the 5-year contracts have typically higher trading volume.
In our case, an inspection of the bid-ask spreads reveals that the dierences across maturities are
small (1 to 3 bps on median).
14One referee raised the issue of using Euro-swap rates as proxies for the risk-free rate, in light of the
nancial crisis events during 2007-2009. Despite its limitations, literature does not seem to provide
a clear substitute superior to our measure. For example, Houweling and Vorst (2005) nd that
mean absolute pricing errors of a hazard-rate pricing model that uses the treasury curve as discount
rate performs very badly for investment grade issuers. Within a similar modeling choice as ours,
Longsta et al. (2011) notice that the estimates are not sensitive to the choice of the discounting
curve because this curve is applied symmetrically to the cash ows from both legs of the CDS
contract.
15For the sake of brevity, the estimates of individual intensity processes are included in the Appendix.
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long-run parameters are higher under Q than P measures (QQ > PP). These param-
eter values indicate that the arrival of credit events is more intense in the risk-neutral
(higher long-run means) than in the actual environment. Moreover, the dierences be-
tween risk-neutral and actual processes tend to increase as time goes by, as a result of
the higher value of P with respect to Q. The negative sign of coecients 0 and 1
conrms that the default environment worsens under risk-neutral more than the actual
measure. This evidence seems to account for and address a systematic risk premium
related to the arrival of unexpected credit events that is being priced in the market (Pan
and Singleton, 2008).
Table 2.3.: Summary statistics for maximum likelihood estimates
Percentile
Parameter Mean Std. Min 10 50 90 Max
Q -0.15 0.65 -1.50 -1.41 0.20 0.41 0.50
QQ -0.43 1.98 -3.20 -1.87 -1.64 3.14 4.08
 1.85 0.64 0.85 1.21 1.69 2.94 3.29
P 2.53 2.79 0.24 0.40 1.07 8.05 8.83
PP -14.68 16.33 -50.00 -47.94 -6.00 -2.59 -1.61
1y(bps) 14.42 8.43 6.05 8.50 10.94 21.92 50.00
5y(bps) 29.70 15.41 6.05 10.94 30.47 50.00 50.00
0 -6.08 6.40 -21.08 -17.05 -2.43 -0.25 0.35
1 -1.14 1.23 -4.00 -3.12 -0.49 0.01 0.24
Summary statistics for maximum likelihood estimates of risk-neutral Qt process. 
Q and P denote the
mean-reversion rates of Qt under the risk-neutral and actual measures, respectively. 
QQ and PP are
the long-run mean of Qt under the risk-neutral and actual measures, respectively.  is the instantaneous
volatility. Finally, 1y and 5y represent the volatility of the misspricing for 1- and 5-year maturities.
0 and 1 are the market price of risk parameters.
To obtain guidance in the performance of our estimations, Table 2.3 displays the
(averaged) volatilities of mispricing errors for 1-year (1y) and 5-year (5y) contracts,
respectively. As shown, mispricing uctuates approximately 14 bps and 30 bps for 1-
and 5-year contracts, respectively. Because CDS spreads reach hundreds of basis points,
these values address the reasonably good performance of our model. To further motivate
the goodness-of-t of the model, Table 3.9 compares the sample versus the tted spreads
by means of a panel data regression with robust standard errors to unobserved rm and
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time eects. Table 3.9 shows a reasonable performance of the model. The R-squared
coecients are above 90% with non signicant intercepts and beta coecients that are
not signicantly dierent from one.
Table 2.4.: Projections of sample values onto tted values for the logOU model
CDSsampleit = 0 + 1CDS
theo
it + it
Maturity ^0 ^1 R2 RMSE (bps) N
1 Year 8.07e-07 0.95 0.91 8 8415
(306e-07) (0.03)
5 Year 24.3e-07 1.04 0.96 4 8415
(221e-07) (0.04)
This table shows the projections of the sample CDS spread increments
onto their tted counterparts. The standard error of the coecients are
in parentheses and have been calculated as in Petersen (2009) to allow
for correlation across time and across rms.
A rst look at the results is provided in Figure 2.1. This gure depicts the evolution
of the distress risk premium of 5-year CDS contract through time for dierent quartiles
(upper graph), ratings (medium graph) and certain sectors (lower graph). Vertical bars
denote the subsample periods. From Figure 2.1, we can draw several conclusions: First,
it is clear that the risk premium increased substantially in August 2007 with respect to
early dates and suers from the events of the nancial crisis (such as the BNP Paribas
freezing and the Lehman Brothers' failure). This result seems to be robust across ratings
and sectors, highlighting the systematic nature of the chosen events. Second, the upper
graph in Figure 2.1 shows that risk premium behavior varies across time. On median, the
distress risk premium is approximately zero during the pre-crisis period and increases to
50 bps after August 2007. Lehman's collapse seems to trigger the risk premium, which
reaches approximately 100 bps during the ensuing weeks. Moreover, those risk premia
exhibit a high degree of co-movement. This evidence is important and economically
relevant because it might be addressing that common aggregate factors are being priced
systematically by investors. Finally, a higher risk premium is demanded to lower rating
rms (medium graph). The lower graph shows how risk premia dier across sectors.
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Surprisingly enough, investors seem to demand systematically lower risk premia from
Financial than Basic or Consumer Sectors, at least in Europe.
Table 2.5 quanties the size of the distress risk premium estimates for ratings (Panel
A), sectors (Panel B) and overall (Panel C) in absolute and relative terms, and these
results corroborate the previous ndings. With respect to ratings, the risk premium
increases as the rating deteriorates. Risk premia accounts for (in median) approximately
25% of AA rated companies, rising to almost 50% (in median) in the case of BBB rms.
With regard to the sectors, all sectors show a median risk premia of 40%, with the
exceptions being, again, the Financial (33%) and Utilities (37%) sectors.
Table 2.5.: Descriptive statistics for distress risk premium
Risk premium (bps) Risk premium Fraction
Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. N
Panel A.- Ratings
AA 10.94 12.43 30.57 -134.26 25.44 258.19 7
A 26.71 21.55 32.54 5.05 37.11 64.53 32
BBB 47.01 37.70 47.47 33.33 46.16 32.40 46
Panel B.- Sectors
Basic Materials 54.87 43.99 53.27 35.37 49.04 40.59 6
Consumer Goods 34.66 29.33 36.89 22.61 44.69 49.71 8
Consumer Services 46.52 35.28 51.69 21.94 42.10 46.53 15
Financials 21.38 20.71 32.04 -55.16 33.42 146.25 15
Health Care 17.57 13.59 27.35 14.57 40.90 59.05 1
Industrials 44.01 38.09 42.22 33.30 45.18 30.43 13
Oil&Gas 39.71 29.15 41.16 -12.08 40.44 88.30 3
Technological 36.22 24.64 41.93 42.52 47.15 15.42 1
Telecommunications 36.36 28.31 38.44 32.23 42.06 28.93 12
Utilities 26.13 19.26 33.19 1.76 36.64 67.97 11
Panel C.- Overall
Total 36.40 29.54 40.45 8.88 41.05 63.09 85
Summary of main statistics for absolute and relative distress risk premia
for 5-year default swaps by ratings (Panel A), sectors (Panel B) and
overall (Panel C). Absolute risk premium is dened as (CDSQ CDSP).
Relative risk premium is (CDSQ CDSP)=CDSQ. The sample comprises
data from 14/June/2006 until 31/March/2010.
2.4.3. Principal components analysis
The joint behavior of the risk premia suggests dierent sources of commonality in the
data. We explore this possibility by carrying out a principal component (PC) analysis in
the risk premium series. Figure 2.2 exhibits the scores of the rst three principal compo-
nents (PC1, PC2 and PC3, respectively) of (standardized) distress risk premium values.
The explained variance is in parenthesis. Figure 2.2 shows that an important source of
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Figure 2.1.: Distribution of distress risk premium along time
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The evolution through time of risk premia by quartiles (upper graph),
ratings (medium graph) and sectors (bottom graph). The graphs depict
the risk premium embedded in the ve-year CDS contract. Rating and
sector gures display the median statistic for each day. The sample
period covers from 01/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010. Vertical bars indicate
subsample periods.
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commonality lies behind risk premia. For example, one factor explains approximately
88% of the joint variability in the risk premium levels. Although not reported here, the
loading coecients (available upon request) show that rst PC coecients are always
positive and have values ranging from 0.09 to 0.11, approximately. In economic terms,
this may be interpreted as an equally weighted contribution of rms to the distress risk
premium, or as an aggregate level of distress risk compensation. Not surprisingly, the
correlation coecient between PC1 scores and the time series of the cross-sectional me-
dian of 5-year CDS spreads is 0:89, indicating clearly that PC1 is related to the general
level of credit risk in the economy.
Figure 2.2.: Principal components of distress risk premium
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The evolution through time of the rst three principal components (PC1, PC2 and PC3, respectively)
of risk premium over time. Variance explained (in percentage) are in parentheses. The sample period
covers from 01/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010. Vertical bars indicate subsample periods.
With regard to the second principal component, the explained variance increases a
4.28% with the inclusion of the PC2 variable. The loading coecients are positive
in approximately 54% of the total number of rms. This result indicates a possible
fragmentation of market information into rms that contribute positively and negatively
to PC2. The loading coecients (available upon request) indicate that all nancial sector
rms have negative coecients. In this sense, PC2 is possibly capturing the dierences
between the Financial sector and other sectors in the economy. We calculate the (cross-
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sectional) mean time series of the nancial CDS spreads to explore this point. Similarly,
we repeat this exercise for the remainder of the non-nancial companies. The correlation
coecient between PC2 scores and the dierence nancial and nonnancial rm spreads
is 0:53. Therefore, there is a strong relationship between PC2 and the spread between
nancial and non-nancial default swaps.
In summary, the distress risk premium substantially increased beginning in August
2007, peaking after the Lehman collapse. This premium varies over time, exhibiting
strong co-movement. The rst and second principal components are related to the
aggregate level of distress risk premium and the spread between the nancial and the
remaining sectors, respectively. On median, the distress risk premium accounts for
approximately 40% of the total CDS spread.
2.5. Macroeconomic sources of risk premium
This section explores the macroeconomic drivers of the default risk premium, analyzing
the nancial variables aecting the aggregate risk premium. Following this, we study
the dynamics of the aggregate risk premium.
2.5.1. Variable descriptions
The observed commonality in risk premia seems to suggest the existence of a pricing
factor in corporate CDS spreads. To analyze the possible sources of such co-movement,
we project the rst (PC1) and second (PC2) principal components of distress risk pre-
mium onto a set of nancial and macro variables by means of OLS regressions. Our
set of nancial variables accounts for variables related to liquidity, monetary policy, and
equity and debt markets, among others. Because we are particularly concerned about
the public-to-private risk transfer, we also control for sovereign risk in the economy.
The importance of the CDS market illiquidity on risk premia is studied. We employ the
bid-ask spread as a proxy for the illiquidity of the 5-year default swap contracts, following
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Tang and Yan (2007) and Bongaerts et al. (2011), among others. CDS bid-ask spreads
are taken from CMA. Diving into further detail, we study the inuence of aggregate
market illiquidity by taking the rst principal component of 5-year CDS bid-ask spreads
(ILLIQ) of the rms under study. The loading coecients of the ILLIQ variable are
approximately equal, which can be understood as an average of bid-ask spreads. This
rst factor accounts for 81.06% of the variance of the total bid-ask spreads in the sample.
Although a puzzling liquidity inuence has been considered, we expect a positive beta
for this variable (higher illiquidity leads to higher CDS spreads).
As for variables representing the stock market, we choose the Eurostoxx 50 Index
(ESTOXX50) and the CBOE implied volatility index (VIX) for the next 30 days. These
variables capture the stock market sentiment and risk appetite (Pan and Singleton, 2008;
Longsta et al., 2011). We control for currency risk by using the dollar-euro exchange
rate (USD/EUR) because the CDS contracts are denominated in Euros and most of the
dealers are either North American or Eurozone corporations. Additionally, the Euro
overnight index average (EONIA) is included as a general stance of monetary authority
decisions (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011). To account for counterparty risk underlying
the Euribor-swap curve, the spread between the 3-month Euribor and the overnight
interest swap (EURIBOR-OIS) is included. We also incorporate information about the
slope (SLOPE) of the term structure of interest rates as an indication of overall economic
health (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Ericsson et al., 2009). The slope is computed as
the dierence between the 10-year and the 2-year yield of German bonds. These two
maturities represent the most liquid segment of the German sovereign bond market.
Finally, sovereign crisis appears to raise corporate default rates (Moody's, 2009).
However, Dieckmann and Plank (2012) show evidence that a sovereign CDS market
incorporates possible nancial industry bailouts, maybe through a private-to-public risk
transfer. They also note the possibility of negative feedback loops. No matter the causal
relationship among public and private sectors, it seems reasonable that investors re-
quire higher spreads for corporate debt when sovereigns begin showing diculties. In
this context, we study whether the distress risk premium required by corporate market
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participants is aected by the sovereign default risk. The sovereign default risk is prox-
ied through the rst (SOVPC1) and second (SOVPC2) principal components of 5-year
sovereign CDS spreads. We employ senior external contracts on 15 Western European
countries whose rms are included in the Markit database. Our available sample in-
cludes contracts denominated in US dollars under the Old Restructuring clause. Table
2.6 provides fundamental statistics and loadings for the rst two principal components.
Notice that SOVPC1 is a weighted average of CDS spreads, accounting for 93.4% of the
total variation. This rst component is usually associated with the level of sovereign
risk in the economy (Groba et al., 2013). The second component SOVPC2 accounts for
4.5% of the variation, and it assigns the lowest negative loadings to Greece, Portugal,
and Spain. This second component could be interpreted as measuring distance between
nancially distressed and non-distressed countries.
Table 2.6.: Country statistics
Government statistics 5-year sovereign CDS
Debt/GDP Decit/GDP SOVPC1 SOVPC2
Country (%) (%) Loading Loading
Austria 69.6 -4.1 0.26 0.18
Belgium 96.2 -5.9 0.26 0.05
Denmark 41.8 -2.7 0.25 0.27
Finland 43,8 -2.6 0.26 0.16
France 78.3 -7.5 0.26 -0.07
Germany 73.5 -3.0 0.26 0.06
Greece 127.1 -15.4 0.23 -0.56
Ireland 65.6 -14.3 0.26 0.06
Italy 116.1 -5.4 0.26 -0.07
Netherlands 60.8 -5.5 0.26 0.22
Norway 43.1 10.5 0.26 0.25
Portugal 83.0 -10.1 0.24 -0.50
Spain 53.3 -11.1 0.26 -0.33
Sweden 42.8 -0.7 0.26 0.22
United Kingdom 69.6 -11.4 0.27 -0.04
All Western European countries with rms included in the Markit's
database with available sovereign CDS spreads for all the sample period.
The GDP, Gross Debt and Decit are those reported by Eurostat for the
year 2009. The sovereign CDS contracts are denominated in USD dol-
lars under the Old Restructuring clause. The rst component SOVPC1
explains 93.43% of the variability, and the second component SOVPC2
explains 4.49%. The sample period for the sovereign CDS spread covers
from 14/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010.
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2.5.2. OLS estimates
We explore the risk factor changes that might be related to the variation of the main
principal components of distress risk premia. To this end, we run the following ordinary
least squares (OLS) autocorrelation-robust standard error regressions,
DRPpt = p0 + ILLIQILLIQt + ESTOXX50ESTOXX50t + V IXV IXt
+ UDS=EURUDS=EURt + EONIAEONIAt
+ EURIBOR OISEURIBOR OISt + SLOPESLOPEt
+ SOV PC1SOV PC1t + SOV PC2SOV PC2t + "pt ; (2.15)
where DRPpt is the change of the principal component p of distress risk premium vari-
ables, with the other variables previously having been dened. Additionally, we examine
three dierent stages of the crisis; in particular, we account for those subperiods when
BNP freezes three funds (09/Aug/2007), and Lehman Brothers fails (15/Sep/2008).
These two events represent potential dates for structural changes in the corporate credit
spreads.
Table 2.7 displays the OLS estimates for rst and second principal components of
distress risk premium. Models I and V include the entire period, while Models II to IV
and VI to VIII refer to the dierent subsamples under study. With regard to the rst
component, there is a positive and signicant relationship to changes in the aggregate
illiquidity, as measured by 5-year bid-ask spreads. When analyzing by subsamples, the
illiquidity variable is positive and statistically signicant during crisis periods (Models III
and IV). Coecients are estimated with precision, and the adjusted-R2 coecients are
higher than 70% when illiquidity is signicant (Models I, III and IV), indicating the high
explanatory power of this variable on the regressions. These results are economically
relevant because they document a positive contribution of aggregate illiquidity to risk
premium, particularly during times of distress. Thus, default swap investors appear to
price the aggregate illiquidity into the CDS market.
Sovereign risk also displays a positive beta on distress risk premia and it has a sta-
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Table 2.7.: Regression for principal components of distress risk premia
Dependent variable DRP1t DRP2t
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
All period <09/Aug/2007  09/Aug/2007 15/Sep/2008 All period <09/Aug/2007  09/Aug/2007 15/Sep/2008
<15/Sep/2008 <15/Sep/2008
Cons. 0.0623 0.0884 0.0113 0.0754 0.0289 0.0240 0.0000 0.0150
ILLIQt 0.4766*** 0.0453 0.3350** 0.5027*** 0.1012** 0.0690** 0.0132 0.1474***
ESTOXX50t 0.0011 0.0012** 0.0003 0.0009 0.0022*** 0.0003** 0.0008 0.0046***
VIXt 0.0348 0.0204 0.0835 0.0299 0.0460 0.0122 0.0253 0.0734
USD/EURt 4.9876 0.8497 0.0572 11.3396 1.6109 1.5175* 1.0266 5.3595
EONIAt 0.4136 0.0666 0.2812 0.4486 0.6742 0.0662 0.4277* 1.1281
EURIBOR OISt 1.0704 7.0873** 0.6105 0.6847 1.1974 1.1434 0.3328 2.8799
SLOPEt 1.2827 0.1034 0.1870 2.4537 0.3983 0.6703** 0.8050 0.9615
SOVPC1t 0.7308*** 5.4239* 1.7270 0.6193** 0.0353 3.0250*** 0.4766 0.0185
SOVPC2t 0.0643 13.7572** 11.0095*** 0.2128 0.2645 0.1628 2.2198** 0.1515
Obs. 99 30 28 41 99 30 28 41
R2 Adj 0.7003 0.5360 0.7488 0.7080 0.1625 0.6871 0.3276 0.2329
OLS regressions of rstDRP1t and secondDRP2t principal components of distress risk premium against
dierent macro-nancial variables. The table reports the estimated OLS coecients and their signi-
cance, according to White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. The date 09/Aug/2007 refers
to the day that BNP Paribas froze three investment funds, and 15/Sep/2008 refers to the date that
Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy. The sample period covers from 14/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010.
*, **, and *** denote the signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
tistically signicant eect, although dierent patterns are observed in each subsample.
Aggregate sovereign risk contributes to the distress risk premium after the Lehman col-
lapse (Model IV), and peripheral risk seems to inuence the early periods of the sample
(Models II-III). Regarding the latter, the negative sign observed at rst becomes positive
and non-signicant in the last part of the sample, perhaps indicating a change in the
perception of sovereign risk. At the beginning, sovereign risk shows a partial, diversi-
able risk (Model II-III), while it indicates a market-wide problem at the end (Model
IV). This is an important result, suggesting that the nancial reliability of sovereign
economies raises concerns about the creditworthiness of their domiciled rms, at least
from the market perspective. This eect is stressed after the Lehman default (Model
IV). Because PC1 of sovereign CDS spreads captures the level of sovereign risk, this
could be evidence that investors are pricing this risk in the economy.
With regard to the second principal component, Table 2.7 outlines a signicant and
positive contribution of the stock market to PC2. Because PC2 is interpreted as the
dierences in risk compensation between nancial and nonnancial rms, positive re-
turns in the stock market are associated with greater dierences between these premia.
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This result is stressed after the Lehman failure (Model VIII), when investors are more
concerned about problems in the nancial sector. This empirical nding, together with
positive and signicant beta coecients for illiquidity in this period, suggests ight-to-
liquidity and ight-to-quality eects. Finally, the explanatory power of the regressions
before the crisis (Model VI) indicates that PC2 was inuenced by other markets, such
as the exchange or sovereign market.
Notably, VIX is not statistically signicant. Our proxy for counterparty risk, the
spread EURIBOR-OIS, is signicant during the rst subsample (Model II). According
to our results, the increments in the EURIBOR-OIS spread, exchange rates or the slope
of the term structure do not have an eect on the aggregate corporate distress risk
premium.
In conclusion, investors seem to price the deterioration of market-wide liquidity and ag-
gregate sovereign risk conditions, particularly during periods of nancial stress. Finally,
the distance between nancial and non-nancial premia widens during the post-Lehman
bankruptcy scenario.
2.5.3. Public-to-private risk transference
We turn next to the existence of a public-to-private risk transference in the default risk
premium. Dieckmann and Plank (2012) show evidence that the sovereign CDS market
incorporates possible nancial industry bailouts through a private-to-public risk transfer.
Alter and Schüler (2012) also analyze the dynamic behavior between the sovereign and
nancial industries in European default swaps, nding that bank spreads aect the
sovereign ones, prior to state interventions. However, the direction of this relationship
reverses after the bailout programs. To assess whether our ndings are aected by the
nancial rms contained in the sample, we perform a panel data analysis using a dummy
variable to control for nancial rms.16 Our results remain qualitatively similar with
liquidity and sovereign risks as main factors behind the risk premia.
16The panel data regressions are available in the Appendix
33
Chapter 2. What drives corporate default risk premia? Evidence from the CDS market
Our previous analysis in Section 2.5.2 above showed that there is a strong relationship
between the aggregate distress risk premium and the sovereign and illiquidity variables.
Figure 2.3 plots the evolution over time of rst principal components of the distress
premium, sovereign spreads and illiquidity, respectively. At rst glance, a strong degree
of co-movement among those variables is clear. For example, the correlation coecient
between the distress risk premia and sovereign spreads is 0:54, rising to 0:71 when
accounting for the pairwise correlation between distress risk premia and illiquidity.
Figure 2.3.: Principal components for distress risk premium, bid-ask spreads and
sovereign risk
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The rst principal components for distress risk premium, bid-ask spreads and sovereign risk over time.
The sample period covers from 01/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010. Vertical bars indicate subsample periods.
In exploring the possibility of a dynamic relationship between the distress risk premia
and the sovereign and illiquidity variables, we propose a vector autoregressive (VAR)
analysis to measure the eect of those variables on the corporate distress risk premium.
Our conjecture is that distress risk premia  not only the default rates  increase when
sovereign market conditions erode. We argue that investors anticipate the uncertainty
about future economic situations when sovereign CDS spreads rise because sovereign
spreads are generally viewed as a lower bound for corporate debt borrowing costs.
Table 2.8 presents the results of Granger causality Wald tests for the rst equation of
the VAR model. Under the likelihood ratio test, our VAR model includes up to six lags
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of the dierenced variables under study. The Wald test allows us to analyze whether the
lags of the sovereign or illiquidity variables are signicant when preceding the distress risk
premium. The results show that the rst principal component of distress risk premium
is driven by the aggregate level of sovereign risk in the European debt market and the
aggregate illiquidity in the corporate CDS market. This nding supports the idea that
sovereign conditions aect the prices of corporate credit risk, in addition to the corporate
default rates.
Table 2.8.: Granger causality Wald tests for VAR(p=6)
Equation R2 Excluded 2 df Prob > 2
DRP1t ILLIQ 19.497 6 0.003
DRP1t 0.3719 SOVPC1 16.971 6 0.009
DRP1t ALL 36.896 12 0.000
Results for a VAR model with 6 lags according to the likelihood-ratio test. The sample is composed of
93 biweekly observations. The sample period covers from 14/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010.
2.6. Jump-at-default risk premium
We complete our analysis by looking at compensation for the default itself. This section
addresses the results about the jump-at-default risk premium in European rms.
2.6.1. Denition
Investors compensate for changes in the credit environment, in addition to compensat-
ing against the event of default (Jarrow et al., 2005). Economically, the jump-at-default
premium captures the risk associated with a jump in price of the bond if the reference
entity does restructure (Pan and Singleton, 2006). The conditional diversiable assump-
tions in Section 2.2.3 are relaxed here, for example, by considering that there are a nite
number of bonds in the economy. Thus, the jump-at-default price of the risk term in
expression (2.8) might not be negligible ( t 6= 0).
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The price of jump-at-default risk is assumed as  t = 1  t, with t dened as,
Qt = t
P
t ; (2.16)
where Qt and 
P
t are the risk-neutral and actual default intensities, respectively, at time
t. Parameter t is usually referred to as the jump-at-default premium, and it has been
previously studied in Driessen (2005) and Berndt et al. (2005). When t equals one, risk-
neutral and actual default intensities are similar and there is no compensation for the
event of default. Although the ratio t has usually been assumed constant for simplicity
(cf. Driessen (2005); Jarrow et al., 2005), our focus here is to explain its temporal
variation.
It follows from equation (2.16) that the concurrence of Qt and 
P
t intensities is neces-
sary for computing the jump-at-default risk premium. We closely follow Driessen (2005)
and Berndt et al. (2005) in calculating the ratio Qt =
P
t .
17 On the one hand, Q estimates
are taken from CDS data, and they were previously obtained in Section 2.4. On the other
hand, we use the Expected Default Frequencies (EDFs) of Moody's KMV as a proxy for
actual default probabilities, which is based on the Merton (1974) model for pricing cor-
porate debt. Moody's uses its extensive data set on historic default frequencies to build
an empirical distribution that maps the distance-to-default of Merton (1974) into a real
default probability called the EDF. Thus, the EDFs are forward-looking default proba-
bilities that are available to public and private companies. For a detailed description of
the KMV estimates of EDF, see Bharath and Shumway (2008).
The literature generally employs the EDFs as proxies for actual default probabilities.
In general, the EDFs have a higher predictive power than credit ratings.18 In this sense,
17Driessen (2005) estimates the relationship between Pt and 
Q
t using U.S. corporate bond price data,
assuming that conditional default probabilities are equal to average historical default frequencies
by credit rating. Berndt et al. (2005) follow a two-step procedure, rst estimating the Pt model
parameters with monthly Moody's KMV EDF measures of default probability, and then estimating
the Qt parameters with weekly U.S. CDS rates and EDFs.
18Rating agencies are harshly criticized for their failure to predict the crises at rms such as Penn Central
Transportation Company in 1970, Orange County in 1994, Enron in 2001, WorldCom in 2002 or
Lehman Brothers in 2008. For example, the European Parliament (2009) commented that credit
rating agencies failed to reect early enough in their credit ratings the worsening market conditions,
on the one hand, and to adjust their credit ratings in time following the deepening market crisis, on
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EDFs depend on stock prices and are time-variant. Empirical studies corroborate the
accuracy of EDFs for predicting default. For instance, Kealhofer (2003) shows that EDFs
correctly identify 72% of defaults, while credit ratings identify only 61%. Bharath and
Shumway (2008) conclude that 65% of defaulting rms had probabilities in the higher
decile during the quarter they default; moreover, hazard models that include Merton's
default probabilities have better out-of-sample performance. And Korablev and Dwyer
(2007) validate the default predictive power of EDFs by computing accuracy ratios.
Additionally, using EDFs to determine the default premium has been also referred to
in Berndt et al. (2005) for US corporate CDS spreads, in Vassalou and Xing (2004) for
stock prices and in Pan and Singleton (2006) for the CDS spreads of Japanese banks.
The actual intensity process Pt comes from the denition of the EDF,
EDF (T ) = 1  EPt
h
e 
R T
t 
P
sdsjFt
i
; (2.17)
and we assume an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process for the logarithms of the default intensity,
d lnPt = 
P(P   lnPt )dt+ dBP; (2.18)
where parameters P, P and  capture the long-run mean, mean-reversion rate and
volatility of the process, respectively.
2.6.2. Estimation procedure and results
We combine our CDS sample with the data provided by Moody's KMV. Our new dataset
is composed of biweekly 1-, 3- and 5-year EDF and CDS for 75 rms from 01/Jun/2006
to 31/Mar/2010. To estimate the Pt parameters, we maximize the likelihood of the joint
density of process (2.18) and the mispricing errors conditional to a set of parameters.19
the other. A number of papers are focused on providing theories that explain why ratings change
relatively seldom, such as the rating stability hypothesis related to the through-the-cycle approach
(e.g., Howe, 1995) and the policy of rating bounce avoidance (e.g., Cantor, 2001)
19This procedure is similar to that described in Subsection 2.4.1. We detail certain steps: First, we
assume that the one-year EDFs are observed without error. As the shortest maturity available, we
assume that the 1-year EDF is the best proxy available for instantaneous actual default probability,
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For the sake of brevity, a summary of the main statistics of the EDF measure and the
ML estimated parameters are provided in the Appendix.
Table 2.9 details the sample statistics for the parameter of the jump-to-default pre-
mium t in equation (2.16) across ratings (Panel A), sectors (Panel B), and overall (Panel
C). The (averaged) median risk premium is 3.82. This value is within the range of those
estimates previously reported in the literature for the US in earlier sample periods. For
example, Driessen (2005) reports risk premium values of 1.83, 2.61 and 2.37 for a weekly
sample of AA, A and BBB US corporate bonds from 1991 to 2000. Berndt et al. (2005)
obtain a distribution of risk premium estimates with the 1st and 3rd quartiles equal to
1.12 and 3.55, respectively, for a CDS and EDF sample from 2000 to 2004. Finally, Pan
and Singleton (2006) observe risk premia between 1.00 and 3.00  and even less than
one  for a short sample of Japanese banks. No other estimates of jump-at-default risk
premia for European rms, or for US rms during more recent periods, are available to
us.
To provide additional insights about the size of the jump-at-default premium, Table
2.9 translates those t estimates to basis points. To illustrate this point, we employ
the denition of jump-at-default premium in expression (2.8). For example, a jump-at-
default risk premium of 3.00 is equivalent to  60%  0:0020  (1   3:00) = 24:00 bps,
assuming a recovery of 40% and an annual default probability of 20 bps (a reasonable
value for the historical default rate of BBB bonds). As shown in Table 2.9, our (averaged)
median jump-at-default estimate is 13:26 bps. These results indicate that an important
economic contribution for excess returns comes via compensation in case of a default
event. For example, the mean risk premium almost doubles when passing from the A
to the BBB rating  similar results apply for volatilities. Focusing on sectors with more
than 10 rms in the sample, Table 2.9 shows that Consumer Services (Industrials) exhibit
the higher (lower) median jump-at-default premia. Conversely, Industrials (Utilities)
consistent with Berndt et al. (2005). A possible path for Pt is obtained by the inversion of expression
(2.17). Second, mispricing errors of three- (3y) and ve-year (5y) EDFs are normally distributed
errors with zero mean and standard deviations (3) and (5), respectively. Finally, we employ
the nite-dierence method of Crank-Nicholson to compute the expectation (2.17) for the intensity
process (2.18).
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Table 2.9.: Descriptive statistics for jump-at-default premium
Risk premium (Q=P) Risk premium (bps)
Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. N
Panel A.- Ratings
AA 6.57 5.74 3.90 19.72 18.19 15.48 7
A 5.64 3.66 5.41 21.18 10.62 47.05 29
BBB 6.05 3.61 6.31 38.40 14.33 77.21 39
Panel B.- Sectors
Basic Materials 6.72 4.53 6.63 58.28 13.88 104.81 6
Consumer Goods 7.44 3.91 9.10 43.06 14.77 68.46 3
Consumer Services 6.48 4.75 5.49 43.47 19.49 60.00 13
Financial 5.70 3.70 5.48 20.53 14.33 50.62 15
Health Care 5.84 5.32 4.16 13.06 12.71 10.98 1
Industrials 4.50 2.48 4.91 17.77 5.35 89.91 12
Oil and Gas 6.81 5.13 5.73 20.19 8.45 63.32 3
Technological 2.84 1.44 2.73 26.68 2.34 57.02 1
Telecommunications 7.61 4.60 7.32 31.40 16.77 37.50 11
Utilities 4.63 2.81 4.62 23.92 10.94 36.11 10
Panel C.- Overall
Total 5.94 3.82 5.74 30.00 13.26 59.79 75
Summary statistics for jump-at-default risk premia by ratings (Panel A), sectors (Panel B) and overall
(Panel C). Jump-at-default risk premium is dened as the ratio Q=P. The sample comprises data
from the period from 14/June/2006 until 31/March/2010.
displays the higher (lower) volatilities. Finally, the nancial sector is on the average and
median of the remaining sectors.
Figure 2.4 depicts the evolution of the jump-at-default risk premium for dierent
quartiles (upper graph), ratings (medium graph) and certain sectors (lower graph). For
ease of explanation, we kept the conversion to basis points of our results. Vertical bars
denote subsample periods. Figure 2.4 allows us to draw several conclusions. First, it is
clear that the jump-at-default premium has increased substantially in August 2007 with
respect to early dates, and it suered from the events during the nancial crisis (such
as the BNP Paribas freezing and the Lehman Brothers' failure). Second, this premium
shows time-varying behavior, as Berndt et al. (2005) reported. Third, investors seem
to demand, on median, higher levels of jump-at-default premia (medium graph) from
lower rated companies, particularly during periods of stress. Finally, the Financial sector
exhibits lower uctuations in the jump-at-default premium compared to other sectors,
such as Basic Materials or Consumer Goods, even though the Financial sector was
viewed suspiciously during the international crisis beginning in August 2007. This last
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result could be a result of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, because national bank rescue
packages and other ECB measures might translate into lower compensation in the event
of default.
We perform a factor analysis to explore sources of commonality in the data that docu-
ments a rst (second) factor that accounts for 58.94% (18.60%) of the common variance.
These values are lower than those reported for the distress risk premium, perhaps indicat-
ing more idiosyncratic behavior for jump-at-default than distress premium. Interested
in their relationship with nancial variables, Table 2.10 displays the OLS regressions
between the rst (JAD1t) and second (JAD2t) jump-at-default risk premium principal
components and the nancial variables in Section 2.5.1. Again, aggregate illiquidity is
revealed as an important factor when considering jump-at-default premia, particularly
after the Lehman default. The stock market variable ESTOXX50 is also signicant and
estimated with high precision.
Table 2.10.: Regression for principal components of jump-at-default risk premia
Dependent variable JAD1t JAD2t
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
All period <09/Aug/2007  09/Aug/2007 15/Sep/2008 All period <09/Aug/2007  09/Aug/2007 15/Sep/2008
<15/Sep/2008 <15/Sep/2008
Cons. 0.0347 0.1276 0.0788 0.0106 0.0253 0.0198 0.1007 0.0486
ILLIQt 0.5318*** 0.1128 0.5754 0.4716*** 0.1275*** 0.0741 0.0130 0.2029***
ESTOXX50t 0.0037** 0.0000 0.0074 0.0069** 0.0012 0.0009 0.0028* 0.0039***
VIXt 0.0783 0.0180 0.1955 0.1038 0.0260 0.0225 0.1135** 0.0650
USD/EURt 2.3459 1.3521 0.5064 10.0183 2.6549 2.2623 0.1628 1.1201
EONIAt 0.2922 0.5136 1.0795 0.0072 0.5980 0.4095 0.8406 0.9375
EURIBOR OISt 4.4043* 5.8592 2.2248 2.9215 0.8479 2.7214 0.3660 1.3491
SLOPEt 0.4509 0.9376 3.5187 2.7928* 0.5385 1.3190* 0.9848 0.4429
SOVPC1t 0.2394 10.6792** 2.4876 0.1546 0.1637 7.1030** 1.0574 0.2554*
SOVPC2t 0.3265 14.4402 24.6994*** 0.0776 0.3620 3.4860 4.5438** 0.1835
Obs. 99 30 28 41 99 30 28 41
R2 Adj 0.3485 0.4539 0.5184 0.5462 0.2385 0.4958 0.2309 0.4952
OLS regressions of rst JAD1t and second JAD2t principal components of jump-at-default risk premia
against dierent macro-nancial variables. The table reports the estimated OLS coecients and their
signicance according to White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. The date 09/Aug/2007
refers to the day that BNP Paribas froze three investment funds, and 15/Sep/2008 refers to the date that
Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy. The sample period covers from 14/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010.
*, **, and *** denote the signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
In summary, we report a jump-at-default risk premium of 3.82 for European rms,
which is somewhat higher than those previously reported in the literature for the US
market and for periods before August 2007. In terms of basis points, the jump-at-default
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Figure 2.4.: Distribution of jump-at-default risk premium along time
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The evolution of jump-at-default risk premia over time by quartiles (upper graph), ratings (medium
graph) and sectors (bottom graph), respectively. Rating and sector gures display the median statistic
for each day. The sample period covers from 01/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010. Vertical bars indicate the
subsample periods.
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risk premium accounts for approximately 14 bps. The jump-at-default premium also
shows two main sources of commonality, showing a statistically signicant relationship
between aggregate illiquidity and stock market variables.
2.7. Conclusions
The nancial crisis that started in August 2007 resulted in a substantial increase in the
cost of borrowing for rms. Higher spreads during recessions reect the rising number
of defaults (quantity of risk) and the higher degree of risk aversion (the risk premium)
during dicult times. Lenders become more uncertain about their own skills in assessing
the creditworthiness of their borrowers and other lenders. In other words, investors
become more aware of the risk and the price of risk increases, giving rise to a systematic
risk even if the creditworthiness of the average borrower does not deteriorate (Flannery,
1996).
This chapter has focused on the corporate default risk compensation under general
default circumstances. We employ the information contained in European corporate
default swaps to extract accurate estimates of expected excess returns during years
2006-2010, a period that includes the credit crisis. The methodology employed here
allowed us to disentangle the entire compensation for default risk into two parts, the
compensation for systematic risk factors, or the distress risk premium, and the premium
for bearing the risk of bond price decline at the event of default, or the jump-at-default
premium.
Our ndings suggest that approximately 40% of total CDS spread is compensation for
distress risk premium. We also report a dominant source of commonality on distress risk
premium series, in which a rst (second) factor accounts for the 87.8% (4.3%) of the total
variability. Moreover, empirical evidence reveals a strong relationship between the rst
principal component of distress risk premia and aggregate illiquidity, particularly during
nancially stressed periods. Illiquidity betas are positive and statistically signicant,
and the explanatory power of regressions after August 2007 exceed 70%. Additionally,
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we report a public-to-private risk transfer between distress risk premium and sovereign
spreads. These results indicate that illiquidity and sovereign risk could be acting as
pricing factors for European corporate spreads during nancially stressed periods.
Using an extensive database of Moody's EDF default probabilities, we also examined
compensation for jump-at-default risk. We document a jump-at-default risk premium of
3.82 for European rms, somewhat higher than those previously reported in the literature
for the US market and for periods before August 2007. Jump-at-default premia also
exhibit a high commonality and temporal variation, and it co-varies signicantly with
aggregate illiquidity and the stock market.
In conclusion, this chapter has studied empirically the corporate default risk premium
for a sample of European rms, disentangling those compensations based on risk factors
and credit event risks, while characterizing their size and behavior. Our results seem to
conrm the existence of one common factor that drives the 88% (59%) movement of the
distress (jump-at-default) risk premia for the sample we studied. This may indicate that
an important fraction of systematic risk is being priced into the market via those premia.
The empirical evidence suggests that aggregate illiquidity and sovereign risk could be
acting as pricing factors in corporate credit spreads. We also document a leading role of
sovereign risk for distress risk premia. These results might have important implications
for risk management and policy measures oriented toward a framework of stability.
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The impact of distressed economies on the
EU sovereign market
3.1. Introduction
Credit default swaps (CDS, hereafter) are nancial instruments that allow debt holders
to hedge against default risk. After appearing in the US in the late 1990s, the CDS
market exploded over the subsequent decade to over 45 trillion US dollars in mid-2007,
as reported by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA, 2007). Al-
though the notional outstanding CDS decreased during the nancial crisis, it reached
approximately 26 trillion at mid-year 2010 (ISDA, 2010). Default swaps focused primar-
ily on municipal bonds and corporate debt during the 1990s, but after 2000, the CDS
market expanded internationally into sovereign bonds and structured nance products,
such as asset-backed securities. The increasing trading volume of the CDS market could
be attributed to several aspects such as the lack of regulation (CDS are traded on over-
the-counter markets) or the potential for speculative investors and hedge fund managers
to manage these insurance contracts without going long on the underlying asset. Ac-
cording to Chen et al. (2011), the majority of CDS trades were interdealer transactions;
however, these authors provide evidence of broad participation in the CDS market as
aggregate trading activity did not appear to be concentrated among a small number of
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dealers.
Compared to the extensive literature on the connections between the CDS market and
the bond and/or stock markets (see, for example, Blanco et al., 2005; Forte and Peña,
2009; Norden and Weber, 2009; or Delatte et al., 2012; among others), relatively little is
known about the nature of default risk transmission in sovereign credit markets. Recent
articles show the increasing interest in the sovereign default risk channels. Dötz and
Fisher (2011) document how the market perceptions of European sovereign risk changed
after the rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008: default events within the Eurozone are
currently perceived as having non-negligible probabilities, reecting how some countries
are seen as a domestic safe haven at the expense of others. Similarly, Favero and Missale
(2012) analyze the intertemporal relationships between the sovereign yield spreads of the
main European economies, nding empirical evidence for substantial contagion eects.
Under this type of a scenario, where some government bonds have lost their previous
role as a domestic safe asset, it becomes crucial to understand the linkages between
changes and the volatility of sovereign credit spreads, in particular, among the Eurozone
countries.
This chapter explores the nature of default risk transmission both inside and outside
of the Eurozone using the information content in the sovereign CDS spreads. As noted
by Longsta et al. (2011), the use of CDS contracts leads to more accurate estimates
of the credit spreads and returns than those based on sovereign bond data.1 Instead of
focusing on the potential destabilizing eects of default swaps on the security markets,
we stress the crossing eects of the time-varying uctuations of CDS spreads. Our major
concern is to provide additional insights into the nature of default risk transmission in
the Eurozone. In particular, we try to assess whether the interactions between the
1The CDS spreads generally approximate the spreads of the referenced bonds. However, time-varying
dierences or basis risk between the CDS and the sovereign bond spreads could appear for several
reasons. First, the empirical literature on the role of the CDS markets in the discovery process is
consistent with the hypothesis that new market-wide information disseminates faster in the CDS
than in the bond markets (Forte and Peña (2009), Delis and Mylonidis (2011)). Second, cash-ow
dierences between default swap contracts and bonds can also cause dierences in spreads (Longsta
et al., 2005). Finally, the sovereign CDS market is more liquid than the corresponding sovereign
bond market. CDS contracts provide a simple way to short credit risk, a costly strategy when
implemented in the secondary cash market (Blanco et al., 2005).
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peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the core countries is aected
by the sharing of the euro as the common currency. Additionally, we estimate which
portion of the sovereign CDS increment is attributable either to changes in default
probabilities or to investor compensation by means of risk premia. Finally, we also
address the time-evolution of the impact of peripheral countries on the components of
the CDS spreads.
Our methodological approach consists of three parts. First, we estimate two bivari-
ate BEKK-GARCH models to analyze the spillover eects between peripheral, core and
non-EMU countries. Second, we use the decomposition technique described by Pan and
Singleton (2008) to break the CDS spread down into two drivers: (i) the risk premium
and (ii) its default component. The risk premium represents the compensation to in-
vestors due to changes in the default environment, commonly referred as the distress
risk premium2 (see Pan and Singleton, 2008; Longsta et al., 2011). Lastly, we conduct
a regression analysis of the components of sovereigns CDS spreads for non-distressed
economies against a risk factor that is representative of the behavior of the peripheral
countries.
The contribution of the chapter is threefold. First, we document a market segmen-
tation between the central and the peripheral countries. A factorial analysis reveals
two orthogonal components that distinguish the information content of the peripheral
and the non-peripheral CDS spreads. These results extend to the CDS levels and their
conditional volatilities, and, in accordance with Laubach (2009), they provide additional
evidence supporting fragmentation in the credit markets. A preliminary analysis based
on the use of the GARCH methodology for the CDS factors that drive distressed and
non-distressed economies suggests a unidirectional volatility transmission pattern from
the distressed to the non-distressed economies inside the European Economic and Mon-
etary Union (EMU). A similar analysis for distressed and non-EMU economies does not
reveal signicant volatility spillover eects from inside to outside the euro, suggesting
2The distress risk premium diers from the default event premium, i.e., the compensation required for
the bond price changes at the event of default. The default event premium has been the subject of
analysis in previous studies such as Driessen (2005) or Berndt et al. (2005). A theoretical discussion
about the default event premium can be found in Jarrow et al. (2005) or Yu (2002).
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that retaining the local currency acts as a rewall.
Second, we estimate the compensation to investors for bearing the risk of default in
non-distressed economies. According to Pan and Singleton (2008), our estimates are
consistent with a systematic risk related to the future default uncertainty. The results
also report an (averaged) median risk premium of 56% over the total CDS spreads.
Although similar levels of risk premium are found on the median, this component is
less volatile outside the EMU. Finally, our regression analysis supports the fact that
the default contagion channels are represented not only by the risk premium but also
by the default probabilities. Empirical evidence also indicates that the former channel
is relatively more important than the latter. Our empirical ndings are robust after
controlling for both local and global macroeconomic and nancial variables.
To summarize, this chapter analyzes the default risk channels between peripheral
and central EU members using the information content of sovereign CDS spreads. The
remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the data and its main
features. Section 3.3 directly analyzes the volatility transmission in the CDS spreads.
Section 3.4 explores the determinants of sovereign CDS spreads and Section 3.5 presents
the decomposition of CDS spreads into default and risk premium constituents. Finally,
Section 3.6 provides some conclusions.
3.2. Data analysis
This section rst presents our dataset. We next analyze the heteroskedastic behavior of
default swaps. Finally, we explore the existence of commonalities in our data.
3.2.1. The dataset
Our sample comprises weekly CDS spreads with 1-, 3- and 5-year maturities of Senior
Unsecured Sovereign debt denominated in USD under the Old Restructuring clause.3
3ISDA identies six credit events: bankruptcy, failure to pay, debt restructuring, obligation default,
obligation acceleration, and repudiation/moratorium. The Old Restructuring clause qualies any
restructuring event as a credit event, and any bond of maturity up to 30 years is deliverable.
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Data are collected from CMA, which has been provided by Datastream.4 Our dataset
spans from January 2008 to July 2012, a period characterized by a signicant increase
in CDS levels, high volatility and uncertainty in the Eurosystem. We select the member
countries of the EU since 1995 with available CDS spreads. More precisely, we collect the
most important economies in terms of GDP that belong to the EMU  Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain
 as well as some control countries  Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK)
 outside of the EMU area.
3.2.2. Univariate volatility analysis
A common feature in nancial series is heteroskedasticity. This subsection analyzes
the behavior of the univariate conditional variances for 5-year CDS spread increments,
a matter of interest in a subsequent analysis. From the dierent families of GARCH
models at our disposition, we select the Exponential GARCH, or EGARCH, introduced
by Nelson (1991),
CDSt = c + 'CDSt 1 + t (3.1)
ln(ht) = 0 +
qX
j=1
gj(zt j) +
pX
i=1
i ln(ht i) (3.2)
gj(zt j) = jzt j +  j(jzt jj   Ejzt jj) j = 1; : : : ; q (3.3)
zt  iid N(0; 1)
where the mean equation follows an AR(1) process, and p and q denote the lags for
the variance and the innovations, respectively. There are several reasons behind our
modeling choice. First, the EGARCH allows for an asymmetric response to shocks; in
this way, the model captures whether upward movements in the CDS spread market are
followed by higher volatilities than the downward movements of the same magnitude.
4Mayordomo et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that the quotes of the CMA database lead the
price discovery process with respect to those provided by other databases such as Markit, JP Morgan
or GFI, among others.
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Second, our model does not require parameter restrictions to assure the positiveness of
the conditional variance.
Table 3.1 reports the point estimates for the sample under study and Table 3.2 sum-
marizes the structure of the nal model considered with the corresponding diagnostic
Lagrange Multiplier tests for the null hypothesis of no ARCH eects from the standard-
ized residuals. Some interesting conclusions arise from these tables. First, we system-
atically observe the high persistence of volatility. This fact is reected by the sum of
the estimated GARCH parameters, which is close to one. Second, the parameters  j
that capture the asymmetries of shocks to the conditional variance are systematically
positive (with the exception of Ireland). Within the context of our model, this pattern
implies that the positive CDS increments tend to be associated with higher uctuations.
In contrast with the extant literature on asset markets, where the leverage eect means
that a negative shock (bad news) increases the variance more than a positive shock, the
nature of leverage for CDS is just the opposite. Therefore, parameter  j is expected
to be positive. In general, the parsimonious EGARCH(1,1) specication leads to stan-
dardized and squared standardized residuals that are free of autocorrelation for the core
countries. However, additional heteroskedasticity structure is required for peripheral
countries (see Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2.: LM tests of heteroskedasticity
EGARCH(p,q) Lags of LM test
Country p q Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
Austria 2 2 0.851 0.550 0.714 0.834 0.767
Belgium 1 1 0.803 0.872 0.898 0.922 0.948
Germany 2 3 0.657 0.575 0.748 0.618 0.751
Denmark 2 1 0.993 0.893 0.816 0.872 0.910
Finland 2 1 0.639 0.297 0.466 0.640 0.696
France 1 1 0.577 0.842 0.943 0.761 0.764
Greece 1 4 0.218 0.446 0.351 0.273 0.289
Ireland 1 2 0.568 0.513 0.542 0.702 0.646
Italy 2 2 0.947 0.988 0.999 0.999 0.995
Netherlands 2 3 0.995 0.990 0.989 0.969 0.983
Portugal 2 4 0.636 0.785 0.918 0.812 0.894
Spain 2 4 0.546 0.703 0.861 0.925 0.909
Sweden 1 1 0.914 0.855 0.385 0.556 0.537
UK 1 1 0.807 0.090 0.163 0.254 0.320
This table reports the p-values of the Lagrange Multiplier test at dierent lag lengths under the null
hypothesis of no ARCH eects. This test of heteroskedasticity has been performed on the standardized
residuals obtained from an AR(1)-EGARCH(p,q) univariate model applied to every country's 5-year
CDS spread increments. The sample period spans from January 2008 to July 2012.
Figure 3.1 depicts the estimated conditional volatility for the central EMU (upper
graph), peripheral EMU (medium graph) and non-EMU (lower graph) countries. To
better appreciate the dierences in the time-varying pattern, we use a logarithmic
scale. From an inspection of Figure 3.1, we observe higher volatility for the periph-
eral economies. A high degree of comovement between the dierent groups of countries
is also observed. Lastly, a shift in the volatility patterns appears to occur in the fall
of 2008. This shift is consistent with the reassessment of the sovereign risk perceptions
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers as noticed by Dieckmann and Plank (2012).
3.2.3. Factor analysis of CDS spreads
The existence of comovements between CDS spreads is addressed in several studies such
as Longsta et al. (2011) or Berndt and Obreja (2010), among others. However, not much
is known about the presence of commonalities in the volatilities of CDS spreads. Table
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Figure 3.1.: Volatility of 5-year CDS spread changes
Panel A.- Central EMU countries
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Panel B.- Peripheral EMU countries
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Panel C.- Non-EMU countries
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This graph plots on a logarithmic scale (base 10) the conditional volatility (in basis points) from the
estimated AR(1)-EGARCH(p,q) model for 5-year sovereign CDS spread increments. The central EMU
countries are Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France and the Netherlands. The peripheral EMU
countries are Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. The non-EMU countries are Denmark, Sweden
and the UK. The sample frequency is weekly, and it spans from January 2008 to July 2012.
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3.3 reports the factor analysis results for both CDS levels and volatilities. The Factors
are denoted by F1-F3. The uniqueness columns refer to the idiosyncratic variance, that
is, the variance that is exclusively attributable to the country and not shared with others.
The greater the uniqueness, the lower the relevance of the country in the factor model.
For ease of interpretation the factors are rotated using the varimax rotation technique.
Table 3.3.: Factor analysis for levels and variance of 5-year CDS increments.
Mean Variance
Country F1 F2 F3 Uniqueness F1 F2 F3 Uniqueness
Panel A.- Loading factors
Austria 0.8715 0.3591 0.2293 0.0135 0.6519 -0.4195 -0.0911 0.3317
Belgium 0.9756 -0.2197 0.0032 0.0000 0.7324 0.4569 -0.1533 0.1970
Germany 0.9746 0.0711 0.0689 0.0142 0.7254 -0.0090 0.1727 0.3147
Denmark 0.8886 0.4586 -0.0127 0.0000 0.7310 -0.2376 -0.2154 0.2166
Finland 0.9222 0.3364 0.0612 0.0154 0.8568 -0.2328 0.1345 0.1310
France 0.9741 -0.1162 -0.1034 0.0031 0.7536 0.4454 -0.3035 0.1267
Greece 0.6567 -0.0103 -0.3970 0.1830 0.0720 0.1386 -0.0506 0.8071
Ireland 0.8420 -0.3504 0.0723 0.0052 0.3145 0.2553 0.5046 0.5303
Italy 0.9622 -0.0721 -0.1295 0.0183 0.7015 0.5638 -0.0581 0.1581
Netherlands 0.9210 0.3052 0.0900 0.0149 0.7878 -0.2906 -0.0131 0.2047
Portugal 0.8916 -0.2587 -0.2412 0.0137 0.2843 0.4656 0.4389 0.4743
Spain 0.9043 -0.2580 -0.0940 0.0122 0.5899 0.5796 -0.0371 0.2721
Sweden 0.4770 0.7536 0.4455 0.0000 0.6183 -0.6504 0.0588 0.1374
UK 0.5749 0.4538 0.6209 0.0000 0.5374 -0.6440 0.1378 0.2452
Panel B.- Explained variance (%)
Total 75.40 12.02 6.64  61.46 28.01 7.58 
Factor analysis (rotated) for the mean (columns two to four) and variance (columns six to eight) of
5-year CDS spread increments. The time series of variance have been computed using the Nelson (1991)
model. Panel A displays the loading factors for each country for the rst three components and their
uniqueness. Panel B exhibits the explained variance for each factor. The sample period spans from
January 2008 to July 2012.
Some interesting results arise from Table 3.3. F1 and F2 in levels (volatilities) ac-
count for approximately 87% (89%) of the total explained variance. A close inspection
of the factor loadings allows us to identify the countries that are related to each fac-
tor. With regard to the analysis in levels, F1 has large and positive coecients for all
countries. In contrast, F2 emphasizes the distinctive feature of the peripheral countries.
Finally, Greece appears to be the least important country in the factor structure both
in levels and volatilities. In conclusion, two sources of commonality attending to debt
sustainability are identied from the European sovereign CDS market.
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3.3. Volatility transmission between the peripheral and the
non-peripheral areas
Motivated by the existence of orthogonal sources of commonality among the EU regions,
this section analyzes the volatility transmission between these geographical areas. To
avoid spurious causal relationships, we gather our sample around three dierent blocks of
countries  peripheral EMU, non-peripheral EMU and selected EU countries (Denmark,
Sweden and the UK) whose local currency is not the euro. This clustering is supported
by the empirical ndings from the factor analysis in Section 3.2.3, where a fragmentation
of the sovereign default swap market into dierent groups is observed. Finally, we reduce
the dimensionality of the problem by performing a factor analysis on each set of countries,
keeping their rst factor. In the three cases, just one principal component is observed
following the rule of eigenvalues greater than one.
A multivariate heteroskedastic model is employed to capture any possible volatility
spillovers between the common trends in the CDS. In particular, we estimate a bivariate
GARCH from the pairs of rst-dierenced factors. We employ the popular BEKK
model specication of Engle and Kroner (1995). Many other multivariate GARCH
specications are special cases of the BEKK specication, such as the factor model of
Engle et al. (1990), the orthogonal GARCH model of Alexander (2001) or the GO-
GARCH model of Weide (2002), among others. Our posited alternative (i) reduces
the number of parameters to be estimated compared to other multivariate GARCH
specications such as, for example, the VECH model, and (ii) interestingly enough, the
conditional covariance matrix is guaranteed to be positive denite by construction.
We propose the following BEKK specication:0@PCr;t
PCs;t
1A =
0@11 0
0 22
1A0@PCr;t 1
PCs;t 1
1A+
0@r;t
s;t
1A ; t  N(0; Ht) (3.4)
Ht = CC
0
+
pX
k=1
A
0
kt k
0
t kAk +
qX
k=1
B
0
kHt kBk (3.5)
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where Ht denotes the variance-covariance matrix; Ak, Bk and C are 2  2 parameter
matrices; and C is lower triangular. The conditional variances depend on the lagged
squared conditional variances and the lagged squared errors, whereas the covariances
depend on the cross-products of the lagged conditional variances and errors, respectively.
The diagonal elements in matrices Ak capture the own ARCH eects, while the diagonal
elements in matrices Bk measure the own GARCH eects. The o-diagonal elements
capture the potential cross-eects between the rst dierences of factors. The structure
p = q = 1 appears to be a valid specication to capture the volatility dynamics.
For ease of interpretation, the elements of the covariance matrix in the case of p =
q = 1 are expressed below:
2r;t = c
2
11 + a
2
11
2
r;t 1 + 2a11a21r;t 1s;t 1 + a
2
21
2
s;t 1 + b
2
11
2
r;t 1
+ 2b11b21rs;t 1 + b221
2
s;t 1 (3.6)
rs;t = c11c21 + a11a12
2
r;t 1 + a11a22r;t 1s;t 1 + a12a21r;t 1s;t 1 + a22a21
2
s;t 1
+ b11b12
2
r;t 1 + b12b21rs;t 1 + b11b22rs;t 1 + b22b21
2
s;t 1 (3.7)
2s;t = c
2
21 + c
2
22 + a
2
12
2
r;t 1 + 2a22a12r;t 1s;t 1 + a
2
22
2
s;t 1 + b
2
12
2
r;t 1
+ 2b22b12rs;t 1 + b222
2
s;t 1 (3.8)
where aij and bij denote the i-th row and j-th element of matrix A1 and B1, respec-
tively.
The BEKK-GARCH specication presents some inference diculties, because spillover
eects are obtained via the multiplication/addition of various parameter estimates.
Therefore, it is not possible to identify the source of volatility spillovers by directly
checking the signicance of the parameters involved in matrices A and B. We test the
directional source of volatility transmission by regarding the signicance of b221 and b
2
12
in equations (3.6) and (3.8), respectively. We use the delta method to estimate the
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standard errors of the squared parameters.
Table 3.4 shows the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimation of the bivariate
BEKK-GARCH models for each pair of factors (non-peripheral / peripheral and non-
EMU / peripheral) considered, while Table 3.5 reports the model diagnostics based on
the standardized residuals. From Table 3.5, our bivariate GARCH specication is a
statistically valid representation of the cross-interactions for each pair of heteroskedastic
factors under analysis.
Back to Table 3.4, we explore the directional causality between peer factors. Inside
the EMU, we detect a unidirectional causal relationship from the peripheral to the non-
peripheral countries for volatilities. The squared parameter involved is signicantly dif-
ferent from zero at conventional signicance levels. However, empirical evidence suggests
that there is no transmission channel from the EMU-peripheral area to the non-EMU
economies. Past volatility in peripheral countries does not anticipate an increase of
volatility in non-EMU countries.
Figure 3.2 displays the estimated conditional correlations for each bivariate GARCH
model. The correlation coecients between peripheral and non-peripheral countries
suggest a strong comovement inside the Eurozone. Moreover, the magnitude of the
coecients tends to be higher than that corresponding to the peripheral and non-EMU
countries, especially until the beginning of January 2010.
3.4. The determinants of credit spreads
Because peripheral countries spill over into non-peripheral economies inside the EMU,
this section analyzes the impact of the peripheral risk factor into the remainder sovereign
CDS spreads.
3.4.1. Control variables
We run OLS regressions of CDS increments for non-EU and central EMU countries on
the peripheral risk factor, but controlling for a set of local and global variables following
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Table 3.4.: BEKK estimations
This table reports the BEKK estimations under the model,
PCr;t
PCs;t

=

11 0
0 22

PCr;t 1
PCs;t 1

+

r;t
s;t

; t  N(0; Ht)
Ht = CC
0
+
pX
k=1
A
0
kt k
0
t kAk +
qX
k=1
B
0
kHt kBk
where cij , aij;k and bij;k denote the i-th row, j-th column element of the matrices
C, Ak and Bk, respectively. The sample period spans from January 2008 to July
2012.
Non-Peripheral (r) vs Peripheral (s) Non-EMU (r) vs Peripheral (s)
Coe p-value Coe p-value
11 0.2028 0.0003 11 0.1907 0.0012
22 0.1701 0.0162 22 -0.0145 0.7997
c11 0.1008 0.0443 c11 0.0048 0.5288
c21 0.0404 0.0000 c21 -0.0149 0.0327
c22 0.0185 0.0030 c22 0.0001 0.9196
a11;1 0.4696 0.0000 a11;1 -0.7009 0.0000
a12;1 -0.3005 0.0098 a12;1 0.3425 0.0013
a21;1 0.0441 0.5362 a21;1 -0.3180 0.0000
a22;1 0.5719 0.0000 a22;1 0.8563 0.0000
b11;1 0.8509 0.0000 b11;1 -0.8603 0.0000
b12;1 0.0011 0.9611 b12;1 -0.0217 0.1623
b21;1 0.1419 0.0158 b21;1 0.0408 0.4029
b22;1 0.8598 0.000 b22;1 -0.8045 0.0000
Log-Likelihood 372.8807 Log-Likelihood 412.4141
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Figure 3.2.: Time-varying conditional correlation between factors
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Table 3.5.: Ljung-Box Tests on the BEKK residuals
Non-Peripheral vs. Peripheral Non-EMU vs. Peripheral
Non-Peripheral Peripheral Non-EMU Peripheral
Standardized 13.0796 20.4741 24.4026 23.9629
residuals (0.8739) (0.4286) (0.2252) (0.2440)
Squared- 16.2258 15.7444 30.0271 13.9007
standardized (0.7025) (0.7323) (0.0694) (0.8355)
residuals
This table reports the Ljung-Box Portmanteau tests for the null of the absence of autocorrelation using
20 lags. The P-values are reported in parentheses. The residuals come from the BEKK model. The
sample period spans from January 2008 to July 2012.
the research design in Longsta et al. (2011). Table 3.6 provides a detailed description
of the control variables as well as some recent papers that support the choice of these
variables.
The local variables include a CDS liquidity proxy, the local stock market return and its
realized volatility, the relevant exchange rate and its 1-month option implied volatility
and the corresponding interest rate for each monetary region. Additionally, the global
variables incorporate a worldwide CDS liquidity score, the EuroStoxx50 index returns,
the volatility risk premium, the Chicago Board of Trade S&P 500 Implied Correlation
Index, the constant maturity 5-year US Treasury yield and the spread between AA-rated
and BBB-rated European corporates.
Concerning the local variables, some early articles have considered the CDS market to
be a liquidity frictionless market (Blanco et al., 2005; Longsta et al., 2005). However,
Tang and Yan (2007) found that the liquidity measures are important determinants of
default swap spreads. For that reason, we use Fitch's liquidity scores for the individual
sovereign CDS. The higher the Fitch score is, the lower the CDS liquidity is. This
measure takes into account the information content in the bid-ask spread, the staleness of
quotes and the dispersion of mid-quotes across brokers. This variable has the advantage
of summarizing several liquidity proxies into a single one, allowing for a direct comparison
through time and across countries.
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Table 3.6.: Variable denitions
Name Denition Main references
Panel A.- Local variables
LiqCDS Fitch s Liquidity scores for each 5-year sovereign CDS. The higher
the score is, the more illiquid is the CDS Blanco et al. (2005),
Longsta et al.
(2005), Tang and Yan
(2007), Bongaerts
et al. (2011)
StM Local Primary stock market index for each country. The indices used are
the following: ATX (Austria), BEL 20 (Belgium), DAX (Germany),
OMXC 20 (Denmark), OMXH (Finland), CAC 40 (France), AEX
(the Netherlands), OMXS 30 (Sweden), and FTSE 100 (the UK)
Longsta et al. (2011),
Dieckmann and Plank
(2012)
StM Vol 20-day average realized volatility of the domestic stock market in-
dices using the open-high-low-close volatility estimator of Garman
and Klass (1980) in %
Zhang et al. (2009)
Forex Exchange rate of the domestic currency (Euro, Danish Krone,
Swedish Krona or British Pound) relative to USD
Forex Vol 1-month option implied volatility in % for the exchange rate of the
domestic currency (Euro, Danish Krone, Swedish Krona or British
Pound)
Carr and Wu (2007),
Hui and Chung (2011)
MP Rate Monetary policy interest rate. Day-to-day money market interest
rates on unsecured loans for each monetary region in %. The indices
used are the Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA), the Danish
Kroner Tomorrow/Next interest rate (DKTONXT), the Stockholm
Interbank Oered Rate (STIBOR), and the Sterling OverNight In-
dex Average (SONIA)
Panel B.- Global variables
LiqCDS Sov Fitch s Liquidity Score for all 5-year sovereign CDS worldwide. The
higher the score is, the more illiquid is the overall sovereign CDS
market
EuroStoxx50 EuroStoxx50 index
Vol Pre-
mium
Dierence between the VSTOXX and the 20-day average real-
ized volatility in the EuroStoxx50 index. The VSTOXX is the
EuroStoxx50 s 1-month option implied volatility in %. The real-
ized volatility measure is calculated using the open-high-low-close
volatility estimator of Garman and Klass (1980)
Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2001), Pan and Sin-
gleton (2008), Carr
and Wu (2006) ,
Carr and Wu (2009),
Bollerslev et al.
(2009), Bollerslev
et al. (2011)
Imp Corr On-the-run CBOE S&P 500 Implied Correlation Index in %
Driessen et al. (2009)
5y Yield Constant maturity 5-year US Treasury s yield in %
IG AA-
BBB
Price spread between AA-rated and BBB-rated European invest-
ment grade corporates. Calculated using the IBOXX Euro Corpo-
rate Price Indexes for 3-5 year maturity bonds.
CDS
Peripheral
The rst factor of the 5-year maturity sovereign CDS spreads for
all peripheral countries
The global variables are the same for each country. The local variables are specic to each country except
the variables Forex, Forex Vol and MP Rate, which are specic to each monetary region (Eurozone,
Denmark, Sweden and the UK). The sources for the variables are Datastream, Thomson Reuters and
Yahoo Finance. The displayed references are those that can provide a better description of the variable
or those that use a similar measure in their empirical research.
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Stock markets also contain important information about the state of the local economy
(Longsta et al., 2011; Dieckmann and Plank, 2012). Moreover, Zhang et al. (2009) have
also shown that the volatility of the stock market can predict a large variation in the
corporate CDS spreads. We proxy local volatility using the open-high-low-close volatility
estimator of Garman and Klass (1980).
The exchange rate could also provide additional information on the country's credit-
worthiness. Carr and Wu (2007) propose a joint modeling of the exchange rate volatility
and the sovereign default risk to capture the co-movements between the volatility of
the currency options and the sovereign CDS market. For this reason, we also include
the option-implied volatility of the local currency. Finally, day-to-day money market
interest rates on unsecured loans for each monetary region are a proxy for funding risk.
These data complete the local information set.
With regard to the global variables, the Fitch's Liquidity Score for 5-year sovereign
CDS worldwide is the global version of the individual Fitch measure previously men-
tioned. We also employ the premium for bearing the volatility risk of an option position.
This volatility risk premium accounts for the dierence between the implied and the re-
alized volatility, and it represents the price of a variance swap contract (Carr and Wu,
2006, 2009; Bollerslev et al., 2009). We dene this type of volatility risk premium as
the dierence between the 1-month VSTOXX option-implied volatility index and the
realized volatility estimator of Garman and Klass (1980).
An increase in the stock market correlations can damage the investment opportunities
and worsen the diversication benets (Driessen et al., 2009). Thus, we incorporate the
Chicago Board of Trade S&P 500 Implied Correlation Index. Moreover, we consider
some standard market variables that capture the state of the economy such as (i) the
5-year US Treasury yield, which can be seen as a safe haven debt security in comparison
to the European debt securities and (ii) the spread between AA-rated and BBB-rated
European investment grade corporates, which summarizes the European corporate bond
market situation.
Finally, the CDS Peripheral variable comprises the rst factor scores in the factor
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analysis structure involving the ve peripheral countries. This variable captures the
commonality among the nancially distressed economies, and it is the main object of
our analysis.
3.4.2. OLS estimates
Table 3.7 shows the resulting OLS estimates from projecting the individual default swap
increments onto the local and global variable set. We also report the p-values based
on the White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent estimate of the covariance matrix and
the adjusted R2. To emphasize the contribution of the peripheral component to the
non-peripheral spreads, we repeat our regressions, omitting the related variable (CDS
Peripheral). In this way, the term R2-Adj Before represents the adjusted coecient of de-
termination excluding the mentioned variable. Additionally, we also explore dierences
between EMU and non-EMU membership.
Several results arise from Table 3.7. For the local variables (panel A), the exchange
rate uctuations appear to be a key variable in explaining the CDS spread increments.
Given that the CDS contracts are nominated in USD, a signicant and positive coecient
for the exchange rates reveals that USD appreciation against the local currency results
in increments of default swaps. However, stock market changes are not signicant to
explain spread changes, in contrast to the empirical ndings reported in Longsta et
al. (2011) for 12 emerging economies. With regard to the global variables, no control
variable is successful in explaining the CDS spread changes with the exception of the
peripheral factor. However, the explanatory ability of these local and global variables is
not as high as reported in Longsta et al. (2011) for emerging countries as well as for
some developed countries such as Japan.
The factor representing nancially distressed economies signicantly aects the incre-
ments of the CDS spreads. The associated coecient is systematically positive. This
pattern is noticeable for both EMU and non-EMU countries. Interestingly, the explana-
tory ability of the OLS clearly improves after the inclusion of the peripheral component
as an additional regressor. While the adjusted R2s excluding the peripheral CDS com-
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Table 3.7.: Regression for 5-year CDS increments
EMU Non-EMU
Austria Belgium Germany Finland France Netherlands Denmark Sweden UK
Cons. -0.000005 -0.000001 0.000016 -0.000009 0.000026 -0.000008 0.000011 -0.000017 -0.000012
Panel A.- Local variables
LiqCDS 0.000214 0.000052 -0.000077 -0.000124 0.000037 -0.000358 0.000197 -0.000386 -0.000653
StM Local -0.000003** 0.000001 -0.000001** -0.000000* -0.000007*** -0.000021* -0.000006 -0.000003 -0.000000
StM Vol -0.000038* -0.000021 -0.000017 -0.000002 -0.000027 -0.000016 -0.000027 0.000013 0.000004
Forex 0.016470*** 0.019866*** 0.006035*** 0.005780** 0.010869*** 0.008698*** 0.001256** 0.001218*** 0.015759***
Forex Vol -0.000019 0.000063 0.000031 -0.000016 0.000101*** 0.000012 0.000025 -0.000001 0.000056
MP rate -0.000077 -0.000480 0.000090 0.000006 -0.000302 -0.000241 0.000182 -0.000707 0.000236
Panel B.- Global variables
LiqCDS Sov -0.000372 0.000376 -0.000224 -0.000119 -0.000088 0.000180 -0.000355 0.000171 0.000404
EuroStoxx50 -0.000002 -0.000005* 0.000000 -0.000001 0.000005* -0.000001 -0.000002*** -0.000001 -0.000002*
Vol Premium -0.000005 -0.000007 -0.000004 -0.000005 -0.000003 -0.000010 -0.000009 -0.000008 -0.000009
Imp Corr 0.000019 0.000008 0.000005 0.000009 0.000031 0.000019 0.000014 -0.000002 0.000018
5y Yield 0.000921 0.000273 0.000319 0.000052 0.000683** 0.000388 0.000134 0.000065 0.000172
IG AA-BBB 0.000479** 0.000327 0.000153* 0.000100 0.000215 0.000113 0.000229 -0.000030 -0.000084
CDS Peripheral 0.002234** 0.003637*** 0.000850** 0.000865*** 0.001880*** 0.001101** 0.001024* 0.001464*** 0.001465***
Obs. 236 236 236 234 236 224 231 217 207
R2-Adj Before 0.2761 0.2636 0.3470 0.2482 0.3324 0.3045 0.2638 0.2454 0.3234
R2-Adj 0.3249 0.3742 0.3930 0.3128 0.3943 0.3494 0.2946 0.3202 0.4043
***Signicant at the 1 percent level. **Signicant at the 5 percent level. *Signicant at the 10 percent level.
The signicance of the variables is tested using White (1980) t-statistics. The R2-Adj Before row
refers to the R-squared for the same regression but without including the variable CDS Peripheral.
The R2-Adj row is the adjusted R-squared for the displayed regression that includes the variable
CDS Peripheral. The sample period spans from January 2008 to July 2012.
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ponent range from 25% to 35%, the explanatory power of the regressions increases after
the inclusion of this variable.
In conclusion, the behavior of the peripheral economies and the exchange rates are
the main variables that account for CDS variability. However, we cannot appreciate a
clear pattern for the eect of global variables.
3.5. Decomposing the CDS spreads
Previous empirical evidence suggests that there is a risk channel transmission from
the peripheral to the non-peripheral countries. How this transference passes through
each country poses an intriguing question. This section explores the nature of risk
transmission at an individual level. We decompose the default swap spreads into two
components: default risk and risk premium. This distinction allows us to disentangle
the impact of distressed economies in EU countries due to changes in the default risk or
the investors' risk appetite. We outline the methodology of Pan and Singleton (2008)
for the CDS decomposition, providing an econometric framework for its estimation.
3.5.1. The model
We adopt the intensity approach of Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longsta et al. (2011)
to decompose the CDS spreads into default risk and risk premium components. Within
this framework, the credit event is triggered by the rst jump of a Poisson process with
stochastic intensity,
d lnQt = 
Q

Q   lnQt

dt+ dWQt ; (3.9)
where Q, Q and  stands for the mean-reversion speed, the long-run mean and the
volatility of the process, respectively. The log-intensities in (3.9) follow an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process, which ensures the positiveness of the default intensity.
Under this formulation, Longsta et al. (2005) or Pan and Singleton (2008) provide
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an expression for computing the CDS spreads,
CDSQt (M) =
4LQ
R t+M
t
EQt
h
Qu e
  R ut (rs+Qs ) dsi duP4M
i=1E
Q
t
h
e 
R t+:25i
t (rs+
Q
s ) ds
i ; (3.10)
where M is the maturity of the CDS, rt is the risk-free rate and LQ is the risk-neutral
expected losses. We consider a loss given default of 60%, which is a standard assumption
in the literature.
The risk-neutral intensity process (3.9) admits an equivalent formulation in terms of
the actual measure P ,
d lnQt = 
P (P   lnQt )dt+ dW Pt ; (3.11)
where P = Q   1 and P P = QQ + 0. Parameters 0 and 1 determine the
market price of risk,
dWQ = (0 + 1 ln
Q)dt+ dW P (3.12)
From the previous expressions for the risk-neutral intensity, notice that equation (3.11)
collapses to (3.9) when parameters 0 and 1 equal zero (no compensation for changes
in the default environment). Then, if there is no risk premium embedded in the CDS
spreads, expressions (3.9) and (3.11) are equal, and the dierence between the CDS
spreads (CDSQ) computed under risk-neutral Q and actual P measures,
CDSPt (M) =
4LQ
R t+M
t
EPt
h
Qu e
  R ut (rs+Qs ) dsi duP4M
i=1E
P
t
h
e 
R t+:25i
t (rs+
Q
s ) ds
i ; (3.13)
is zero. Otherwise, the divergences between CDSQ and CDSP capture the risk premium
embedded in the CDS spreads for compensating changes in the default environment.
It is worth mentioning that our risk premium represents compensation due to changes
in the default conditions (changes in economic fundamentals, etc.) rather than a reward
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for the default itself. The former is called distress premium, and it was previously ana-
lyzed by Pan and Singleton (2008) or Longsta et al. (2011), among others. The latter
is called default-event premium; it has been studied by Yu (2002), Pan and Singleton
(2006), Driessen (2005) and Berndt et al. (2005), and it is out of the scope of our study.
Jarrow et al. (2005) present a unifying framework of both premia within the intensity
model.
3.5.2. Estimation procedure
We estimate the parameters of our model using maximum likelihood (ML). We summa-
rize here the main steps involved. For simplicity, we denote Q as . First, we assume
that 3-year CDS contracts are perfectly priced; given a set of Q, Q and  parameters,
we recover a time series for  by means of a non-linear optimization technique. Second,
the dierences between the sample and the theoretical 1- and 5-year CDS contracts are
priced with normally distributed errors 1y and 5y with zero means and standard de-
viations (1) and (5), respectively. Third, we use the bootstrapped USD Libor-Swap
curve as the risk-free rate to discount future payos. Specically, we employ the 3-, 6-,
9- and 12-month USD Libor published by the British Bankers' Association. We also use
the 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-year USD interest rate swaps from the Federal Reserve Statistical
Release H.15. Fourth, the expectations in equations (3.10) and (3.13) when Q follows
a log-OU process are not in closed form, so they are computed using a Crank-Nicholson
discretization scheme for the corresponding partial dierential equation. Finally, the
joint density function is
fP (; ) = fP (1yj(1)) fP (5yj(5)) fP (lnjP ; P P ; )
 @CDSQ(jQ; QQ; )=@ 1 (3.14)
with parameter vector  = (Q; QQ; Q; P ; PP ; (1); (5)) and fP () representing
the density function of the Normal distribution, and t equal to 1/52.
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3.5.3. Maximum likelihood estimates
Table 3.8 displays the ML estimates for the sample under study. We observe that the
convergence of dierent default intensity processes to a particular long-run mean are
faster in the actual world than in risk-neutral environments (P > Q), indicating that
the default arrival rates as seen by risk-neutral investors tend to explode as time goes by.
Moreover, the average default intensity level is much lower in the actual than in the risk-
neutral measure QQ > P P . Our results are quite similar to those reported in Pan
and Singleton (2008) and Longsta et al. (2011) in the context of emerging economies.
Table 3.8.: ML estimates for logOU model
Country Q QQ Q P P P (1) (5) LogLk
Austria 0.0423 -0.2625 0.9613 0.3391 -1.9816 0.0011 0.0010 3916.46
(0.0091) (0.0326) (0.0078) (0.3753) (2.0386) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Belgium -0.0951 0.1094 1.1900 1.2505 -6.2719 0.0014 0.0008 3825.37
(0.0086) (0.0305) (0.0101) (0.7391) (3.9398) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Germany 0.0383 -0.2247 1.0111 0.5837 -3.7873 0.0004 0.0010 4319.61
(0.0116) (0.0516) (0.0060) (0.5287) (3.4166) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Denmark 0.0727 -0.4915 1.1102 0.3024 -1.9884 0.0006 0.0005 4294.69
(0.0085) (0.0334) (0.0061) (0.5102) (3.0841) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Finland 0.1520 -0.8825 1.0608 0.9904 -6.5735 0.0004 0.0006 4468.76
(0.0096) (0.0414) (0.0049) (0.4817) (3.0949) (0.0000) (0.0000)
France -0.0337 0.1267 0.8960 0.4889 -2.7258 0.0008 0.0010 4045.66
(0.0112) (0.0399) (0.0061) (0.4866) (2.7953) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Netherlands 0.1155 -0.6886 1.0298 0.3143 -1.9318 0.0003 0.0010 4314.34
(0.0098) (0.0426) (0.0061) (0.4015) (2.4851) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sweden 0.2117 -1.1923 1.2001 0.4758 -3.2467 0.0005 0.0004 4450.32
(0.0076) (0.0333) (0.0057) (0.4808) (3.0685) (0.0000) (0.0000)
UK 0.1683 -0.8854 1.1151 0.3626 -2.3770 0.0004 0.0011 4209.76
(0.0106) (0.0446) (0.0061) (0.5278) (3.2166) (0.0000) (0.0001)
This table provides the maximum likelihood estimates for the Pan and Singleton (2008) model. The
standard errors are in parentheses. Q, Q and Q denote the mean reversion, the long run mean
and the instantaneous volatility of the default intensity process Q under the Q probability measure,
respectively. Analogously, P and P are the mean reversion rate and the long run mean under the
objective measure P , respectively. (M) is the deviation of the CDS spread mispricing for maturities
1- and 5-years. Weekly data are used from January 2008 to July 2012.
We also address the performance of the model under two dierent criteria. First,
Figure 3.3 displays the cross-sectional, averaged pricing errors for our sample of countries.
As shown, the pricing errors are (on average) close to zero. Second, Table 3.9 shows the
projections of the sample CDS spread increments onto their theoretical counterparts. An
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intercept and slope coecients close to zero and one, respectively, indicate a reasonable
t for the model. From Table 3.9, we systematically observe that the intercepts are zero
and the slopes close to one, no matter the maturity considered. Additionally, the overall
R-squared coecient is 85% and the standard deviation of residuals is lower than four
basis points.
Table 3.9.: Projections of sample values onto tted values for the logOU model
CDSsamplet = 0 + 1CDS
theo
t + t
Maturity ^0 ^1 R2 std. res. (bps) N
1 Year -0.00 0.98 0.80 3.43 2115
(0.00) (0.01)
5 Year 0.00 0.96 0.90 2.87 2115
(0.00) (0.01)
Overall 0.00 0.97 0.85 3.16 4230
(0.00) (0.01)
This table shows the projections of the CDS data increments onto
their model counterparts. The standard deviations of the coe-
cients are in parentheses. The standard deviations of the residuals
(std. res.) are shown in basis points.
Table 3.10 reports some descriptive statistics for the risk premium and risk premium
fractions of the 5-year CDS spreads, respectively. The risk premium is computed as the
dierence between CDSQ and CDSP using expressions (3.10) and (3.13). In addition,
we look at the contribution of the risk premium (in percentage) over the total spread of
the CDS,
RPF  (CDSQ(M)  CDSP (M))=CDSQ(M) (3.15)
or risk premium fraction (RPF), similarly to Longsta et al. (2011). Some interesting
conclusions arise from Table 3.10. For example, we observe that investors pay approx-
imately 30:68 (47:00) basis points to German (French) default swaps in terms of risk
compensation, approximately 57% (34%) of its total value. To the contrary, the protec-
tion sellers of countries outside of the EMU demand 31:60, 30:42 and 40:12 basis points
for Denmark, Sweden and the UK, respectively. Outside of the EMU, this component
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Figure 3.3.: Averaged pricing errors over time
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Averaged pricing errors for 1- and 5-year CDS spreads. The theoretical spreads are computed using the
ML estimates of the Pan and Singleton (2008) model in Table ??. The sample frequency is weekly, and
it comprises January 2008 to July 2012.
69
Chapter 3. The impact of distressed economies on the EU sovereign market
represents (on average) approximately 56% of their total spreads. It should also be
highlighted that the non-EMU countries exhibit lower variability in the risk premium
fractions than the EMU countries. Again, the last result suggests that membership in a
common currency arrangement could act as a contagion enhancer.
Table 3.10.: Decomposition of CDS for the non-peripheral countries
Risk premium (bps) Risk premium fraction
Country Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std.
Austria 51.09 43.62 39.02 0.42 0.52 0.28
Belgium 70.21 60.00 82.05 0.18 0.52 0.74
Germany 30.68 29.44 21.21 0.57 0.66 0.23
Denmark 31.60 20.35 27.25 0.46 0.48 0.15
Finland 26.25 21.10 18.48 0.62 0.66 0.16
France 47.00 35.80 49.19 0.34 0.51 0.43
Netherlands 22.73 18.99 17.33 0.36 0.40 0.15
Sweden 30.42 28.00 21.64 0.63 0.66 0.07
UK 40.12 40.86 20.82 0.60 0.62 0.05
Descriptive statistics of the risk premium for 5-year CDS spreads. The risk premium
is computed as the dierence between CDSQ and CDSP . The risk premium fraction
is the ratio between the risk premium and CDSQ. The risk premiums are in basis
points.
3.5.4. Disentangling the impact on risk premia and default components
This subsection revisits the analysis conducted in Section 3.4 to exploit the information
content in the risk premium and default risk components of the sovereign CDS spreads.
In this way, we project the constituents of the 5-year sovereign default swaps onto the
risk peripheral factor, controlling for both the local and the global nancial variables
previously described in Section 3.4. Tables 3.11 and 3.12 summarize the OLS estimates.
Again, we report the adjusted R2 for the regressions including and not including the
peripheral risk factor.
Is the market translating peripheral risk into higher central sovereign CDS risk pre-
mia? The results from Table 3.11 suggest an armative answer to this question. First,
the slope coecients that are associated with the peripheral factor are signicantly dif-
ferent from zero at the conventional signicance levels. The estimated eect on the
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Table 3.11.: Regression for the distress risk premium
EMU Non-EMU
Austria Belgium Germany Finland France Netherlands Denmark Sweden UK
Cons. -0.000009 -0.000021 0.000001 -0.000020 0.000008 -0.000013 0.000002 -0.000016 -0.000016
Panel A.- Local variables
LiqCDS 0.000236 -0.000079 -0.000108 -0.000155 -0.000045 -0.000301 0.000174 -0.000204 -0.000499**
StM Local -0.000002** 0.000001 -0.000001* -0.000000 -0.000004* -0.000007 -0.000006 -0.000003 0.000000
StM Vol -0.000027* -0.000005 -0.000013 -0.000002 0.000003 -0.000003 -0.000018 0.000011 0.000009
Forex 0.011120** 0.017610*** 0.005867*** 0.006277*** 0.009897*** 0.004615** 0.000785* 0.000827*** 0.011305***
Forex Vol -0.000036 0.000044 0.000016 -0.000007 0.000067* 0.000004 0.000013 -0.000004 0.000038
MP rate -0.000047 -0.000606 0.000006 -0.000007 -0.000316 -0.000168 0.000188 -0.000392 0.000173
Panel B.- Global variables
LiqCDS Sov -0.000191 0.000282 -0.000013 -0.000135 0.000217 0.000146 -0.000196 0.000037 0.000283
EuroStoxx50 -0.000001 -0.000005** 0.000000 -0.000001 0.000003 -0.000001 -0.000002*** -0.000001 -0.000002**
Vol Premium -0.000004 -0.000009 -0.000003 -0.000005 -0.000005 -0.000006 -0.000006 -0.000007* -0.000007
Imp Corr 0.000015 0.000022 0.000006 0.000011 0.000035* 0.000010 0.000009 0.000002 0.000003
5y Yield 0.000580 0.000226 0.000264 -0.000002 0.000440* 0.000210 0.000160 0.000053 0.000155
IG AA-BBB 0.000354** 0.000214 0.000138* 0.000092 0.000095 0.000032 0.000182* 0.000007 -0.000072
CDS Peripheral 0.001390* 0.003317*** 0.000802** 0.000830*** 0.001709*** 0.000671** 0.000765* 0.001030*** 0.000919***
Obs. 235 235 235 233 235 224 231 217 207
R2-Adj Before 0.2604 0.2577 0.2719 0.2475 0.2569 0.2133 0.2782 0.2678 0.2798
R2-Adj 0.2976 0.3748 0.3181 0.3100 0.3315 0.2605 0.3103 0.3390 0.3492
***Signicant at the 1 percent level. **Signicant at the 5 percent level. *Signicant at the 10 percent level.
The signicance of the variables is tested using White (1980) t-statistics. The R2-Adj Before row
refers to the R-squared for the same regression but without including the variable CDS Peripheral.
The R2-Adj row is the adjusted R-squared for the displayed regression that includes the variable
CDS Peripheral. The sample period spans from January 2008 to July 2012.
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Table 3.12.: Regression for the default risk component
EMU Non-EMU
Austria Belgium Germany Finland France Netherlands Denmark Sweden UK
Cons. -0.000000 -0.000001 0.000000 -0.000002 0.000003 -0.000007 0.000003 -0.000004 -0.000006
Panel A.- Local variables
LiqCDS 0.000074 -0.000023 -0.000022 -0.000019 -0.000028 -0.000215* 0.000054 -0.000074 -0.000213**
StM Local -0.000001*** -0.000000 -0.000000* -0.000000* -0.000001* -0.000007* -0.000003 -0.000001 0.000000
StM Vol -0.000009 0.000000 -0.000002 -0.000000 0.000002 -0.000000 -0.000006 0.000004 0.000004
Forex 0.004167** 0.001817*** 0.000902** 0.000796*** 0.002220*** 0.003368*** 0.000383** 0.000267*** 0.004852***
Forex Vol -0.000011 0.000006 0.000003 -0.000000 0.000018** 0.000006 0.000003 -0.000001 0.000017
MP rate -0.000019 -0.000049 0.000004 0.000000 -0.000053 -0.000090 0.000104 -0.000112 0.000070
Panel B.- Global variables
LiqCDS Sov -0.000026 0.000033 0.000005 -0.000015 0.000044 0.000097 -0.000069 0.000015 0.000125
EuroStoxx50 -0.000000 -0.000000* -0.000000 -0.000000 0.000001 -0.000000 -0.000001*** -0.000000 -0.000001**
Vol Premium -0.000002 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000004 -0.000003 -0.000002 -0.000003
Imp Corr 0.000006 0.000002 0.000001 0.000001 0.000007* 0.000006 0.000004 0.000001 0.000001
5y Yield 0.000259 0.000012 0.000029 -0.000004 0.000114** 0.000155 0.000091 0.000034 0.000084
IG AA-BBB 0.000145** 0.000005 0.000016 0.000010 0.000009 0.000019 0.000078 0.000001 -0.000035
CDS Peripheral 0.000524* 0.000299*** 0.000123** 0.000098*** 0.000360*** 0.000457*** 0.000385** 0.000348*** 0.000399***
Obs. 235 235 235 233 235 224 231 217 207
R2-Adj Before 0.2974 0.2920 0.2879 0.2561 0.2991 0.2373 0.2866 0.2724 0.2783
R2-Adj 0.3328 0.4092 0.3328 0.3194 0.3806 0.2868 0.3237 0.3486 0.3482
***Signicant at the 1 percent level. **Signicant at the 5 percent level. *Signicant at the 10 percent level.
The signicance of the variables is tested using White (1980) t-statistics. The R2-Adj Before row
refers to the R-squared for the same regression but without including the variable CDS Peripheral.
The R2-Adj row is the adjusted R-squared for the displayed regression that includes the variable
CDS Peripheral. The sample period spans from January 2008 to July 2012.
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risk premium is systematically positive. Second, the relative increase in the adjusted
R2 after including the peripheral risk factor is, on average, approximately 24%. Third,
exchange rates alone appear to exhibit a wide eect on the CDS risk premiums similar
to that of the peripheral factor. The exchange rates are positive and signicant at the
conventional signicance levels. Moreover, the stock market returns also retain some
explanatory ability. The remaining local and global variables play a negligible role in
explaining the CDS risk premia.
What about the eect of peripheral countries on the default risk for the central EU
economies? In light of the results in Table 3.12, it is observed that the peripheral factor
is again signicant in explaining the CDS risk default risk across all of the countries.
Again, the estimated parameter is systematically positive, revealing that the nancially
distressed economies tend to deteriorate the sovereign creditworthiness of the central EU
economies. With regard to the local and global variables, the results remain qualitatively
similar to those reported for the risk premium component.
In short, our empirical ndings show that the risk factor of peripheral economies
is a relevant variable that accounts for much of the variability of the European CDS
components. We also detect that the exchange rate is a relevant variable to explain the
time evolution of European CDS. However, global variables do not play a key role in
driving the Euro sovereign credit spreads.
3.5.5. Is the impact stable over time?
As a robustness check, we examine whether the previous slope coecients for the pe-
ripheral risk factor could be safely interpreted as the representative impact, on average,
of the overall sample. To address this issue, we compute rolling-window regressions us-
ing a 1-year window. For the sake of brevity, Figure 3.4 only depicts the OLS slope
coecients (left column) and the relative adjusted R-squared ratios (right column) for
the three largest economies (Germany, France and the UK).5
Several interesting aspects emerge from Figure 3.4. First, the impact of distressed
5Empirical ndings for the remaining countries are available from the authors upon request.
73
Chapter 3. The impact of distressed economies on the EU sovereign market
Figure 3.4.: Rolling window regressions
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Panel B.- France
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Panel C.- UK
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The graphs come from regressions with a rolling window of 1 year. The regressions are estimated
using OLS. The graphs in the rst column are the beta sensitivities to the rst factor of the peripheral
countries. The grey lines represent the 95% condence interval using White (1980) standard errors.
The second column is the ratio of the adjusted R2 from the regression that includes the rst factor of
peripheral CDS, and the Adj. R2 from the same regression without including the rst factor of the
peripheral CDS.
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economies on both the default and the risk premium is positive and relatively steady
until the beginning of 2010. Second, during this time period, the eect on the default
component remains lower than the corresponding eect on the risk premium. Third,
the coecients dramatically decrease after January 2010, becoming close to zero dur-
ing the last part of the sample. This fact is consistent with the time evolution of the
estimated conditional correlation coecients between factors in Section 3.3. Assuming
that contagion between two assets is dened as a signicant increase in the degree of
comovement between them (see Caporale et al., 2005; Rigobon, 2003), contagion in the
sovereign market has gradually diminished. These negligible estimated slope coecients
may reect a safe haven eect in the core countries since the beginning of the crisis. The
scarcity of safe assets worldwide implies that the investors who are willing to allocate
their funds have rushed to government assets in Germany and other core EMU countries.
Once the credit portfolios have been reallocated, the peripheral risk becomes diversi-
able.6 Fourth, the peripheral risk factor remains a relevant regressor until January 2010.
Hereafter, this additional explained ability substantially decreases over time, reinforcing
the idea that peripheral risk does not represent a source of systematic risk during the
last part of the sample.
3.6. Conclusions
The volatility of the credit default swaps inside the European Economic and Monetary
Union signicantly increased after 2008. The Keynesian treatment of the crisis in the
hopes of encouraging economic growth led to scal imbalances that resulted in the sig-
nicant updating of default risk expectations. Under a new scenario in which a sovereign
credit event is not perceived as a rare event, it is a major concern to understand the
credit risk interactions among EU countries. This chapter provides additional insights
on the risk transmission channels inside and outside of the Eurozone from the perspec-
tive of the credit derivatives market during the period covering January 2008 to July
6We wish to thank the referee for suggesting this comment.
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2012.
We analyze the spillover eects from the peripheral to the central EU economies as
a reaction to some common global shocks. A preliminary overview reveals a strong
commonality among the EU sovereign default swaps. We also nd a CDS market frag-
mentation inside the Eurozone between the peripheral economies and the core countries.
A signicant risk transmission from the peripheral to the non-peripheral countries is
empirically observed during the period analyzed.
To better understand the impact of distressed economies, we decompose the sovereign
CDS spreads into their risk-premium and default risk components in accordance with the
ane sovereign credit valuation proposed by Pan and Singleton (2008). In the case of
EMU economies, the risk premium accounts for, on average, 42% of the total CDS spread.
This percentage rises to 56% for the non-EMU countries. However, a sharp dierence for
the risk premium uctuations between the EMU and the non-EMU countries is found.
We nd that both the risk premium and the default components of CDS spreads are
partially explained by global and local macroeconomic factors. Peripheral risk plays a
key role in explaining the CDS risk premium for the remaining EU members before 2010.
After this point, the impact of peripheral risk gradually vanishes over time, most likely
reecting a safe haven eect in core countries since the beginning of the crisis.
In conclusion, the overall CDS spread not only reects the default risk but also reects
a signicant and relatively more important component due to compensation for changes
in the economic outlook. Peripheral risk is signicant in explaining the increase in the
risk premium component until the beginning of 2010. The fact that the CDS market
enables a risk transmission channel not only for default risk but also for the risk pre-
mium is undoubtedly of interest to the macro prudential authorities and policymakers.
Our analysis reveals a nancial fragmentation in two primary areas facing asymmetric
borrowing costs. Maintaining the euro requires that monetary policy preserves price
stability and controls credit conditions. Policy measures aimed at mitigating credit
market fragmentation should require the active role of the European Central Bank in
the secondary sovereign bond market. Additionally, our results document a reduction
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in the intensity of spillover eects after 2010. Whether this attenuation is due either
to investors' asset substitutions or to recently adopted policy measures is a subject of
further research.
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Foreign monetary policy and rms' default
risk
Finally, we should consider whether the creation of an authority specically
charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks would help protect the
system from nancial crises like the one we are currently experiencing [. . . ]
Any rm whose failure would pose a systemic risk must receive especially
close supervisory oversight of its risk-taking, risk management, and nancial
condition, and be held to high capital and liquidity standards
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Speech at the Council
on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. Financial Reform to Address
Systemic Risk. March 10, 2009.
The establishment of the ESRB [European Systemic Risk Board] will be a
landmark event in how Europe deals preventively with systemic risk. It forms
part of wider developments across the globe, including in the US with the
newly created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). Very much like
the ESRB, this council is a collaborative body bringing together the relevant
US authorities with the aim of identifying systemic risk and responding to
threats. We will aim for close cooperation with the FSOC and other author-
ities for macro-prudential oversight
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB. Speech at the European
Banking Congress, Frankfurt am Main. November 19, 2010
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Does foreign monetary policy (MP) have any eect on domestic economies? What
is the eect of external MP on domestic rms' default risk? How do dierent MPs
interact? Is there an endogenous relationship between monetary policy and systemic
default risk? Opposed to the comprehensive literature analyzing the impact of domestic
MP on the risk-taking of domestic banks, the existence of crossover eects from dierent
rate policies has not yet been addressed. As a natural extension, we wonder about the
role of external MP in the stability of the domestic rms. The stability of the domestic
economy and credit markets not only depends on the domestic monetary policy, because
it also relies on the policies undertaken by foreign monetary authorities.
This chapter empirically addresses the importance of foreign monetary authorities
on the default risk of domestic rms. Our main contribution is twofold. First, we
document that foreign monetary authorities inuence the default risk of domestic rms.
This inuence relies on the characteristics of the rm as those companies with higher
foreign operations seem to be more exposed to foreign monetary policy. This evidence is
robust to controls for business cycle, exchange rates or idiosyncratic rm characteristics.
Second, we suggest the existence of an endogenous relationship between systemic default
risk and monetary policy. The empirical ndings reveal that (i) monetary authorities
lower their interest rates under a systemic risk shock and that (ii) there might be a
heterogeneous eect of dierent monetary policies on systemic risk. Particularly, a
monetary tightening in the US leads to a decrease of systemic risk, but a monetary
tightening in the Eurozone leads to an increase in systemic risk in the long term. These
results can be interpreted as a warning call for the dierent monetary authorities to join
eorts in the ght against systemic risk. To our knowledge, no similar study to date has
examined the inuence of foreign monetary policy on the default risk of domestic rms,
and how this exposure to some extent depends on the degree of internationalization of
the rms.
Our analysis is conducted in two perspectives. From a micro-perspective, we analyze
the way that the default risk of individual rms is related to an external monetary
policy. Along these lines, we study the role of foreign monetary policies on amplifying
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the default risk of domestic rms. At the individual level, the monetary policies have the
ability to aect the bank loan supply, the risk taking attitudes of banks, the valuation
of assets and liabilities, and the ability of rms to raise external nancing. Although
similar analyses have already been performed, we innovate on employing ex-ante default
probability measures. Instead of historical accounting-based measures or past default
history, we use the default probability implied from market prices of credit derivatives
markets. We employ an extensive database on Credit Default Swaps (CDS), a derivative
instrument whose liquidity has increased during recent years because it provides a simple
way to short credit.
From a macro-perspective, we wonder about the possible endogenous role of MP
with the systemic default risk. The nancial crisis started in August 2007 revealed
the signicant role of MP in the stability of the nancial system in particular, and the
economy in general. In addition to the historical major goals of monetary policy  stable
prices, growth, and unemployment (Friedman, 1968) , the interaction between MP and
systemic default risk has found room in the current banking research agenda. Not
surprisingly, two new institutions, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), were recently created to deal with
the systemic risk.1 Regardless of whether these new organisms should be dependent
or independent of the central banks, we are interested in analyzing if monetary policy
rates are a valid mechanism to lessen the systemic risk. Furthermore, we argue that
due to the ubiquitous nature of systemic risk, the dierent regions' economic conditions
(ination, growth, or unemployment), and the dierent monetary authorities' targets,
the monetary authorities might exert dierent eects on the systemic risk.
Our results stress the importance of domestic and foreign central banks for the credit
1In the US, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July
21, 2010 establishes the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to identify risks
to the nancial stability, to promote market discipline and to respond to threats to
the stability of the United States nancial system. This regulation is available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf . Similarly, in Eu-
rope the Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of November 24, 2010 establishes a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to mon-
itor, assess and mitigate the exposure to systemic risk. This regulation is available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri OJ:L:2010:331:0001:0011:EN:PDF .
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stability of the corporate sector during distressed episodes. From a policy perspective,
our empirical evidence suggests that a coordinated monetary policy might be a more
appropriate mechanism to deal with large systemic events.2 Domestic monetary policy
rates are not designed for dealing with systemic risks without borders. Our study is
based on the US and the Eurozone, two of the major economies in the world. According
to the IMF, between 2000 and 2009 the US and the Eurozone accounted for the 27%
and 21% of the world GDP, respectively. They are also large trading partners. For
example, the US exports to EMU countries represent a 19% of total exports, and the
US imports from EMU countries reach a 17%.3 This economic integration is mutual,
and multinational rms in one region are likely to make investments in the other region.
And as the domestic parent companies depend on foreign trades (exports and imports)
and on their foreign aliates, they are likely to depend on the foreign monetary policy
as well.
Thus, this chapter analyzes the impact of foreign monetary authorities on the default
risk of domestic rms, examining also their endogenous relationship with the default
risk. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 discusses the related literature.
Section 4.2 presents the data used to measure rm specic and systemic default risks.
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 deal with the monetary policy eect on rms' default probabilities.
Section 4.5 studies the empirical endogenous relationship between the monetary policy
and systemic default risk. Section 4.6 summarizes and concludes.
2The thought of joining eorts in monetary policy is gaining importance in recent dates.
There exist already examples of coordinated actions by central banks to solve specic is-
sues. For instance, on October 8th, 2008 the Bank of Canada, the Bank of Eng-
land, the ECB, the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank si-
multaneously announced reductions in policy interest rates. Announcement available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081008a.htm . Also, in Septem-
ber 2011 the ECB, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan
and the Swiss National Bank announced three-month dollar loans to banks due to the
diculties of European banks in obtaining dollar funding. Announcement available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr110915.en.html
3The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce provides detailed
information for each country on exports, imports and foreign direct investment (FDI) made by multi-
national corporations. More information available at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm
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4.1. Contribution to the existing literature
This article relies on the cross-sectional eects of dierent MPs, and their role in the
default risk of the rms. To position our chapter in the current literature, we organize
the existing articles around three major elds: the interaction among dierent MPs,
the impact of MP in the default risk of the rms and the role of MPs in managing the
systemic risk.
The cooperation between a domestic and foreign monetary authorities in a two-country
world has already been suggested in the theoretical research. For example, Rogo (1985)
argues that under certain circumstances the monetary policy cooperation can be coun-
terproductive, leading to higher ination scenarios. Obstfeld and Rogo (2002) conclude
that even in a world tightly linked with world productivity shocks, it is not necessarily
problematic that countries unilaterally design their monetary policy in an inward-looking
decision-making process. In opposition to those arguments, Pappa (2004) recently allude
at the cooperation between monetary authorities  the Fed and ECB  because of the
high degree of trade links between the US and the Eurozone.
Concerning the literature analyzing the eects of MP in the default risk of rms, we
outline two major groups.4 On the one hand, some studies deal with the eect of default
risk on lending supply. For example, Altunbas et al. (2010) nd that banks with low
(high) default risk supply more (less) loans during periods of rising 3-month Euribor
rates. Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) also nd that banks with higher default
probabilities have supplied less loans under a MP tightening during the recent crisis
period. On the other hand, some papers explore the role of interest rates on default
probabilities. For example, Altunbas et al. (2011) nd that the eect of changes in MP
rates on the default probability changes of banks is positive. Jiménez et al. (2011) assume
4These trends can also be organized within the two main eects of the MP described by the banking
literature: the bank lending and the bank risk-taking behavior. The rst strand studies the inuence
of monetary policy on the bank lending supply (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). This lending channel
of monetary transmission has been empirically tested using aggregate (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992;
Kashyap et al., 1993) or specic (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jiménez et al., 2012) measures of lending.
With regard to the risk-taking behavior, the related literature has analyzed the impact of MP on the
willingness to take on risk in a search for yield (Rajan, 2006) or the softening of lending standards
(Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Jiménez et al., 2007)
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that banks can foresee the default probability of a loan, and use a dummy variable for
rms with doubtful loans ratio as a measure that resembles an ex ante measure of credit
risk. In this way, this chapter is closer to Jiménez et al. (2011), where we take ex-ante
measures of credit risk as seen by the credit derivatives markets. As a corollary of this
issue, Altunbas et al. (2010) argue that traditional accounting measures such as bank
size, liquidity or market capitalization are no longer informative about the bank lending
supply nor their nancial stability, especially during distressed periods. These authors
suggest that this is due to the nancial innovation, the securitization, the o-balance
sheet accounts and the mark-to-market accounting.
Previous evidences mainly stress the MP eect over the supply and/or default risk of
loans. In other words, they focus on the asset side of the banks' balance sheet. More
recently, there is an increasing attention to the eects of MP on the liability side of the
rms and on the nancial markets. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) nd that unexpected
changes in the Federal funds target rate are negatively related to the returns of stock
indexes. Therefore, a tight monetary policy increases the riskiness of a rm either
through higher interest costs and weaker balance sheets, or reducing the willingness of
investors to bear risk. This article directly addresses the eect of monetary policy on the
creditworthiness of individual rms, stressing their liability side and ability to reimburse
their debts.
Finally, systemic risk has become a new challenge for monetary authorities. Although
MP rules are not designed to mitigate systemic risk, recent evidence suggests that mon-
etary authority actions and the systemic risk might be endogenous. For example, MPs
have acted as lenders of last resort or lowered interest rates as reaction to the sharp
increments of systemic risk levels. With regard to the former, the central banks have
provided liquidity in emergency situations to solvent but illiquid banks. In this way,
pre-crises literature has paid attention to the possible creation of an international lender
of last resort (Fischer, 1999; Goodhart, 1999; Repullo, 2000). The consequences of poli-
cies on the risk taking behavior has been partially addressed. For example, Acharya
(2009) and Acharya et al. (2010) point out that Basel agreements, designed to constrain
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the individual risk of banks, are not a suitable tool to manage systemic risk. Then,
the monetary policy that only supervises the systemic risk of its own rms might be
short-sighted.
4.2. The data set
Our empirical analysis involves the matching of several data sources to address the
monetary policy inuence on the creditworthiness of individual and aggregate rms.
Finally, we also present the set of control variables employed. This section describes
them in detail.
4.2.1. Monetary policy variables
The primary monetary policy tool used by Monetary Authorities is the short-term in-
terest rate market. This is a conventional mechanism to aect the cost of external
nancing for all the agents in the economy. The policy rates represent the general
stance of monetary policy. Our study pays attention to foreign monetary policies, but
for practical purposes, we restrict our sample to two representative developed monetary
regions. These are the US and the Economic and Monetary Union of the European
Union (EMU), which issue the dollar and the euro currencies.
The general functioning of the short-term interest rate is the following. First, the Mon-
etary Authority sets the nominal or target interest rate, then the eective interest rates
at which participant banks borrow will be closed to the target rate. The ECB considers
as key rates, the interest rates on the Main Renancing Operations (ECBMRO), deposit
facilities and marginal lending facilities. Marginal lending facilities and deposit facilities
determine the range where the eective overnight reference rate for the euro (EONIA)
moves. And the ECBMRO interest rate is the target rate for the EONIA.5 In the US
case, the Federal Reserve publishes a target rate (FEDTRG) for the Eective OverNight
5For more information, go to http://www.ecb.int/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html and
http://www.euribor.org
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Federal Funds rate (FEDON).6 The ECBMRO and the FEDTRG represent the general
stance of monetary policy in Europe and the US. For a more detailed description of
these two markets, refer to Benito et al. (2007) and Piazzesi (2005).
4.2.2. Default probability variables
Traditionally, the banking literature has measured rm's specic default risk by means
of accounting information. An important caveat of those measures is that they reect
ex-post default risk (e.g. Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Jiménez et al., 2013). We innovate
on introducing information from the credit market that reects ex-ante probabilities of
default. These market based variables have the advantage that they specically price
the default risk of a rm. Moreover, their premium not only includes a compensation for
default risk, but also a reward for the expected future changes in the creditworthiness
of the issuer (Jarrow et al., 2005; Berndt et al., 2005; Díaz et al., 2013). In this way,
Gilchrist et al. (2009) and Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek (2012) nd that credit spreads are a
robust predictor of future economic activity. Surprisingly enough, the predictive ability
of credit spreads mainly comes from the price of default risk rather than the default risk
itself.
We employ the information from the credit derivatives market to extract (risk-neutral)
default probabilities.7 In particular, we use the credit default swap (CDS) contract, a
credit derivative that provides insurance against the default of a reference entity. The
CDS spread is the amount paid (in basis points) in a quarterly basis by the protection
buyer to the protection seller. CDSs are traded in a lower friction market than the bond
6For more information, go to http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm
7Alternatively, we also employ actual default probabilities from the Expected Default Frequency (EDF)
estimates of Moody's KMV. The EDF data are forward-looking default probability measurements
built with a version of the Merton (1974) model that combines accounting and stock market infor-
mation. The EDFs default probabilities are comparable to credit ratings. Literature suggests that
EDFs provide a higher predictive power than credit ratings (Kealhofer, 2003; Vassalou and Xing,
2004; Korablev and Dwyer, 2007; Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Campbell et al., 2008). EDFs have
already been used in the related literature in Altunbas et al. (2011). More recently, some papers
(Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Campbell et al., 2008) argue that the default prediction can be im-
proved by using a reduced-form econometric approach, although they still stress the high default
predictive power of measures based on the Merton (1974) model.
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market, and there exists a consensus among the nancial literature on using CDS spreads
as measures of default risk (Longsta et al., 2005). To build a simple estimator of the
default probabilities from CDS spreads we follow Berndt and Obreja (2010), where the
conditional default probability of default (Qt ) in a small time interval t results in
Qt (T ) = 4log

1 +
CDSt(T )
4LGDt

(4.1)
with CDSt(T ) as the CDS spread with maturity T and LGDt as the loss given default,
both obtained from Markit. To translate these conditional default probabilities into cu-
mulative (risk-neutral) default probability we just replace the default intensity estimates
in the following formula
Qt(T ) = 1  e t(T )T (4.2)
where the default probability depends on the constant default intensity of an homoge-
neous Poisson process.
Our sample consists on corporate default swap contracts that belong to the US and
the EMU monetary regions. In particular, we select the constituents of CDX and iTraxx
investment grade indexes, two standardized portfolios that comprise the most liquid
corporate CDS contracts from the US (CDX) and Europe (iTraxx). This selection
presents two main advantages. First, rms belonging to those indexes are the most
liquid in the CDS market, so our conclusions are less likely to be biased by liquidity
frictions. Second, the index constituents correspond to larger and internationalized
rms, which usually present a large debt outstanding in the market. This circumstance
makes those rms potentially exposed to foreign monetary authorities.
The dataset comprises a full spectrum of CDS spreads with maturities ranging from
6 month until 30 years. Our analysis mainly focuses on the probabilities extracted
from the 5-year CDS spreads  the most liquid maturity , but we also extend our
estimations to other maturities for robustness. The period under study comprises from
Jan/2000 to Dec/2009. The rst CDS spread observation is available in Jan-2001, as the
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credit derivatives market has been recently developed. We use only the end-of-month
observations of CDS spreads. For US rms, we use CDS contracts denominated in US
dollars with the Modied Restructuring clause, and for European rms, we use CDS
contracts denominated in Euros with the Modied-Modied Restructuring clause.8 As
a result, we have data for 210 rms from the US and Europe, where 169 of them are
investment grade. Table 4.1 shows that our sample is distributed along a wide class of
countries, industries, and ratings. The data is taken from the Markit database.
In addition to the information about rm's specic default risk provided by default
swaps, our database also provides information about aggregate corporate credit risk.
More in detail, we use the CDX and iTraxx indexes and tranche quotes from Markit. The
payo structure of those indexes equals to that of a collateral debt obligation (CDO),
where the payments are allocated following a priority rule. According to their risk,
equity (senior) investors agree to suer the rst (last) losses within the portfolio.9 For
example, the senior CDO tranches resemble the behavior of bonds that default under
severe economic conditions (Coval et al., 2009). They are frequently used as a measure
of systemic risk because they contain prices on the default of a large number of rms.
The data sample spans from Jul/2005 to Dec/2009. Other periods have been dropped
because of liquidity concerns.
4.2.3. Control variables
Finally, we control for observable rm characteristics that can aect the rms' sensitiv-
ity to monetary policies. In particular, we use three main rm characteristics: assets
8The restructuring clause denes the credit events that trigger settlement. The main dierence is
the maximum maturity of the deliverable obligation in case of a restructuring: 30 months in the
Modied Restructuring clause, and 60 days in the Modied-Modied Restructuring clause.
9As the market requires upfront payments, we follow O'Kane and Sen (2003), Amato and Gyntelberg
(2005) and Houdain and Guegan (2006) to transform the upfront payment to a running spread.
Thus, a tranche with an upfront payment of 37.5%, a running spread of 500 basis points and risky
duration of 3.75 is equivalent to a contract with a running spread of (37.5*100/3.75) + 500 basis
points 1,500 basis points. We assume a risky duration of 3.75 to translate upfront payments
into running spreads. Additionally, to compute a systemic default risk measure we also need the
default-free term structure. We use the LIBOR-swap curve for US and the EURIBOR-swap curve
for Europe by the bootstrapping method, which is usual in credit derivatives pricing.
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Table 4.1.: Distribution of rms across sectors, average ratings and countries
BM CG CS Fin HC Ind OG Tech TC Util Total
Panel A.- By rating
AAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AA 0 0 1 9 1 1 1 0 0 2 15
A 3 7 6 12 5 7 2 5 3 9 59
BBB 8 14 26 2 4 17 6 2 9 7 95
BB 0 4 9 0 1 3 2 0 2 0 21
B 2 2 4 2 1 3 0 1 0 2 17
CCC 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
NR 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Panel B.- By country
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
France 0 2 6 4 0 3 2 0 2 3 22
Germany 3 5 1 4 1 2 0 0 1 3 20
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Italy 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 2 8
Luxembourg 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Netherlands 2 2 2 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 11
Portugal 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Spain 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 5
United States 7 19 38 11 11 23 8 7 6 8 138
Panel C.- Overall
TOTAL 13 28 47 26 12 31 11 8 14 20 210
This table shows the distribution of rms across dierent sectors, average rat-
ings and countries. Ratings vary from AAA to CCC, and NR in case of a
non rated rm. Sectors correspond to Basic Materials (BM), Consumer Goods
(CG), Consumer Services (CS), Financial (Fin), Health Care (HC), Industrials
(Ind), Oil & Gas (OG), Technological (Tech), Telecommunications (TC) and
Utilities (Util). The sample period goes from Jan-2000 to Dec-2009.
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liquidity (LIQ) measured as Cash and Receivables over Total Assets, capital ratio (CAP)
measured as Shareholders' Equity over Total Assets, and assets size (SIZE) as the natural
logarithm of the Total Assets.
We also include some control variables that potentially might aect the default risk
of rms. For example, the dollar-euro exchange rate (USD-per-EUR) is a standard
control for possible currency exposure of rms. Within the context of our analysis, we
consider the exchange rate as an exogenous variable. Although this issue could result
controversial in the case of currency crises, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) do not nd a
clear causal link between currency crises and banking crises. Both causal directions are
possible between the two types of crises. They nd that in general the banking crises
begin before the currency collapse, and that the consequences are more severe when
currency crisis and banking crisis happen together, than when they are isolated.
Another usual macroeconomic control is the term spread, measured as the dierence
between the 10- and 2-year government bond yields. More precisely, we employ the
US and German government bonds (TERM-US and TERM-EMU, respectively). The
reason is that in times of low short-term interest rates, when new stimuli are needed,
central banks proceed with unconventional policies to facilitate government borrowing.
In November 3rd 2010, the Fed announced a purchase of $600 billion of Treasury securi-
ties to avoid deation risk.10 Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) use intra-day
data in an event study approach to analyze the channels through which the Federal Re-
serve's announcements of long-term bonds' purchases  known as Quantitative Easing 
lower long-term interest rates. In September 21st 2011, the Fed announced the purchase
of $400bn of long-dated Treasuries nanced with the sale of short-term securities. It
was nicknamed as `Operation Twist' because it sought to change the shape of the yield
curve.11 Similar policies were conducted by the ECB in order to calm the bond markets
of the weakest countries. Central banks are able to aect the shape of the term structure
through unconventional purchases of long-dated securities.
10See announcement on: http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_101103.html
11See announcement on: http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/operating_policy_110921.html
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4.3. Crossover eects of monetary polices: a rm level
approach
This section analyzes the existence of a crossover eect where the decisions of foreign
monetary authorities impact on the rm's specic default risk. We stress the role of the
internationalization of the rms as a transmission channel for foreign monetary policies.
4.3.1. Measuring the exposure to foreign monetary policies
We suggest that rms with more foreign operations are more aected by foreign monetary
policies. In this way, our main assumption is that the degree of internationalization
enables a risk transmission channel from outside monetary policies to national rms:
the larger the foreign business, the higher the impact of foreign policy. Although this
assumption is not new in the literature, we introduce an innovation when extending
this idea to the corporate sector and when studying the eect on the default risk. For
example, banks and rms hold an important amount of their assets and liabilities in
foreign currencies (Grammatikos et al., 1986; Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003; Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2007; Tille, 2008). Foreign holdings are exposed to exchange rate risk
and interest rate risk and even if the currency exposure is hedged, foreign interest rate
risk arises whenever a rm mismatches the maturities of its foreign currency assets and
liabilities (Grammatikos et al., 1986).
To empirically analyze the exposure to foreign monetary policies, we rst identify the
degree of internationalization of the rms. The most common measure of internation-
alization is the Foreign Sales as Percentage of Total Sales (TFSALEP). This variable
measures the exposure to foreign sources of income, and it is available in Compustat for
US rms.12 The external sources of costs might oset and reduce the foreign exposure
of the rm, because the TFSALEP variable only includes foreign sales. To control for
12Since 1997, rms are required to disclosure this information by the Statement of Financial Account-
ing Standards (SFAS, 131). The regulation is available at: http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas131.pdf .
However, the Compustat database only keeps track of the last 7 years, and we can only obtain the
size of foreign sales since 2005.
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this issue, we dene the variable FORINC
FORINC =
jForeign Pretax Incomej
jDomestic Pretax Incomej+ jForeign Pretax Incomej (4.3)
as the ratio of foreign income or loss over the total amount of domestic plus foreign
income or loss. To construct the variable FORINC, we use the domestic and foreign pre-
tax income.13 We employ absolute values because rms could have negative domestic
and/or foreign income, which complicates the construction of a simple measure of foreign
exposure for rms.
Similar variables to measure foreign exposure have been previously employed by the
literature. For example, Sullivan (1994) created an aggregated measure of the degree
of internationalization of a rm based on ve dierent ratios.14 Bodnar and Weintrop
(1997) demonstrate the importance of foreign earnings for multinational rms, because
the domestic and foreign earnings changes have signicant positive associations with ex-
cess stock returns. Other literature links the foreign operations with currency exposure.
Jorion (1990) and Pantzalis et al. (2001) nd that the rms' stock returns currency ex-
posure is related to the fraction of total sales made overseas by U.S. multinationals. For
this reason, other research like Geczy et al. (1997) and Allayannis and Weston (2001)
use foreign operations (measured by foreign sales or foreign pre-tax income) as proxies
for foreign exchange-rate risk. More in detail, they nd that rms using currency deriva-
tives have greater foreign operations; the use of foreign currency derivatives is positively
associated with rm market value in rms with foreign operations, and it is not associ-
ated with rm market value for rms without foreign operations. Moreover, rms with
larger foreign operations are more likely to issue foreign currency debt to hedge their
exposure (Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003).
13It is also mandatory for rms to report the foreign and domestic components of pre-
tax income, according to the SEC Regulation §210.4-08(h). This regulation is avail-
able at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title17-vol2/pdf/CFR-2011-title17-vol2-sec210-
4-08.pdf .
14Unfortunately, this procedure is not advisable for us: rstly, the information to construct the measure
of Sullivan (1994) is not available for our entire sample. Secondly, the eect of foreign monetary
policy on the rm's default risk depends on the nature of international exposure: a long or a short
position.
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4.3.2. Sample descriptive statistics
Table 4.2 provides detailed information on the country of origin for the rms that appear
in the most popular rankings on largest foreign investments: the Forbes and UNCTAD
rankings. Forbes magazine has a raking of the top 100 largest foreign investments in
the US.15 By 2002, out of these 100 rms, 43 belong to the Eurozone, and 22 of them
are in our sample. With respect to the UNCTAD ranking, our sample includes 51 out
of the 100 top non-nancial corporations by absolute total foreign assets from 2000 to
2008.16 When considering the top 50 nancial corporations by foreign-to-total aliates
and number of foreign aliates for the period 2003 to 2009, 14 out of 50 rms are in our
sample. Not surprisingly, our sample is composed of large rms as the total asset value
of the US rms in sample was estimated in $6.439 trillion during 2007, representing the
46% of GDP of the United States. In the European case, our sample was worth e14.726
trillion during 2007, resulting in approximately the 163% of the GDP of the Eurozone.
Table 4.2.: Number of largest foreign rms by ranking
US US sample Europe EMU EMU sample
Largest foreign investments in US 65 43 22
World's top 100 non-nancials (2000-2008) 39 17 85 61 34
World's top 50 nancials (2003-2009) 16 2 47 32 12
Each row is related to a ranking made by Forbes or UNCTAD. The rst row is
the 2002 Forbes' ranking titled The Largest Foreign Investments In The US.
It is a ranking of the 100 largest investments in the US by foreign rms by the
revenue they make in the US. The second row is the 2000-to-2008 UNCTAD's
annual rankings of The world's top 100 non-nancial Transnational Corpora-
tions, by the size of the foreign assets. And the third row refers to the 2003,
2004, 2006, 2008, and 2009 UNCTAD's annual rankings of The Top 50 nancial
Transnational Corporations ranked by the foreign-to-total aliates ratio and
the number of host countries. The columns represent the number of rms that
belong to the regions where the rm is headquartered (US, Europe, or EMU),
and the number of rms that belong to our US or EMU sample.
15According to Forbes, the foreign rms are ranked with the absolute amount
of revenue they get from US investments. This information is available at
http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2002/0722/foreign.html
16The UNCTAD classication ranks the world's top transnational corporations (TNC). A description of
UNCTAD is available at http://archive.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID 2443&lang 1
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Table 4.3 summarizes all rm-level accounting information that we could collect from
Compustat Global Vantage, Compustat North America, and UNCTAD's rankings. Un-
fortunately, the variables TFSALEP and FORINC are not available for banks, and they
are only observable in the 62% of the original sample of US rms. For EMU rms, we only
have at our disposal the information in the UNCTAD rankings about the foreign-to-total
Sales (TFSALEP), foreign-to-total Assets (FORASS), and foreign-to-total Employment
(FOREMP). And this information is only available for the 47% of the EMU rms in our
sample. When we consider also the information in UNCTAD on FORASS and FOREMP
for US rms, we only have information on 17 US companies. In our sample, an average
rm has a foreign-to-total Sales ratio of 32% in US and 62% in EMU countries. This
means that it is likely that our EMU sample is more biased towards more international
rms than the US sample.
Table 4.3.: Accounting numbers
US (millions of US dollars EMU (millions of Euros
Variable # Firms Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # Firms Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(rm-year (rm-year
Panel A.- Annual Reports
otal Assets (AT 138 1360 37786.61 83227.01 1061.6 1060505 72 716 155581.2 298330.6 4049 2202423
Cash & S Investments (CHE 136 1349 1872.195 4972.014 0 74585 72 716 16452.88 45648.77 23.677 410541
Accounts Receivable (RECT 123 1216 2591.056 4062.256 0 30726 57 566 8492.469 14129.11 333.7 123366
Equity (SEQ 136 1342 9705.416 14755.51 -3532 152027 72 716 13953.92 13111.59 -9951 69501
Net Sales (SALE 138 1359 21421.56 32785.95 19.317 402298
Domestic Pretax Income (PIDOM 86 623 1051.218 5668.84 -105179 16239
Foreign Pretax Income (PIFO 86 623 1098.83 2179.012 -3582 14957
Panel B.- Ratios
LIQ ([CHE +RECT ]=AT 136 1342 .1624036 .1309679 .0007407 .6744421 72 716 .2131364 .1367624 .0029687 .9040849
CAP (SEQ=AT 136 1342 .321075 .1517489 -.1440755 .8097345 72 716 .2279833 .1448286 -.0933604 .6865051
Foreign-to-total Sales (TFSALEP 87 388 .324949 .2222151 0 1 34 123 .6304407 .1864184 .1775217 .9651292
FORINC (jPIFOj=[jPIDOM j+ jPIFOj] 86 623 .3403981 .2741099 0 .999
FORASS 17 204 .5357274 .1952422 .0594807 .9975873 34 122 .56041 .195678 .0840584 .9526457
FOREMP 17 204 .4979036 .1897753 .0399986 .9655092 34 121 .5732295 .1742303 .0512187 1
This table summarizes annual corporate information for the rms in our sam-
ple during the period 2000-2009. The data is mainly obtained from Compustat
Global Vantage. The Compustat Mnemonics are between brackets. For US
rms, the variables SALE, TFSALEP, PIDOM and PIFO are obtained from
Compustat North America. For EMU rms, the variables TFSALEP, FORASS
and FOREMP are obtained from the 2000-to-2008 UNCTAD's annual rankings
of The world's top 100 non-nancial Transnational Corporations. The ac-
counting numbers are reported in millions of US dollars for US rms and in mil-
lions of Euros for EMU rms. The variables LIQ, CAP, TFSALEP, FORINC,
FORASS, and FOREMP are ratios between 0 and 1.
The high degree of correlation observed in Table 4.4 between the aggregate measures of
foreign exposure is in agreement with previous ndings of Sullivan (1994) and Kedia and
Mozumdar (2003). In the empirical research these variables are sometimes dropped due
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to multicollinearity, because they do not provide additional information by themselves
regarding the level of rm's default risk. Despite the high degree of correlation, the
proxies can provide signicant information about the impact of foreign monetary policy
in the rm's default risk. And the sign of foreign monetary policy inuence on default
risk can dier depending if the rm has long or short foreign net position. For this
reason, we keep the measures of internationalization separate instead of using one single
measure as in Sullivan (1994).
Table 4.4.: Pairwise correlations
US EMU
LIQ CAP SIZE TFSALEP FORINC FORASS FOREMP LIQ CAP SIZE TFSALEP FORINC FORASS FOREMP
LIQ 1.0000 1.0000
CAP 0.1194 1.0000 0.1492 1.0000
SIZE -0.1383 -0.1253 1.0000 -0.2898 -0.5783 1.0000
TFSALEP 0.3183 -0.0471 0.1402 1.0000 0.1732 0.2639 -0.5263 1.0000
FORINC 0.3501 -0.0405 0.1328 0.6978 1.0000
FORASS 0.2110 0.3911 -0.5511 0.6531 0.7168 1.0000 -0.1550 0.3444 -0.6466 0.7078 1.0000
FOREMP 0.3363 0.2561 -0.4832 0.7023 0.7243 0.7780 1.0000 -0.0707 0.3220 -0.6524 0.7164 0.7585 1.0000
This table reports pairwise correlations in the period 2000-2009. The data is
obtained from Compustat Global Vantage and Compustat North America. For
each rm, the variables LIQ, CAP and SIZE are linearly interpolated from year
to monthly frequency using the Compustat Global Vantage dataset from 1999
to 2010. For the variables TFSALEP, FORINC, FORASS and FOREMP, we
only use the sample average between 2000 and 2009, because the large number
of missing values does not allow for interpolation.
The accounting information obtained from Compustat and UNCTAD's rankings is
scarce, it is not available for all rms, and certainly not available for every year. For
each rm, the variables LIQ, CAP and SIZE are transformed from annual to monthly
frequency by linear interpolation from the years 1999-to-2010.17 Regarding the proxies
for foreign exposure, the variables TFSALEP, FORINC, FORASS and FOREMP are
unobserved for many years and interpolation is not possible. For that reason, we only use
the sample average from 2000-to-2009 as a measure of the degree of internationalization.
17The results of our empirical ndings remain regardless of the type of interpolation and even if we
only use the sample average. This is because the accounting characteristics are important sources
of rm information in the cross-section, but not in the time dimension.
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4.3.3. Research design
The Figure (4.1) represents our two-monetary-authority world with regional targets (un-
employment, ination and growth). Nevertheless, the MP rates can aect domestic rms
or foreign rms with foreign exposure. In this fashion, foreign monetary authorities can
contribute to the domestic banks' loan supply and to the nancial (in)stability of do-
mestic rms. At an aggregated level, a large systemic event can give rise to periods of
low economic activity, high ination and high unemployment. In this section, we study
empirically what types of rms are more likely to be aected by a foreign monetary
policy  the crossover eect.
Figure 4.1.: Risk transfer owchart
We want to analyze empirically the inuence of short-term monetary policy on the
rms' default risk as seen by the credit markets. And we are especially interested on
identifying whether rms with more foreign operations are more aected by foreign
monetary policy. Our empirical strategy is based on running for each monetary region
panel regressions with the following general specication
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logit (PDit(M)) = 1STratet 1 + 01Firmit 1  STratet 1 + 001DOIi  STratet 1 (4.4)
+ 2Foreign STratet 1 + 
0
2Firmit 1  Foreign STratet 1 + 002DOIi  Foreign STratet 1
+ CONTROLSt 1(USD/EUR, GDP growth, Ination, LTrate, Term Spread)
+ 0 + 
0
0Firmit 1(Firm Dummy, Financials Dummy, LIQ, CAP, SIZE)
+ 000DOIi(TFSALEP, FORINC, FORASS, FOREMP)+ "it
where logit (PDit(M)) is the logistic transformation ln (PDit=(1  PDit)) of the prob-
ability of default measure PDit(M) of rm i at month t for the horizon M . This logistic
transformation assures that the probability of default is dened in the zero-one interval.
It is important to notice that this is not a logistic regression where the dependent vari-
able is an historical variable that takes value 1 when a default happens and 0 otherwise.
We observe directly the forward looking default probabilities. The logit transformation
guarantees that the probability of default PDit(M) of a rm i at time t over the next M
years is bounded between zero and one. The error term "it captures all other factors not
captured by the macroeconomic variables used that aect the rms' default probability.
We cluster the standard errors by rm and month in case the residuals are correlated
across rms or along time as suggested by Petersen (2009). In the robustness analysis
we also use GLS estimation and the dynamic model of Arellano and Bond (1991).
The variables STratet 1 and Foreign STratet 1 are the domestic and foreign short-
term interest rate at time t   1. We use the target interest rate as a measure of short-
term monetary policy, but in robustness analysis we also employ the eective short-term
interest rate and the Taylor rule residuals.
To identify the type of rms that are more exposed to the monetary policy, we interact
the short-term interest rates with three types of rm characteristics. First, we use a
dummy variable for nancial rms (FIN). The reason is that the nancial sector is the
rst sector that suers more directly the monetary policy changes. Moreover, the number
of nancial rms in our sample is too small to derive further and general statements.
Second, we use the capital ratio, the liquidity ratio and the rms' size as in Jiménez
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et al. (2012) as basic and aggregate rm-risk characteristics. And third, we use measures
about the degree of internationalization or the degree of foreign operations (DOI) for
every rm.18 The use of DOI variables reduces the sample substantially. For instance,
the foreign-to-total sales ratio is only available for half of the original sample. Notice
that the capital, liquidity and size have been interpolated to monthly frequency, and
for the DOI variables we only use the sample average due to the lack of data. It is
important to highlight that the results do not change due to the interpolation or the
interpolation methodology, because the rm characteristics mainly give cross-sectional
information and not time-series information.
In order to isolate the eect of short-term interest rates on bank loans' lending stan-
dards from other macroeconomic variables Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) use the 10-year
long-term government bond interest rate (LTrate), the GDP growth, and the ination
rate. In our study, the business cycle is a relevant control since the rate of default
tends to increase during bad economic conditions. To obtain a monthly measure of the
business cycle, we use the annual growth on quarterly nominal GDP and interpolate
it to monthly frequency as Jiménez et al. (2012) does. Results are unaected if we do
not interpolate. In the baseline model, we only consider the domestic macroeconomic
controls. In robustness, we also include the foreign macroeconomic controls, and the
main ndings remain.
The empirical strategy consists on performing initially the panel regression with the
domestic and foreign monetary policy, and adding stepwise the macroeconomic, rm
and DOI controls.
4.3.4. Empirical results
The main results that we nd in our empirical study are summarized in Table 4.5. This
table displays dierent specications for the 5-year risk-neutral default probability. We
proceed by adding stepwise the macroeconomic, rm and DOI controls.
18The DOI measures are not available for banks
97
Chapter 4. Foreign monetary policy and rms' default risk
T
ab
le
4.
5.
:
P
an
el
re
gr
es
si
on
fo
r
5-
ye
ar
im
pl
ie
d
de
fa
ul
t
pr
ob
ab
ili
ti
es
on
ta
rg
et
in
te
re
st
ra
te
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
le
l
o
g
i
t
(
Q
i
t
(
5
Y
)
)
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
r
e
g
i
o
n
U
S
E
M
U
M
o
d
e
l
I
)
I
I
)
I
I
I
)
I
V
)
V
)
V
I
)
V
I
I
)
V
I
I
b
)
V
I
I
I
)
I
X
)
I
)
I
I
)
I
I
I
)
I
V
)
V
)
V
I
)
V
I
I
)
V
I
I
I
)
I
X
)
C
o
n
s
-
2
8
4
-
3
3
7
-
1
0
3
-
1
0
6
-
1
9
2
-
2
0
2
0
9
0
-
3
6
3
0
0
5
-
0
1
1
-
3
1
2
-
3
2
9
-
0
4
6
-
2
2
0
-
1
4
4
7
-
1
0
8
3
-
8
2
6
-
8
0
3
-
6
8
2
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
0
)
0
1
2
)
0
1
0
)
0
4
4
)
0
0
6
)
0
9
9
)
0
9
3
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
6
9
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
.
U
S
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
p
o
l
i
c
y
F
E
D
T
R
G
t
 
1
-
2
9
2
6
-
3
0
1
6
-
1
3
5
9
2
4
5
8
2
8
5
6
3
7
9
1
-
2
8
8
8
3
2
8
7
-
3
2
6
3
-
3
2
4
0
-
4
5
5
3
-
1
6
8
5
-
1
4
7
2
2
3
9
3
5
7
0
5
2
5
4
4
3
7
2
1
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
2
)
0
0
2
)
0
0
0
)
0
2
9
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
2
5
)
0
0
7
)
0
0
6
)
0
3
6
)
0
1
7
)
F
I
N
i

F
E
D
T
R
G
t
 
1
-
2
2
6
9
-
2
1
0
4
-
2
1
2
5
-
1
7
9
6
-
1
7
2
4
-
2
0
3
6
-
1
7
3
0
-
1
4
4
2
-
1
4
1
4
-
8
4
5
-
1
3
9
7
-
4
4
8
-
8
0
8
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
5
)
0
0
3
)
0
0
6
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
2
2
)
0
0
4
)
L
I
Q
i
;
t
 
1

F
E
D
T
R
G
t
 
1
0
5
8
-
9
2
3
-
1
4
7
6
-
1
7
0
4
-
8
6
6
-
1
2
3
0
1
2
1
1
7
2
1
1
1
6
9
9
7
0
9
4
)
0
2
9
)
0
1
4
)
0
3
5
)
0
3
3
)
0
9
0
)
0
9
9
)
0
3
4
)
0
1
7
)
0
2
3
)
C
P
i
;
t
 
1

F
E
D
T
R
G
t
 
1
-
6
4
4
-
2
0
7
-
6
1
7
-
1
4
0
4
-
2
3
4
3
0
2
-
6
5
5
7
6
5
0
9
2
1
8
9
0
3
9
)
0
8
4
)
0
5
7
)
0
6
3
)
0
8
2
)
0
7
5
)
0
4
6
)
0
5
9
)
0
9
3
)
0
8
6
)
S
I
Z
E
i
;
t
 
1

F
E
D
T
R
G
t
 
1
-
3
5
9
-
4
4
5
-
4
9
7
0
3
2
-
4
3
8
-
2
5
3
-
3
6
9
-
6
3
7
-
3
7
1
-
3
3
7
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
8
7
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
9
)
0
1
1
)
T
F
S
L
E
P
i

F
E
D
T
R
G
t
 
1
1
0
0
0
5
3
9
9
6
4
-
1
6
3
7
-
2
6
0
6
-
2
5
7
3
0
1
0
)
0
6
5
)
0
1
1
)
0
1
3
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
0
)
F
O
R
I
N
C
i

F
E
D
T
R
G
t
 
1
7
7
2
0
1
9
)
F
O
R
S
S
i

F
E
D
T
R
G
t
 
1
5
0
9
9
-
2
3
7
9
-
2
1
0
1
0
0
3
)
0
1
0
)
0
1
4
)
F
O
R
E
M
P
i

F
E
D
T
R
G
t
 
1
-
2
6
9
1
4
5
0
0
4
3
2
4
0
3
3
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
P
a
n
e
l
B
.
E
M
U
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
p
o
l
i
c
y
E
C
B
M
R
O
t
 
1
3
2
6
2
3
5
5
6
1
8
0
7
2
4
1
2
5
5
3
0
2
4
9
2
9
7
5
6
1
9
-
7
7
3
2
1
6
8
3
1
6
7
3
0
7
1
7
9
3
2
2
7
9
8
2
5
5
1
6
6
-
2
9
7
2
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
5
)
0
4
3
)
0
6
5
)
0
8
4
)
0
1
3
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
1
6
)
0
9
4
)
0
9
6
)
0
3
9
)
F
I
N
i

E
C
B
M
R
O
t
 
1
1
7
3
0
9
9
1
-
1
0
7
8
9
8
2
2
3
0
1
9
9
3
1
8
0
9
2
2
6
1
1
8
4
9
1
8
8
0
1
8
2
6
1
8
5
9
1
3
3
7
0
0
5
)
0
1
9
)
0
2
0
)
0
2
2
)
0
7
8
)
0
0
3
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
4
)
L
I
Q
i
;
t
 
1

E
C
B
M
R
O
t
 
1
7
0
8
5
6
6
3
1
0
3
3
5
6
7
7
3
4
9
3
1
3
6
-
5
6
2
7
0
5
1
2
1
5
1
1
0
6
0
3
2
)
0
5
8
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
1
)
0
5
2
)
0
6
8
)
0
4
4
)
0
4
9
)
C
P
i
;
t
 
1

E
C
B
M
R
O
t
 
1
1
4
6
4
2
3
2
9
1
8
0
7
2
9
6
7
3
5
0
7
1
9
5
5
2
7
7
4
4
7
1
5
4
9
3
5
5
0
0
6
0
1
1
)
0
0
6
)
0
1
8
)
0
0
6
)
0
3
4
)
0
1
4
)
0
1
1
)
0
0
4
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
1
)
S
I
Z
E
i
;
t
 
1

E
C
B
M
R
O
t
 
1
-
4
6
1
-
1
1
8
0
9
3
0
5
4
2
1
4
0
9
4
3
4
0
6
1
7
5
7
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
)
0
3
6
)
0
4
9
)
0
7
3
)
0
5
5
)
0
4
8
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
4
)
0
0
2
)
0
0
1
)
T
F
S
L
E
P
i

E
C
B
M
R
O
t
 
1
-
2
9
8
4
-
3
3
0
7
-
2
9
7
7
-
1
5
9
2
-
1
8
5
9
-
1
8
1
5
0
0
0
)
0
0
2
)
0
0
0
)
0
3
6
)
0
4
7
)
0
4
4
)
F
O
R
I
N
C
i

E
C
B
M
R
O
t
 
1
-
2
2
1
2
0
0
0
)
F
O
R
S
S
i

E
C
B
M
R
O
t
 
1
-
6
7
5
9
4
1
3
4
3
6
0
5
0
1
5
)
0
0
8
)
0
0
8
)
F
O
R
E
M
P
i

E
C
B
M
R
O
t
 
1
4
7
7
6
-
3
5
7
4
-
3
1
3
8
0
1
0
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
2
)
P
a
n
e
l
C
.
M
a
c
r
o
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
U
S
D
/
E
U
R
t
 
1
-
0
9
9
-
0
8
8
-
0
9
0
-
0
8
1
-
0
8
4
-
0
8
0
-
0
8
8
-
0
5
7
-
0
4
6
-
0
7
3
-
0
9
5
-
1
0
1
-
1
1
9
-
1
2
1
-
1
0
9
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
1
)
0
3
7
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
3
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
G
D
P
G
-
U
S
t
 
1
-
1
6
2
8
-
1
5
2
9
-
1
4
6
4
-
1
3
6
6
-
1
4
2
8
-
1
3
0
5
-
1
3
9
3
-
1
2
5
9
-
9
0
1
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
G
D
P
G
-
E
M
U
t
 
1
-
6
4
5
-
7
3
7
-
2
2
0
3
-
4
0
7
-
1
8
0
2
-
1
8
6
4
-
1
8
3
3
-
1
2
0
2
0
0
9
)
0
1
3
)
0
0
0
)
0
3
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
1
)
I
n

a
t
io
n
-
U
S
t
 
1
1
4
7
5
1
2
3
4
1
3
9
3
1
1
6
1
1
1
7
5
1
0
8
8
1
3
3
5
0
8
7
-
5
4
0
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
8
5
)
0
3
6
)
I
n

a
t
io
n
-
E
M
U
t
 
1
2
3
6
8
3
4
4
9
0
3
7
9
1
1
0
8
9
1
0
4
6
1
0
7
0
3
9
5
7
0
0
3
)
0
7
1
)
0
1
6
)
0
2
9
)
0
0
7
)
0
0
5
)
0
0
5
)
0
0
0
)
1
0
-
y
e
a
r
r
a
t
e
-
U
S
t
 
1
-
3
2
1
9
-
2
3
3
8
-
3
0
3
3
-
2
2
1
3
-
2
1
9
1
-
2
0
3
5
-
2
8
9
0
-
1
4
2
2
-
1
4
7
6
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
1
3
)
0
1
1
)
1
0
-
y
e
a
r
r
a
t
e
-
E
M
U
t
 
1
-
8
2
6
-
7
4
9
-
4
8
5
9
-
1
8
7
-
3
9
3
3
-
4
1
6
5
-
4
1
3
0
-
1
5
2
9
0
4
7
)
0
5
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
8
4
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
2
0
)
T
E
R
M
-
U
S
t
 
1
1
6
6
5
-
3
9
0
1
4
7
9
-
4
1
4
-
8
3
5
-
7
1
0
-
1
3
7
2
-
1
6
3
6
-
1
7
3
0
0
0
)
0
5
9
)
0
0
0
)
0
5
7
)
0
2
8
)
0
3
5
)
0
1
7
)
0
1
1
)
0
8
7
)
T
E
R
M
-
E
M
U
t
 
1
3
0
9
9
-
9
0
4
0
3
0
3
6
-
6
3
4
8
3
4
4
3
3
6
8
1
3
7
0
5
5
3
8
5
0
0
4
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
7
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
4
)
0
0
3
)
0
0
3
)
0
0
0
)
P
a
n
e
l
D
.
F
i
r
m
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
L
I
Q
i
;
t
 
1
-
1
7
1
-
1
6
8
-
2
4
4
-
2
3
6
-
4
8
4
-
2
4
9
-
0
5
8
-
0
3
3
-
1
0
7
-
1
4
1
-
1
1
3
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
3
8
)
0
4
4
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
1
)
C
P
i
;
t
 
1
-
3
3
8
-
3
4
8
-
3
3
5
-
3
7
9
-
0
5
8
-
3
3
8
-
0
5
2
-
1
6
7
-
2
3
0
-
2
2
0
-
2
6
5
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
7
5
)
0
0
0
)
0
4
0
)
0
0
3
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
1
)
0
0
0
)
S
I
Z
E
i
;
t
 
1
0
2
2
0
2
3
0
2
4
0
2
7
0
0
3
0
2
3
1
4
1
0
9
4
0
7
4
0
7
3
0
5
6
0
0
5
)
0
0
5
)
0
1
3
)
0
0
8
)
0
9
4
)
0
1
4
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
0
0
1
)
T
F
S
L
E
P
i
-
6
2
0
-
6
1
6
0
0
0
)
0
0
0
)
F
O
R
I
N
C
i
1
9
8
0
0
0
)
F
O
R
S
S
i
F
O
R
E
M
P
i
F
ir
m
d
u
m
m
y
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
N
o
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
F
I
N
d
u
m
m
y
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
Y
e
s
O
b
s
F
ir
m
-
m
o
n
t
h
)
1
2
4
8
0
1
2
4
8
0
1
2
4
8
0
1
2
4
8
0
1
2
3
4
6
1
2
3
4
6
8
0
6
4
8
1
0
6
1
3
8
9
8
0
6
4
5
3
6
7
5
3
6
7
5
3
6
7
5
3
6
7
5
3
6
7
5
3
6
7
2
5
5
7
2
5
5
7
2
5
5
7
R
2
-
d
j
0
1
5
5
0
0
7
2
3
4
0
7
7
7
8
0
7
8
5
9
0
8
0
1
2
0
8
1
2
3
0
7
9
4
2
0
7
9
0
4
0
7
8
0
0
0
7
9
6
1
0
4
4
4
7
0
6
7
1
7
0
6
5
2
6
0
7
5
9
8
0
7
2
5
1
0
8
0
3
5
0
8
2
3
4
0
8
3
0
0
0
8
4
3
2
P
a
n
el
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
fo
r
th
e
cu
m
u
la
ti
ve
ri
sk
n
eu
tr
a
l
d
ef
a
u
lt
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
ie
s.
H
er
e,
i
st
a
n
d
s
fo
r

rm
,
a
n
d
t
st
a
n
d
s
fo
r
ti
m
e.
T
h
e
p
-v
a
lu
es
re
p
o
rt
ed
co
m
e
fr
o
m
cl
u
st
er
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
b
y

rm
a
n
d
b
y
ti
m
e,
a
s
su
g
g
es
te
d
b
y
P
et
er
se
n
(2
0
0
9
)
to
co
rr
ec
t
th
e
fa
ct
th
a
t
th
e
re
si
d
u
a
ls
m
ay
b
e
co
rr
el
a
te
d
a
cr
o
ss

rm
s
o
r
a
cr
o
ss
ti
m
e.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
st
s
o
f
m
o
n
th
ly
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
fo
r
1
3
8
U
S
a
n
d
7
2
E
M
U

rm
s
co
n
st
it
u
en
ts
o
f
th
e
C
D
X
a
n
d
iT
ra
x
x
in
d
ex
es
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
g
o
es
fr
o
m
J
a
n
-2
0
0
0
to
D
ec
-2
0
0
9
.
98
Chapter 4. Foreign monetary policy and 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The models I-II show the most naive specication with only domestic and foreign
target monetary policy interest in our two monetary regions US and EMU. In case
of model II, we include rm dummies that proxy for unobservable time-invariant rm
specic characteristics such as the risk management ability. The estimations show that
an increase in the Fed rates decreases the default probabilities, but an increase of the
ECB rates increases the default probabilities. The eect is more pronounced for nancial
rms. This very general empirical nding is robust to the specication of the regression,
the data that we use (CDS or EDF), and even the maturities (unreported).
In order to control for other missing variables, we include the macroeconomic controls
in models III-IV. Lower USD/EUR exchange rate, lower domestic GDP growth, and
higher domestic ination rate, and lower domestic long-term interest rates lead in general
to higher default probabilities in the US. Although in Europe their statistical signicance
depends on the specication.
There exists the possibility that domestic monetary policy is endogenously aected by
rms' default probabilities. We believe that domestic monetary policy has been fairly
exogenous to rms' default risk for two reasons. Firstly, because monetary authorities
haven't decisively showed their intentions for macro-prudential regulation until 2010 with
the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the European Systemic Risk
Board. And secondly, for a given rm, the monetary policy is quite exogenous to its
unconditional default probability. Monetary authorities are more likely to endogenously
respond to aggregate measures of systemic default events that lead to a large number
of rms defaulting together. We will analyze this in the next section. Nevertheless, we
exclude the domestic monetary policy in model IV and the sign of foreign monetary
policy remains.
Why the US and EMU short-term interest rates aect negatively and positively 
respectively  the rms' default risk? The interpretation is not so clear. We can think
of two straightforward and complementary explanations for this behavior. Firstly, the
FEDTRG and the ECBMRO are not in sync as we can see in Figure (4.2), because both
monetary authorities pursue dierent economic targets. And the default probabilities
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might have a common movement between US and EMU rms as it seems in the examples
of Figure (4.3). The dierent MP rates, and the similar timing of default probability
levels would explain the dierent signs of the coecients. Secondly, and most interest-
ingly, the signs of the monetary policy rates would make sense if the rms in our sample
held long positions (assets) in euros, and short-positions (liabilities) in dollars. This is
partially corroborated by the negative sign of the exchange rate control for US and EMU
rms. An US rm with assets denominated in euros facing an increase in the exchange
rate, would have a higher dollar value of its assets and lower default probability. And
an European rm with dollar denominated liabilities facing an increase in the exchange
rate, would have a lower euro value of its liabilities and therefore lower default proba-
bility. This possibility might be too simplistic. In practice, it is not possible to know
the exposure of a rm to foreign interest rates, if we do not know the composition of
domestic and foreign assets and liabilities, and their maturity structure (Grammatikos
et al., 1986) nor their derivative contracts.
Figure 4.2.: Monetary Policy Rates
Jan00 Mar01 Apr02 May03 Jun04 Aug05 Sep06 Oct07 Nov08 Dec09
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Ba
sis
 P
oin
ts
 
 
FEDTRG
FEDON
ECBMRO
EONIA
End of month observations. The period goes from Jan/2000 to Dec/2009.
The theory that directly relates the eects of monetary policy on rms' default risk
is scarce. Bhamra et al. (2011) explains that xed-income corporate obligations with a
xed nominal coupon increases the incentives of rms to default due to the monetary
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Figure 4.3.: Median default probabilities implied from CDS spreads
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End of month observations. The period goes from Jan/2000 to Dec/2009.
policy inuence on expected ination. In the dynamic model of González-Aguado and
Suarez (2012), the eect of monetary policy on aggregate default rates depends on the
horizon, and on the type of rm. A positive shift in the risk-free rate makes non-mature
rms (dened as rms that never reached their target leverage ratio) to default in the
short-run. Whereas mature rms tend to default more in the short-run under an interest
rate cut because they have to adjust to their new, higher target leverage. Instead, higher
interest rate reduces rms' target leverage and produces lower default rates in the long
run. We will describe evidence that for our set of large and international rms, their
degree of international operations inuences their exposure to foreign monetary policy.
What type of rm in our sample is more exposed by monetary policy? The models
V-VI include the capital, liquidity and size controls and its interactions with the short-
term rates to identify the rms. The rm controls show, as expected, that the market
assigns higher risk for rms with lower liquidity and capital. Although for EMU rms,
the controls are not signicative unless we add further controls. With the interactions
of rm controls with short-term interest rates, we can identify the type of rms more
exposed to monetary policy. When we exclude domestic monetary policy in specication
V, a tightening of foreign monetary policy decreases the probability of default for larger
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rms. In model VI, a domestic monetary tightening aects more larger rms, but the
sign is dierent for US rms than for EMU rms. So far, we haven't been able to
identify a rm characteristic that interacted with the monetary policy is systematically
signicant, keeps a consistent sign across all specications, and is able to explain the
monetary exposure identied in models I-IV.
Does the degree of foreign operations explain the foreign monetary policy exposure?
The models VII-IX feature the same regression than model VI but including the variables
that measure the rms' degree of internationalization and their interaction with short-
term interest rates. The disadvantage is that by including DOI variables, our sample
decreases approximately by half, and does not include banks.
In the case of US rms, the model VII yields an interesting result: a loosening of
foreign monetary policy increases the default probability of rms with higher foreign-to-
total sales. In the model VIIb we repeat the estimation but instead of the foreign-to-
total sales ratio we use our measure of foreign income or loss (FORINC). The variable
FORINC measures the degree of internationalization of a rm taking into account netted
foreign expenses that can decrease long foreign exposure and without considering the
sign of the foreign exposure (positive or negative foreign income). Similarly, the eect
of foreign monetary policy is stronger for rms with higher FORINC. In general, US
rms with higher degree of foreign sales or income increase  respect to rms with no
FORINC  their default probability when the foreign monetary authority loosens the
interest rates. The model VIII includes the interaction with the variables FORASS and
FOREMP that we were able to collect for a few rms from UNCTAD rankings, but they
are not signicant and the negative sign of the interaction with TFSALEP remains.
The dotted coecients reported come from dropped variables due to multicollinearity.
The interaction with the dummy variable FIN is dropped because there are no nancial
rms with available FORASS and FOREMP. The variables TFSALEP, FORASS, and
FOREMP are dropped due to their high level of correlation reported in Table 4.4 and in
the studies of Sullivan (1994) and Kedia and Mozumdar (2003). Finally, the model IX
repeats the model VII including the foreign macroeconomic controls. The interaction
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of TFSALEP with the foreign monetary policy keeps as a signicant source of foreign
monetary policy exposure.
In the case of EMU rms, the models VII-IX repeat the same specications. Similarly
to the US rms, the size seems to be an important characteristic for monetary policy
exposure in some specications, but it is not robust to all specications. Again we
can't obtain a general conclusion regarding liquidity, capital or size being the source of
foreign monetary policy exposure. Contrary to the US scene, the variable FOREMP 
which proxies the structural costs that a rm faces abroad  is also a source of exposure
to the Federal Reserve short-term interest rates. And the sign of the interaction is
the opposite of the interaction between TFSALEP and the foreign MP interest rates.
Both variables TFSALEP and FOREMP are a measure of DOI, but their nature diers.
The former proxies for foreign resources, and the latter proxies for foreign obligations.
This dierent nature would explain the opposite signs of their interactions with foreign
monetary policy.
In general, a loosening of the monetary policy in the US, or a tightening of the mon-
etary policy in the Eurozone can lead to higher default probabilities for any rm in
any country and for any maturity (unreported). In the cross-section, US rms with
larger proportion of foreign sales have higher exposure to foreign monetary policy. And
EMU rms with higher foreign-to-total employment ratio are more exposed to foreign
monetary policy. The magnitude of the estimated coecients implies a reasonably eco-
nomically signicant relationship between the default probability and the interaction of
foreign monetary policy with the degree of foreign operations.
For example, based to the specication VII of Table 4.5, an average US non-nancial
rm with a cumulative 5-year market implied default probability of 10%, a liquidity ratio
of 16%, a capital ratio of 32%, a log-size of 9.7, and a ratio of foreign-to-total sales of 32%
during a period of average ECB interest rates of 3% would decrease its default probability
up to 8.32% if the monetary policy decreased 1% (the sample standard deviation) up to
2%.19
19The calculation for an average US rm with average foreign sales is: 1=(1 + exp( (ln(0:10=(1  
0:10))+ (9:75+18:09  0+31:03  0:16+ 18:07  0:32+0:96  9:7  29:84  0:32)  ( 0:01)))) = 8:32%
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On the contrary, an identical rm without foreign sales, would decrease its default
probability up to 7.62% if the monetary policy decreased 1% from 3% up to 2%.20 In
this case, a foreign monetary policy shock leads to a 23.8% decrease in the default
probability of a rm without foreign sales, and only a decrease of 16.8% if the rm has
average foreign-to-total sales ratio.
4.3.5. Robustness checks
In this section we conduct a series of robustness checks. In the rst place, we check
other denitions of monetary policy. In the second place, we reduce the frequency from
monthly to quarterly. And in the third place, we test other estimation methodologies.
The target interest rate does not determine by itself the short-term interest rates. For
instance, in the Eurozone, the eective interest rate not only depends on the rate of
the main renancing operations, but also on the marginal lending facility, the deposit
facility, and the type of auction (Benito et al., 2007). For this reason, we display for EMU
rms in Table 4.6 the same specication of the model VIII from Table 4.5, where instead
of the target interest rate, we use the eective interest rate. Moreover, we repeat the
regression for all horizons available of CDS implied default probabilities and EDF real
default probabilities. Across all maturities and default measures, the rms with more
foreign employment are more exposed to the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve.
The coecient is relatively constant for every maturity. This means, in general, that
under an increase in foreign monetary policy, the change in the log odds ratio is the
same for all maturities, and the change in the default probability is higher for higher
horizons.
20The calculation for an average US rm without foreign sales is: 1=(1 + exp( (ln(0:10=(1  0:10)) +
(9:75 + 18:09  0 + 31:03  0:16 + 18:07  0:32 + 0:96  9:7  29:84  0)  ( 0:01)))) = 7:62%
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Chapter 4. Foreign monetary policy and rms' default risk
Other concern is that the MP rates are partially determined by other macroeconomic
variables. In the most simple monetary policy rule of thumb, as the Taylor rule, the
monetary authority sets the target interest rates depending on the levels of GDP growth
and ination (Taylor, 1993, 2009). The Figure 4.4 plots the residuals of such Taylor
rule. The residuals represent how tight or how loose the monetary policy is respect
to the simplest Taylor rule. As example, the Table 4.7 displays for US rms the same
specication of model VII from Table 4.5 where we use the Taylor rule residuals as a
measure of tightness in the monetary policy. Results show across all maturities and
default measures that a tightening of ECB monetary policy under the Taylor rule has a
dierent eect on rms with higher proportion of foreign sales.
Figure 4.4.: Taylor rule residuals
Jan00 Mar01 Apr02 May03 Jun04 Aug05 Sep06 Oct07 Nov08 Dec09
−300
−200
−100
0
100
200
300
Ba
sis
 P
oin
ts
 
 
US Taylor residuals
EMU Taylor residuals
The graph shows the Taylor rule residuals at monthly frequency. Tay-
lor rule residuals are the residuals of the regressions of FEDTRG and
ECBMRO rates on their respective GDP growth and ination over the
period Jan/2000 to Dec/2009. The annual GDP growth has been linearly
interpolated from quarterly to monthly frequency.
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There are two other concerns in the results showed so far. To begin with, if the errors
are autocorrelated the estimated parameters might not be appropriate. We reduce the
frequency from monthly to quarterly to alleviate the possibility of autocorrelated errors
and also the importance of the interpolation applied on some variables that are not ob-
served at high frequencies. Lastly, there might be unobservable or omitted time-variant
macroeconomic variables, hence we will perform the regressions including a quarter
dummy.
The Table 4.8 reports the results of three dierent models at quarterly frequency.
The rst model I is estimated by OLS assuming iid errors, and reports the p-values
that come from clustered standard errors by rm and quarter. The model II reports
GLS coecients imposing heteroscedastic errors across rms and a rm-specic AR(1)
structure. The GLS estimates are known to be more ecient, but it comes at the price
of imposing an error structure.
The third model measures directly the persistence of the log odds ratio transformation
of market implied default probabilities, and assumes contemporaneous shocks from ex-
ogenous variables. Jiménez et al. (2013) estimated a similar a dynamic model where their
dependent variable ex-post measure of bank risk-taking is the log odds transformation
of the non-performing loans ratio. And Delis and Kouretas (2011) estimated a similar
dynamic model and used the ratio of risk assets to total assets and the non-performing
loans ratio as dependent variables that measure bank risk-taking. In our dynamic model,
the rm characteristics and their interactions with domestic monetary policy (xit) can
be endogenous if they respond to past shocks in the rm's specic default probabilities.
Technically, a variable xit is endogenous if E[xit"is] 6= 0 for s  t and E[xit"is] = 0 for all
s > t. We use the estimation methodology of Arellano and Bond (1991) and use up to
four lags of the rm characteristics and their interactions with the domestic monetary
policy to instrument for these potentially endogenous variables.
In the US monetary region, models I to III conrm that the degree of foreign sales is
an important source of foreign monetary policy exposure. In comparison, models I to
III also conrm for the Eurozone that the foreign monetary policy exposure depends on
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Table 4.8.: Panel regression for 5-year implied default probabilities on target interest
rates at quarterly frequency.
Dependent variable logit (Qit(5Y ))
Monetary Region US EMU
Model (I (II (III (I (II (III
Estimation OLS FGLS Arellano and Bond (1991 OLS FGLS Arellano and Bond (1991
Cons. -1.02 -5.44 -1.93 -10.59 -1.32 -2.66
(0.33 (0.46 (0.00 (0.00 (0.49 (0.00
logit (Qi;t 1(5Y )) 0.70 0.63
(0.00 (0.00
Panel A.- US Monetary policy
FINiFEDTRGt -3.95 .
(0.05 .
FINiFEDTRGt 1 -15.94 -10.18 . .
(0.06 (0.01 . .
LIQi;tFEDTRGt 0.68 1.19
(0.84 (0.80
LIQi;t 1FEDTRGt 1 -6.23 -12.35 7.50 0.44
(0.51 (0.01 (0.38 (0.96
CAPi;tFEDTRGt 4.71 1.71
(0.16 (0.76
CAPi;t 1FEDTRGt 1 -1.46 -7.75 0.86 2.60
(0.89 (0.13 (0.93 (0.74
SIZEi;tFEDTRGt -2.22 -0.81
(0.00 (0.42
SIZEi;t 1FEDTRGt 1 -4.63 -2.70 -3.15 0.33
(0.00 (0.00 (0.19 (0.83
TFSALEPiFEDTRGt 2.19 -14.77
(0.31 (0.00
TFSALEPiFEDTRGt 1 5.05 4.25 -30.10 -29.35
(0.42 (0.24 (0.00 (0.00
FORASSiFEDTRGt -7.58
(0.18
FORASSiFEDTRGt 1 -22.13 -13.43
(0.14 (0.23
FOREMPiFEDTRGt 20.44
(0.00
FOREMPiFEDTRGt 1 45.82 46.40
(0.00 (0.00
Panel B.- EMU Monetary policy
FINiECBMROt 7.40 .
(0.03 .
FINiECBMROt 1 26.44 9.22 . .
(0.01 (0.14 . .
LIQi;tECBMROt 4.76 4.28
(0.43 (0.62
LIQi;t 1ECBMROt 1 31.66 32.78 6.72 -7.03
(0.05 (0.00 (0.71 (0.63
CAPi;tECBMROt -2.92 13.84
(0.61 (0.17
CAPi;t 1ECBMROt 1 18.33 21.89 50.86 29.55
(0.24 (0.01 (0.02 (0.03
SIZEi;tECBMROt 2.22 3.86
(0.00 (0.03
SIZEi;t 1ECBMROt 1 1.89 -0.45 8.05 4.36
(0.24 (0.68 (0.00 (0.08
TFSALEPiECBMROt -8.45 7.25
(0.03 (0.36
TFSALEPiECBMROt 1 -26.91 -18.05 0.22 23.00
(0.00 (0.00 (0.99 (0.04
FORASSiECBMROt 17.66
(0.07
FORASSiECBMROt 1 35.71 18.07
(0.07 (0.27
FOREMPiECBMROt -21.41
(0.02
FOREMPiECBMROt 1 -40.56 -42.72
(0.00 (0.00
Panel C.- Firm controls
LIQi;t -1.05 -0.27
(0.00 (0.22
LIQi;t 1 -2.70 -2.26 -0.84 -0.46
(0.00 (0.00 (0.09 (0.29
CAPi;t -0.93 -1.11
(0.00 (0.00
CAPi;t 1 -3.16 -2.74 -2.75 -1.71
(0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00
SIZEi;t 0.14 0.10
(0.01 (0.13
SIZEi;t 1 0.19 0.18 0.48 0.33
(0.20 (0.00 (0.03 (0.00
TFSALEPi -6.08 5.09 . . -4.38 .
(0.00 (0.74 . . (0.00 .
FORASSi . -3.24 .
. (0.11 .
FOREMPi . -0.95 .
. (0.32 .
Panel D.- Unobservable eects
Firm dummy Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
FIN dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. (Firm-quarter 2706 2706 2524 858 858 790
R2-Adj 0.8256 0.8829
Wald statistic 7347.47 13257.92 4805.00 8441.29
(0.00 (0.00 (0.00 (0.00
Panel regressions for the 5-year cumulative risk neutral default probability. Here, i stands for rm, and
t stands for time. The p-values are reported between parenthesis. In the OLS estimation, the p-values
reported come from clustered standard errors by rm and by quarter, as suggested by Petersen (2009) to
correct the fact that the residuals may be correlated across rms or across time. The Feasible Generalized
Least Squares (FGLS) estimation allows residuals to be heteroscedastic across rms and assumes a rm-
specic AR(1) error structure. The dynamic model is estimated with the Arellano and Bond (1991)
procedure by treating the rm characteristics and their interactions with the domestic monetary policy
as endogenous. We use up to four lags to instrument for the endogenous variables. The sample consists of
quarterly observations for US and EMU rms constituents of the CDX and iTraxx indexes. The sample
period goes from Jan-2000 to Dec-2009.
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the proportion of foreign employment.
Using the CDS prices to construct a measure of market implied default probabilities,
we nd evidence that the rms' default risk exposure to foreign monetary policy de-
pends on the rms' degree of internationalization. This statement is relatively robust to
numerous macroeconomic controls (exchange rate, business cycle, ination, long-term
interest rates, term spread), rm controls (liquidity, capital ratio, size, rm xed ef-
fects), unobservable time-varying factors (time dummies), the geography (US or EMU),
the frequency (monthly or quarterly), the denition of monetary policy (target interest
rate, eective interest rate or Taylor-rule residuals), the type of forward default proba-
bility (market implied or real default probability), the horizon of the default probability
(from 6 months up to 30 years), and the methodology (pooled panel data regression and
dynamic panel data with endogenous domestic monetary policy).
4.4. Unexpected monetary policy shocks
So far, we have focused on the overall credit market relationship with a foreign monetary
policy. This section focuses on the immediate impact of monetary policy the credit
market. Understanding the direct links between monetary policy and asset prices is
important for understanding the policy transmission mechanism (Bernanke and Kuttner,
2005).
The empirical approach summarized in equation (4.5) presents some obstacles in or-
der to safely say that the foreign monetary policy indeed aects international rms'
default probabilities. Among the main concerns are endogeneity, simultaneity, omitted
foreign monetary policies, other omitted variables, stickiness of the monetary policy or
non conventional monetary policies at near-zero interest rates. Furthermore, the asset
markets are forward looking and tend to incorporate information about future monetary
policy (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005). These empirical issues make it dicult to safely
disentangle the eect (if any) of foreign monetary policies on market implied default
probabilities.
110
Chapter 4. Foreign monetary policy and rms' default risk
Most recent studies try to circumvent the previous concerns by measuring the unex-
pected changes in the target rate by the monetary authorities. They use the overnight
interest rates futures market forecast errors as measures of exogenous, unforeseeable
changes in the stance of monetary policy (Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008). To construct
the unexpected changes in US and European monetary policy, we need futures contracts
on eective short-term interest rates. For the US, we use the 30-Day Federal Funds
Futures from the Chicago Board of Trade and for the Eurozone we use the EUREX
One-Month EONIA Futures.21 We follow the approach of Kuttner (2001) to construct
the unexpected changes from futures on the interest rates controlled by the monetary
authorities
iu =
D
D   d
 
f 0m;d   f 0m;d 1

(4.5)
where f 0m;d is the current-month futures rate. The change in the futures price on
day d is scaled by the number of days D   d remaining in the month m.22 Assuming
that no further monetary policy changes are expected within the month, and that the
premium embedded in the futures market does not change from one day to the next
in the event of a monetary policy change, this method provides a good gauge of 1-
day surprise target change (see Kuttner, 2001). As the risk premia embedded in the
futures change at business-cycle frequencies, one-day changes in near-term futures on
the day of a monetary policy announcement can be safely interpreted as a measure of
monetary policy shock robust to the presence of risk premia (Piazzesi and Swanson,
2008; Hamilton, 2009).
21More information available at:
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/stir/30-day-federal-fund_contractSpecs_futures.html and
http://www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/products/int/mon/14664/
22Similarly to Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), we use the unscaled change in the
futures rate to calculate the funds rate surprise when the change occurs within the last 3 days of
the month. Also, in case of an event the rst day of the month, I use the 1-month futures rate from
the last day of the previous month f1m 1;D instead of f
0
m;d 1. The monetary policy changes by the
Fed, ECB and other central banks in September 17th, 2001 after the twin towers attack have been
removed from the sample. We also exclude from the analysis October 8th, 2008 because the Bank
of Canada, the Bank of England, the ECB, the Federal Reserve, Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss
National Bank simultaneously announced reductions in policy interest rates.
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The vast majority of the empirical research on the reaction of nancial markets to
policy surprises is focused on the stock market. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) docu-
ments that an unanticipated 25-basis-point cut typically leads to a 1% increase in the
stock market index. They hypothesize that two main reasons might be behind this phe-
nomenon. First, that tight money increases the risk-aversion of investors. And second,
that tight money increases the rm's riskiness due to higher interest costs or weaker
balance sheets. In order to identify the source of the reaction, Ehrmann and Fratzscher
(2004) and Basistha and Kurov (2008) study the cross-sectional reaction of stocks that
belong to the S&P500. They nd that rms with higher credit and nancial constraints
are more aected by domestic monetary policy. Our empirical approach using ex-ante
measures of default risk allows to better disentangle the asymmetric eects and focus
on the default risk channel of monetary policy transmission.
The related literature has also studied the foreign stock market reactions to deci-
sions by the Federal Reserve (eg. Wongswan, 2006; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009).
Wongswan (2009) and Hausman and Wongswan (2011) nd that the cross-sectional re-
sponse of the foreign equity indexes to surprise changes in the federal funds rate depends
on the degree of nancial integration with the United States, measured as the percentage
of each country's equity market capitalization owned by U.S. investors. At rm level,
Ammer et al. (2010) study foreign stocks and nd stronger stock price reactions to U.S.
monetary policy surprises for rms with higher ratio of foreign sales to total sales.
Following a similar approach to the literature on monetary policy surprises, we esti-
mate the rms' default risk response to surprises in monetary policy rates as described
in equation (4.6). More specically, we conduct an event study where the daily change
in the log-odds ratio reacts to unexpected changes of monetary policy the days that the
Federal Reserve or the ECB decided to change interest rates
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logit (PDi;t(M)) = 0 + 
0
0FedEvent+ 1SALESi;j + 2Surprisej;t (4.6)
+ 3SALESi;j  Surprisej;t
+ 4SALESi;j  Surprisej;t  FedEvent
+ "it
Related research like Cenesizoglu and Essid (2012) and Zhu (2013) found that cor-
porate bond yield indexes widen (narrow) following an unexpected tightening (easing)
in monetary policy during periods of distress. In the equation (4.6) we measure the
eect of domestic and foreign monetary policy shocks on rm level measures of default
risk.23 The regression (4.6) pools together the US and EMU rms. Both the surprises
of the Fed and the ECB that happen at disjointed events are included in the variable
Surprisej;t where j represents the monetary region. Next, we introduce two types of
cross-sectional reaction in the default probabilities. First, the variable DOIi;j introduces
the dierent reaction depending on the rm's degree of internationalization. Second,
the dummy variable FedEvent distinguishes the Fed changes from the ECB changes of
interest rates.
We have created the variable SALES to proxy for the percentage of sales to the
monetary region j that suers a policy shock. This variable is measured as the percentage
of foreign sales in the case of rms experiencing a shock in foreign monetary policy, and
is measured as one less the foreign-to-total sales ratio in the case of rms experiencing a
shock in domestic monetary policy. This denition of SALES allows us to pool all the
surprises into one single regression instead of doing the analysis separately for the US
23Gürkaynak et al. (2005) provide evidence that besides the target surprise introduced by Kuttner
(2001), it is also needed the surprise on the expected path of future monetary policy (path surprise)
to fully capture monetary policy surprises. For example, Wongswan (2009), Ammer et al. (2010)
and Hausman and Wongswan (2011) measure the path surprise by running a regression of the daily
change in 1-year-ahead Eurodollar interest rates futures and the target surprise measured as in
equation (4.5) around FOMC's change in the target rate. However, we do not include the path
surprises because they rarely exert a signicant impact on credit spreads (Zhu, 2013). Moreover,
due to data limitations we can only measure 17 ECB surprises, and the small sample would not
allow us to construct the path surprises in the Eurozone.
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and Europe.
The results showed in the Table 4.9 reinforce our previous statement that foreign
monetary policy leads to higher default risk change for rms with a higher degree of
internationalization. The rms with larger exposure to Europe experience a decrease in
their default probability when facing an unexpected tightening event by the ECB. And
rms with larger exposure to the US suer an increase in their default probability when
there is an unexpected tightening of the interest rate in a Fed event.
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4.5. The endogenous relationship between MP and aggregate
default risk
This section discusses the endogenous relationship between monetary policy and the
aggregate level of default risk. This section is divided into three subsections. In the
rst, we provide a brief review of the literature on systemic risk measurement. In the
second, we describe our modeling framework to measure the probability of a systemic
event. In the third subsection, we evaluate the sensitivity of our systemic risk measure
to the impact of intervention rate shocks.
4.5.1. Measures of systemic risk
Previous empirical evidence in the Section 4.3 shows a signicant eect of (external)
monetary policies on the individual default risk. An interesting question is whether the
monetary policy mechanisms are useful for handling the aggregate level of default risk
in the economy. In this way, this section extends our study to broader aspects of credit
risk.
The measurement of aggregate default risk constitutes a major issue for academics
and regulators. On the regulatory side, the policy authorities have created specic insti-
tutions to monitor systemic risks as the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the US
or the European Systemic Risk Board in the Eurozone. With regard to the academic
side, one promising area of research is the analysis of systemic events.24 Das and Uppal
(2004) dene systemic risk as the risk of infrequent events that are highly correlated
across a large number of assets. They study the eects of this risk in portfolio diversi-
cation, concluding that systemic risk reduces the gains from international diversication
and penalizes investors for holding levered positions. More recently, systemic risk has
been associated with the common exposures of nancial institutions. Acharya (2009)
24Classifying a certain event as systemic can be a judgment call at most times. For instance, the Federal
Reserve rejected to bail out Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the largest bankruptcy in the US
at the time. Two days after, the Fed rescued the insurance company AIG for its large exposition to
the credit derivatives market, which could resulted in a collapse of the entire nancial system.
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denes systemic risk as the joint failure risk due to the endogenously chosen correlation
across assets held by banks.
In parallel with that literature, the latest developments provide indicators of systemic
risk. The recent measures of systemic risk have been dened as large losses in the
in the nancial system. For example, Lehar (2005) estimates a time series of bank
asset values implied from the structural model of Merton (1974). Lehar (2005) uses
simulation techniques to build an indicator of systemic risk as the probability that more
than a certain fraction of all banks go bankrupt at the same time. Similarly, Huang
et al. (2009) extract individual default probabilities and asset correlations from CDS
and stock prices, respectively. Their systemic indicator represents the price for insuring
a hypothetical portfolio of bank liabilities issued by a set of US banks.
Similarly, Acharya et al. (2010) consider that a systemic event takes place when the
aggregate bank capital in the nancial system falls below a certain threshold. They
denote the Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES) as the contribution of each nancial in-
stitution to systemic risk. Finally, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) posit the CoVaR
measure, which is becoming a standard in the systemic risk measurement. This measure
captures the marginal contribution of a specic bank to the overall systemic risk. In
particular, the CoVaR is computed as the dierence between the VaR of the entire
nancial system when the bank is in distress and the VaR of the entire nancial system
when the bank is not in distress.
4.5.2. Modeling framework and results
Macro-prudential supervision and monetary policy seek the stability of the banking sys-
tem and the stability of rms that belong to other sectors also. Within the context of our
modeling framework, we dene systemic default risk as the instantaneous probability of
an event that produces a market-wide default of rms. Under this denition of systemic
risk, some recent crisis as the dot-com bubble with large default consequences could
be considered as systemic, even though it was not originated by the nancial system.
Along these lines, our denition agrees with Das and Uppal (2004) or Longsta and
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Rajan (2008), who consider the possibility of an event that aects the entire economy,
instead of focusing on a particular rm or sector.
We employ the model of Longsta and Rajan (2008) to obtain a time-varying estimate
of the probability of a market-wide event that aects the entire economy. Their model
provides prices for a standard portfolio of CDSs.25 The value of this portfolio depends
on the default of its constituents, i.e. the higher the default probability, the higher the
portfolio's value. Longsta and Rajan (2008) captures the losses of the portfolio (Lt)
with the unpredictable arrival of three independent Poisson processes
Lt = 1  e 1N1;te 2N2;te 3N3;t (4.7)
representing the probability of an idiosyncratic, sector or market-wide impact in the
portfolio, respectively. The independent Poisson processes Ni;t have default intensities
it, with i = 1; 2; 3. The impact of the default arrival is captured by the constant
i = 1  e i . Finally, the initial value of the portfolio is set to L0 = 0, and 0  Lt  1.
Using data from the CDS indexes and their tranches, Longsta and Rajan (2008)
provide an econometric approach for estimating the parameters of model (4.7). Contrary
to other measures that rely on discretionary thresholds to dene systemic events (see
Lehar, 2005; Huang et al., 2009; Acharya et al., 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011),
our approach endogenously determines the time evolution of the systemic risk. The
Table 4.10 displays the estimates of Longsta and Rajan (2008) model. The results
correspond to those with the best model t. We run the optimization with dierent
initial parameters until convergence. The parameter 3 has a size of approximately
50% to 60%. Roughly speaking, the estimated systemic default risk is the probability
25This credit derivative is known as Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). There are several liquid
CDOs that are permanently traded in the market as the CDX NA IG index, which comprises the
125 most liquid CDS contracts of US rms. Similarly, the iTraxx index represents the 125 most
liquid European CDS rms. The CDO issues claims with dierent priority against the cash-ows
generated by the portfolio. These derivatives are named CDO tranches and they vary from high
(equity tranche) to low (senior tranche) default risk of the payos. It is important to highlight that
approximately a 30% of the rms contained in the iTraxx do not belong to the Eurozone. As we will
explain later, we nd a ubiquitous systemic risk measure in the CDX and iTraxx tranches, which
diminishes the importance of European Non-EMU rms being included in the EMU systemic risk
measure.
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that approximately 50% to 60% of the debt in the portfolio defaults in a small time
period. On average, in the period Jul/2005 to Dec/2009, there is a 0.007t conditional
probability of a systemic event happening in a small time interval t.
Table 4.10.: Longsta and Rajan (2008) estimates
Level i mean(i) med(i) std(i) min(i) max(i) Obs:
Panel A.- Europe (iTraxx)
Firm 0.0102 0.5011 0.4840 0.1131 0.3057 0.6674 54
Industry 0.0813 0.0385 0.0069 0.0549 0.0018 0.2088 54
Systemic (SYS-US) 0.5994 0.0071 0.0043 0.0073 0.0004 0.0274 54
Panel B.- United States (CDX.NA.IG)
Firm 0.0152 0.5919 0.4861 0.2874 0.2705 1.0000 54
Industry 0.1021 0.0177 0.0046 0.0300 0.0010 0.1346 54
Systemic (SYS-EMU) 0.5295 0.0075 0.0039 0.0076 0.0004 0.0262 54
Estimates of systemic risk and summary statistics along time. We use monthly
information from CDX.NA.IG and iTraxx indexes and their tranches from
Jul/2005 to Dec/2009. We assume a risky duration of 3.75 to transform the
upfront payments into running spreads, and a recovery rate of 40%.
The Figure 4.5 depicts the evolution through time of our proxies for the systemic
default risk in the US (SYS-US) and in Europe (SYS-EMU). This Figure shows the
ubiquitous nature of systemic risk. Even though we have employed data of dierent
economic regions, the paths of systemic risk share a common trend behavior. This may
suggest that systemic risk is highly transferable between regions.
4.5.3. Monetary policy and systemic default risk
We turn next to explore the endogenous relationship between the monetary policy and
our measure of aggregate default risk. It is possible that monetary authorities react to
shocks in the systemic default risk of the economy (Figure 4.1). And it is also possible
that the monetary policy exerts power on the systemic risk undertaken by the economy.
We test this endogenous relationship with a multivariate representation of the aggregate
economy. This methodology is a common practice in the literature to assess the responses
of aggregate variables to the stance of monetary policy. For instance, see the examples in
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Figure 4.5.: Systemic risk in US and Europe.
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Systemic risk measured as in Longsta and Rajan (2008) with the
CDX.NA.IG and iTraxx indexes and their tranches. End of month ob-
servations from Jul/2005 to Dec/2009
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) or Benati and Surico (2009).
In practice, the Vector Autoregressive representation in our data is not stable due
to the presence of unit roots and the short time period  from Jul/2005 to Dec/2009.
Instead, we use a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) that includes ination, unem-
ployment, GDP growth and our proxy for the systemic default risk. Table 4.11 reports
the estimates of a VECM for each monetary region separately. To better understand
the results, we conduct an impulse-response analysis between the monetary policy rates
and the systemic risk for each economic region.
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The Figure 4.6 depicts the results. On one side, a systemic default risk increment is
followed by a loosening on the monetary policies gradually over time. The loosening of
policy rates is not equal, being three times larger in the US than in the Eurozone. On
the other side, a tightening of the monetary policy results in an asymmetric response of
systemic risk in both areas. For example, a monetary tightening in the US leads to a
permanent decrease of systemic risk at every subsequent month. In Europe, a monetary
tightening leads to an increase of the systemic risk in the long term. Moreover, the US
has more power to exert inuence on the systemic risk, as can be seen from the larger
responses of systemic risk. Unreported impulse-response simulations of a positive shock
in the systemic risk measure predict reasonable economic consequences: an increase in
the unemployment and a decrease of GDP growth.
Theoretical research in a two-country world has evaluated the possibility of cooper-
ation between a domestic and a foreign monetary authority. The theoretical work of
Rogo (1985) argues that under certain circumstances the monetary policy cooperation
can be counterproductive and leads to higher ination. Moreover, even in a world tightly
linked with world productivity shocks, it is not necessarily problematic that countries
unilaterally design their monetary policy in an inward-looking decision-making process
(Obstfeld and Rogo, 2002). On the contrary, Pappa (2004) concludes that for the Fed
and ECB to cooperate, one has to assume high degree of trade links of the US and the
Eurozone. Our results stress the importance of domestic and foreign central banks for
the rms' credit stability during dicult episodes. Coordinated monetary policy might
be a more appropriate mechanism to deal with large systemic events.
In summary, we document the existence of an endogenous relationship between mon-
etary policy and systemic default risk. Although the monetary policy rates are not
designed to ght against systemic risk, the last evidence suggests that monetary author-
ities have responded to an increase in systemic risk by lowering interest rates. However,
we nd an asymmetric impact of monetary policy on systemic risk. More long-term
coordinated action in policy rates might be needed to solve a systemic crisis.
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Figure 4.6.: Impulse-response graphs for the VECMs
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Orthogonalized impulse-response for the VECMs. The horizontal axis represents the months
after the shock event. The lag of the VECM is selected according to the Schwarz Bayesian
Information criterion. The number of cointegrated equations is chosen according to the
Johansen's cointegration test.
123
Chapter 4. Foreign monetary policy and rms' default risk
4.6. Conclusions
We have used a new source of information to learn about the ex-ante default probability
of a rm: the credit derivatives market. And we have paid attention to the possible
inuence of a foreign monetary policy on the rms' default risk. Furthermore, the data
suggests that the monetary authorities have tried to attenuate the systemic events by
using their monetary policy rates as a mechanism.
From a micro-perspective, the rms' default risk depends on the state of foreign mon-
etary policy. Moreover, we document that a foreign monetary policy can have an im-
portant eect on international rms highly exposed to foreign countries.
Our ndings suggest that, in general, foreign monetary policy's inuence of rms'
default risk depends on the rms' degree of foreign operations. And this result is quite
robust to the denition of monetary policy, the type of default probability, the type of
foreign operations, the horizon of cumulative default probability, the frequency, macroe-
conomic controls, unobservable rm and time eects, the geography (US and EMU),
rm controls, and the empirical model. More interestingly, we nd that rms facing a
surprise tightening of the Fed's monetary policy or a surprise loosening of the ECB's
monetary policy experience higher default probabilities than rms with lower foreign
exposure to those economic areas.
From a macro-perspective we study how the monetary authorities have aected and
reacted to the systemic risk. As we nd evidence of non-stationary variables in the
sample period, we perform a VECM. Systemic defaults are not frequent and predictable
events, thus the results of the VECM that we nd in our sample might be anecdotic,
and highly model dependent. Due to the ubiquitous nature of the systemic default risk
across countries that we nd in our data, and the dierent regional specic monetary
targets, the monetary policy might not be an eective tool to manage systemic risk.
In the long term, we generally nd a negative response of systemic risk to a monetary
contraction in the US, but a positive response in the Eurozone. And this statement is
generally robust to the VECM specication.
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Chapter 5.
Final Remarks
The credit crunch has raised major concerns about the developed economies. The
market-wide default events since 2007 have resulted in apprehensions about the credit-
worthiness of corporate and sovereign debts. Therefore, the understanding of the deter-
minants of the rising credit spreads is becoming an important issue. Along these lines,
this thesis commenced a search for the sources of credit risk at corporate, sovereign, and
policy levels.
The understanding of the credit spreads during distressed conditions is at its origins.
This thesis contributes to this understanding from asset pricing and policy perspectives.
First, from an asset pricing perspective, the results evidence that corporate investors
demand an excess return when the sovereign debt distress increases. Moreover, the
ndings suggest a risk transmission from distressed towards healthier sovereign debt
through the price of risk. Second, from a policy perspective, we nd an asymmetric
response of systemic risk to the monetary policies undertaken by the Federal Reserve and
the ECB. This suggests that a coordinated monetary policy might be more appropriate
to deal with large systemic risks.
As a closing remark, there are important questions that need to be addressed regarding
the transmission of risk during stressed scenarios, the regulation in the OTC credit mar-
kets, and the institutional role of the newly created systemic risk supervisors. Further
research along these lines is needed to ght against large credit market disruptions.
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Appendix A.
Risk-Neutral and actual estimates
A.1. Risk-Neutral intensity estimates
Appendix A.1 contains the maximum likelihood estimates for the risk-neutral intensity
processes in Section 2.4. The Table A.1 exhibits the results for 85 companies. The
sample period covers from 14/June/2006 until 31/March/2010.
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Table A.1.: Risk-neutral intensity estimates
Maximum likelihood estimates for the Pan and Singleton (2008) model. Standard errors
are in parenthesis. Q and P are the mean-reversion rates of default intensity process
Q under Q and P measures, respectively. Analogously, Q and P are the long-run mean.
 is the instantaneous volatility. Finally, 1y and 5y are the mispricing volatilities for
CDS spreads with maturities 1- and 5-years. Data sample spans from 14/June/2006 until
31/March/2010.
Firm Q QQ  P PP 1y 5y LogLk
Anglo Amern plc 0.4063 -1.7000 1.1903 0.2654 -1.8750 0.0013 0.0013 1504.04
(0.0134) (0.0468) (0.0204) (0.2511) (1.4565) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cr Agricole SA -1.4844 4.0812 2.6625 4.8450 -28.1406 0.0011 0.0030 1501.91
(0.1190) (0.4856) (0.2146) (4.5890) (27.7113) (0.0001) (0.0012)
ACCOR 0.2000 -1.7000 1.8170 1.0730 -6.0000 0.0017 0.0014 1533.17
(0.0268) (0.1195) (0.0487) (1.2687) (7.2627) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Adecco S A 0.3750 -1.6844 1.1078 0.5442 -3.0625 0.0006 0.0026 1569.83
(0.0165) (0.0609) (0.0143) (0.3738) (2.1968) (0.0000) (0.0023)
Aegon N,V, 0.2313 -1.7000 1.7135 0.5315 -3.2500 0.0027 0.0014 1466.70
(0.0244) (0.0976) (0.0252) (0.5883) (3.2439) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Koninklijke Ahold N V 0.2313 -1.7000 1.6910 1.6121 -8.2500 0.0018 0.0021 1471.50
(0.0328) (0.1241) (0.0539) (1.5275) (8.1627) (0.0003) (0.0004)
AKZO Nobel N V -1.4688 3.3469 3.1937 8.4856 -50.0000 0.0011 0.0050 1458.44
(0.0930) (0.2854) (0.3374) (6.0365) (37.0095) (0.0001) (0.0129)
ALSTOM 0.2000 -1.7000 1.7984 1.1482 -6.0000 0.0015 0.0015 1520.60
(0.0224) (0.0940) (0.0485) (1.1999) (6.1340) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Assicurazioni Generali S p A -1.1875 1.6125 3.1000 5.1262 -29.5781 0.0011 0.0050 1465.38
(0.0579) (0.1362) (0.2303) (3.8444) (22.8912) (0.0001) (0.0083)
Aviva plc 0.3750 -1.8563 1.2387 0.2786 -1.8438 0.0008 0.0021 1541.59
(0.0134) (0.0559) (0.0219) (0.3077) (1.7542) (0.0000) (0.0005)
AXA 0.2500 -1.5438 1.3656 0.4583 -2.8125 0.0021 0.0011 1606.18
(0.0276) (0.1092) (0.0181) (0.4927) (2.7964) (0.0005) (0.0002)
EnBW Energie Baden Wuerttemberg AG -1.1563 3.1437 2.1312 6.7512 -37.7813 0.0011 0.0050 1533.94
(0.1010) (0.4030) (0.1721) (4.3480) (25.6617) (0.0002) (0.0208)
BAE Sys PLC 0.2500 -1.5750 1.3266 0.6887 -3.9688 0.0011 0.0030 1624.22
(0.0272) (0.0919) (0.0187) (0.6492) (3.7307) (0.0002) (0.0036)
Brit Amern Tob plc -0.2344 -0.5125 2.1156 3.5794 -20.4063 0.0011 0.0030 1547.16
(0.0270) (0.0696) (0.0867) (2.2010) (11.9527) (0.0001) (0.0028)
Bco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S A -1.2969 3.0812 2.7562 5.0012 -28.7656 0.0011 0.0030 1494.97
(0.0734) (0.2551) (0.2035) (4.2179) (25.2262) (0.0001) (0.0011)
Bay Motoren Werke AG 0.4219 -2.2313 1.5502 0.4046 -2.7656 0.0011 0.0013 1622.09
(0.0203) (0.0721) (0.0244) (0.5308) (2.9757) (0.0001) (0.0002)
BNP Paribas -1.4063 3.6437 2.4750 5.5169 -31.4219 0.0011 0.0050 1521.33
(0.1196) (0.4453) (0.2055) (4.5622) (27.3451) (0.0001) (0.0082)
Brit Telecom PLC 0.2000 -1.7000 1.8326 1.0701 -6.0000 0.0012 0.0013 1574.13
(0.0280) (0.1040) (0.0522) (1.4601) (8.1020) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Bayer AG -1.4063 3.0812 3.2250 8.2981 -50.0000 0.0011 0.0050 1470.14
(0.0863) (0.2667) (0.2966) (5.3243) (34.3661) (0.0002) (0.0140)
Carrefour -0.9375 1.6125 2.6312 7.6731 -44.6563 0.0011 0.0050 1510.74
(0.0600) (0.1326) (0.2136) (4.5141) (26.9364) (0.0002) (0.0110)
Commerzbank AG 0.0000 -0.4344 1.2875 0.7512 -4.4375 0.0040 0.0011 1588.15
(0.0189) (0.0552) (0.0230) (0.8147) (4.4135) (0.0036) (0.0003)
Compass Gp PLC 0.0000 -0.1688 0.8812 2.0012 -10.9219 0.0011 0.0050 1570.97
(0.0116) (0.0328) (0.0290) (1.0780) (5.7969) (0.0002) (0.0135)
Deutsche Bk AG 0.0156 -1.0281 1.6469 1.1106 -6.3281 0.0011 0.0021 1581.64
(0.0054) (0.0426) (0.0301) (1.3566) (7.0027) (0.0001) (0.0008)
Diageo PLC -0.6250 0.9875 2.1156 4.8762 -27.3750 0.0011 0.0050 1529.01
(0.0495) (0.0765) (0.1566) (3.8701) (21.4474) (0.0003) (0.0153)
Deutsche Post AG -1.1875 2.8312 2.5062 8.8294 -50.0000 0.0011 0.0050 1507.53
(0.1142) (0.3274) (0.2910) (7.0280) (41.0134) (0.0003) (0.0182)
Deutsche Telekom AG 0.2500 -1.6844 1.4906 0.8020 -4.6094 0.0008 0.0030 1527.53
(0.0293) (0.1091) (0.0309) (1.0202) (5.5410) (0.0000) (0.0032)
Eurpn Aero Defence& Space Co Eads N V 0.3750 -2.0281 1.4320 0.4622 -2.9063 0.0022 0.0008 1604.47
(0.0224) (0.0782) (0.0202) (0.4294) (2.5106) (0.0005) (0.0000)
EDP Energias de Portugal SA 0.0000 -0.4812 1.2094 0.7669 -4.2031 0.0040 0.0011 1590.42
(0.0171) (0.0546) (0.0286) (0.8105) (4.4568) (0.0059) (0.0002)
ENEL S p A 0.3750 -2.0750 1.5023 0.4036 -2.5938 0.0021 0.0008 1618.88
(0.0271) (0.0977) (0.0321) (0.5249) (2.7783) (0.0006) (0.0001)
E,ON AG -1.4688 3.7375 2.8500 8.5481 -50.0000 0.0011 0.0050 1480.80
(0.1330) (0.5400) (0.2643) (5.1030) (31.7814) (0.0001) (0.0148)
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Table A.1 (Cont.).: Risk-neutral intensity estimates
Firm Q QQ  P PP 1y 5y LogLk
Bco Espirito Santo S A 0.5000 -3.2000 2.0219 0.5794 -3.6406 0.0050 0.0011 1495.57
(0.0510) (0.2656) (0.0313) (1.0529) (5.5368) (0.0036) (0.0002)
Edison S p A -1.4219 3.0187 3.2875 7.9387 -47.9375 0.0011 0.0050 1465.31
(0.0710) (0.2754) (0.2582) (4.4691) (28.4856) (0.0001) (0.0103)
Finmeccanica S p A 0.2500 -1.6531 1.4398 0.6223 -3.6250 0.0011 0.0030 1581.81
(0.0253) (0.0942) (0.0283) (0.6410) (3.5357) (0.0001) (0.0031)
Fortum Oyj -1.2969 2.8312 3.0062 8.0637 -48.9063 0.0011 0.0050 1496.30
(0.0636) (0.2312) (0.2520) (4.1865) (27.6061) (0.0002) (0.0171)
France Telecom -0.2813 0.7063 1.2875 2.1106 -11.5156 0.0011 0.0030 1571.80
(0.0208) (0.0687) (0.0530) (2.0742) (11.2534) (0.0001) (0.0044)
Gas Nat SDG SA 0.2500 -1.6375 1.5453 0.4934 -3.0156 0.0011 0.0040 1529.75
(0.0229) (0.0834) (0.0304) (0.6059) (3.5951) (0.0000) (0.0049)
Casino Guichard Perrachon 0.2000 -1.7000 1.7921 1.3191 -7.0000 0.0015 0.0018 1504.79
(0.0282) (0.1164) (0.0549) (1.4936) (7.7891) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Hannover Ruck AG -0.4531 -0.0438 2.2094 3.6106 -20.0000 0.0011 0.0050 1497.35
(0.0411) (0.0232) (0.1244) (2.5844) (14.5074) (0.0001) (0.0123)
Holcim Ltd 0.4219 -1.8250 1.3500 0.2981 -1.9844 0.0011 0.0050 1479.15
(0.0176) (0.0719) (0.0301) (0.3796) (2.0249) (0.0001) (0.0053)
Iberdrola S A 0.2500 -1.6063 1.3969 0.5559 -3.3438 0.0011 0.0030 1588.72
(0.0296) (0.1166) (0.0349) (0.6304) (3.6305) (0.0001) (0.0058)
Koninklijke DSM NV -0.7969 0.8312 2.7250 8.6419 -49.5156 0.0011 0.0050 1500.41
(0.0610) (0.0955) (0.2240) (4.6141) (27.3314) (0.0003) (0.0170)
Koninklijke KPN N V 0.2000 -1.1844 1.3062 1.8762 -10.8281 0.0008 0.0013 1650.52
(0.0244) (0.1026) (0.0331) (1.2355) (6.9918) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Linde AG -0.5000 -0.8094 2.9750 8.0481 -47.0781 0.0011 0.0050 1493.06
(0.0729) (0.1028) (0.2015) (3.6821) (22.1354) (0.0003) (0.0105)
Lanxess 0.2625 -1.7000 1.6207 1.1057 -6.0000 0.0022 0.0014 1489.61
(0.0312) (0.1136) (0.0278) (0.8826) (4.6857) (0.0002) (0.0002)
METRO AG 0.2000 -1.7000 1.7750 0.9895 -5.6875 0.0011 0.0013 1589.42
(0.0285) (0.1057) (0.0296) (0.9794) (5.0869) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Marks& Spencer p l c 0.2000 -1.7000 1.9269 0.9236 -5.3750 0.0021 0.0018 1461.33
(0.0297) (0.1156) (0.0407) (1.2186) (6.5668) (0.0002) (0.0004)
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton -0.5156 -0.3875 2.7719 5.1731 -30.1719 0.0011 0.0050 1498.32
(0.0468) (0.0730) (0.1942) (3.4781) (20.1488) (0.0002) (0.0121)
Bca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S p A -1.5000 3.3625 3.1625 6.3919 -37.9063 0.0011 0.0050 1447.86
(0.0779) (0.2854) (0.2406) (4.2011) (26.5650) (0.0001) (0.0060)
Natl Grid Plc 0.3750 -1.8719 1.2602 0.4251 -2.7500 0.0006 0.0028 1608.86
(0.0175) (0.0887) (0.0354) (0.3735) (2.2733) (0.0000) (0.0057)
Next plc 0.2313 -1.7000 1.8375 1.0515 -6.0000 0.0028 0.0022 1412.03
(0.0351) (0.1484) (0.0383) (1.2971) (6.6134) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Hellenic Telecom Org SA 0.2500 -1.6531 1.4984 0.8567 -4.7813 0.0008 0.0030 1559.55
(0.0261) (0.1078) (0.0456) (1.0287) (5.7480) (0.0000) (0.0061)
Koninklijke Philips Electrs N V -1.1563 2.1125 3.0062 8.4075 -49.8438 0.0011 0.0050 1488.78
(0.0568) (0.1631) (0.2616) (4.6149) (28.9831) (0.0002) (0.0131)
PPR 0.5000 -1.7938 1.1156 0.2356 -1.6094 0.0011 0.0050 1396.47
(0.0100) (0.0435) (0.0207) (0.2310) (1.2997) (0.0000) (0.0032)
Pearson plc 0.0313 -0.6062 1.2875 1.9700 -10.9531 0.0011 0.0030 1588.16
(0.0062) (0.0424) (0.0319) (1.3576) (7.2386) (0.0001) (0.0029)
Royal Bk Scotland plc 0.1250 -1.7000 1.9682 0.7854 -4.8750 0.0021 0.0014 1520.32
(0.0187) (0.0957) (0.0365) (1.1428) (6.3208) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Reed Elsevier PLC -1.0313 3.6125 1.6625 4.5012 -24.7344 0.0050 0.0011 1448.24
(0.0575) (0.2501) (0.0860) (3.0984) (16.2568) (0.0014) (0.0001)
Repsol YPF SA 0.3750 -1.9344 1.4086 0.4622 -2.8125 0.0008 0.0033 1522.51
(0.0128) (0.0613) (0.0259) (0.4554) (2.7315) (0.0000) (0.0032)
Rolls Royce plc 0.2500 -1.7000 1.4477 0.6419 -3.9219 0.0006 0.0016 1712.61
(0.0183) (0.0644) (0.0202) (0.6732) (3.7022) (0.0000) (0.0011)
RWE AG -0.0938 0.2062 0.8500 1.1419 -6.5000 0.0011 0.0050 1599.82
(0.0097) (0.0304) (0.0263) (0.6917) (3.8557) (0.0001) (0.0119)
J Sainsbury PLC 0.1875 -1.7000 1.9965 1.3875 -8.5000 0.0022 0.0024 1410.93
(0.0219) (0.1122) (0.0303) (1.0886) (6.4450) (0.0002) (0.0003)
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Table A.1 (Cont.).: Risk-neutral intensity estimates
Firm Q QQ  P PP 1y 5y LogLk
Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA 0.2000 -1.7000 1.7311 1.0242 -6.0000 0.0015 0.0013 1571.13
(0.0271) (0.1102) (0.0364) (1.3224) (7.0017) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Siemens AG 0.2500 -1.6375 1.4438 0.6106 -4.0000 0.0006 0.0030 1661.52
(0.0272) (0.1142) (0.0376) (0.7489) (4.2979) (0.0000) (0.0064)
Societe Generale -0.4844 -0.0750 2.4438 2.2044 -12.8906 0.0011 0.0050 1498.38
(0.0343) (0.0416) (0.1053) (2.5742) (14.1697) (0.0001) (0.0056)
Cie de St Gobain 0.5000 -2.1844 1.3813 0.3450 -2.3281 0.0011 0.0030 1488.09
(0.0166) (0.0649) (0.0241) (0.4218) (2.3416) (0.0001) (0.0006)
Stmicroelectronics N V 0.2500 -1.6531 1.4789 0.6419 -4.0000 0.0011 0.0035 1606.48
(0.0296) (0.1298) (0.0428) (0.7175) (4.1002) (0.0003) (0.0078)
Swedish Match AB 0.3750 -1.7469 1.0531 0.5872 -3.5938 0.0023 0.0006 1671.96
(0.0260) (0.0985) (0.0138) (0.4290) (2.6534) (0.0003) (0.0000)
Technip 0.3750 -1.8250 1.2836 0.4739 -3.1875 0.0008 0.0022 1622.83
(0.0150) (0.0510) (0.0178) (0.3991) (2.3860) (0.0000) (0.0006)
Telefonica S A 0.2500 -1.5125 1.3617 0.8020 -4.4844 0.0011 0.0030 1539.96
(0.0343) (0.1251) (0.0275) (0.7814) (4.1666) (0.0001) (0.0051)
Telenor ASA 0.2500 -1.7000 1.5141 0.6575 -3.9844 0.0011 0.0030 1599.99
(0.0308) (0.1277) (0.0478) (0.8861) (5.1444) (0.0001) (0.0071)
Telecom Italia SpA 0.2313 -1.7000 1.8375 1.0891 -6.0000 0.0022 0.0013 1479.82
(0.0298) (0.1200) (0.0337) (1.0182) (5.3458) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Telekom Austria AG 0.2000 -1.5281 1.6109 1.3450 -7.8906 0.0008 0.0013 1680.33
(0.0259) (0.1152) (0.0395) (1.2130) (7.0700) (0.0001) (0.0003)
TeliaSonera AB -0.4219 0.5188 2.0375 5.5012 -31.4844 0.0011 0.0030 1559.60
(0.0465) (0.0584) (0.1431) (4.0052) (22.8826) (0.0002) (0.0046)
TNT N,V, -0.0469 -0.3719 1.3187 1.6731 -9.1094 0.0011 0.0030 1589.19
(0.0115) (0.0496) (0.0353) (1.4863) (7.7720) (0.0001) (0.0045)
Total SA -1.4375 3.6125 2.5062 6.0169 -34.4375 0.0011 0.0050 1535.95
(0.1038) (0.3357) (0.2016) (4.2799) (25.4443) (0.0002) (0.0127)
Tesco PLC -1.1406 2.3312 2.7562 5.0481 -29.4688 0.0011 0.0050 1497.80
(0.0605) (0.1635) (0.2019) (3.9559) (24.4367) (0.0002) (0.0099)
UBS AG 0.2000 -1.7000 1.7267 0.5369 -3.5000 0.0018 0.0013 1555.62
(0.0238) (0.0981) (0.0318) (0.8615) (4.6244) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Veolia Environnement 0.2500 -1.4500 1.2289 0.6731 -3.8906 0.0011 0.0030 1599.49
(0.0290) (0.1077) (0.0289) (0.5423) (3.0888) (0.0001) (0.0053)
Vinci 0.2000 -1.7000 1.7682 1.0647 -6.0000 0.0017 0.0014 1527.63
(0.0264) (0.1119) (0.0433) (1.2420) (6.8712) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Vivendi 0.2000 -1.7000 1.7862 1.1751 -6.3750 0.0012 0.0013 1570.72
(0.0268) (0.1107) (0.0577) (1.5270) (8.3901) (0.0001) (0.0003)
AB Volvo 0.5000 -2.0906 1.3344 0.2512 -1.6250 0.0011 0.0050 1400.70
(0.0118) (0.0572) (0.0259) (0.3350) (2.0595) (0.0001) (0.0037)
Vodafone Gp PLC 0.2500 -1.2781 1.0609 0.6223 -3.6406 0.0026 0.0011 1625.32
(0.0250) (0.0937) (0.0124) (0.5438) (2.9169) (0.0010) (0.0002)
Volkswagen AG 0.5000 -2.2781 1.3500 0.3450 -2.3594 0.0011 0.0021 1573.93
(0.0174) (0.0716) (0.0218) (0.3942) (2.1572) (0.0001) (0.0008)
Wolters Kluwer N V -1.4063 3.8625 2.9437 8.3762 -50.0000 0.0011 0.0050 1466.67
(0.1782) (0.7289) (0.3815) (7.6445) (47.1471) (0.0002) (0.0117)
WPP 2005 Ltd 0.2000 -1.7000 1.9469 0.8299 -5.0000 0.0012 0.0014 1542.62
(0.0284) (0.0990) (0.0381) (1.1719) (6.3440) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Xstrata Plc 0.4375 -1.7000 1.2045 0.3040 -2.0000 0.0022 0.0025 1370.92
(0.0135) (0.0390) (0.0111) (0.2453) (1.3577) (0.0001) (0.0001)
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A.2. Summary statistics for the EDF measure
Appendix A.2 shows the summary statistics for the 1-year EDF measure. The sample
consists of biweekly EDF data for 75 European rms provided by Moody's, covering
from 14/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010.
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Table A.2.: Summary statistics for 1-year EDF
Mean Median Std Skew Kurt Min Max s Acorr(s)
(bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (bps) (1st lag)
Panel A.- Basic Materials
Mean 14.19 3.78 30.27 1.82 9.40 1.28 203.42 0.0586 -0.0707
Std 14.51 1.41 52.55 2.18 16.23 0.44 415.89 0.0496 0.1941
Min 2.38 1.40 1.55 0.50 1.53 1.00 5.28 -0.0036 -0.2842
Max 41.39 5.56 136.48 6.17 42.41 1.97 1050.67 0.1455 0.2797
Panel B.- Consumer Goods
Mean 6.63 5.14 4.17 0.65 2.39 1.65 17.20 0.0219 -0.2017
Std 1.26 1.48 1.20 0.16 0.52 0.57 2.08 0.0699 0.0275
Min 5.22 4.03 3.34 0.47 1.82 1.00 15.62 -0.0410 -0.2269
Max 7.65 6.82 5.55 0.78 2.85 1.99 19.56 0.0971 -0.1724
Panel C.- Consumer Services
Mean 8.40 6.36 5.39 1.04 3.91 2.64 24.80 -0.0070 -0.0528
Std 3.48 2.31 3.75 0.75 2.74 1.67 14.78 0.0765 0.1868
Min 2.19 1.21 1.34 0.20 1.78 1.00 6.33 -0.1814 -0.3855
Max 13.96 10.60 13.61 2.72 11.50 5.59 56.29 0.1399 0.2890
Panel D.- Financials
Mean 22.36 8.04 26.66 1.19 3.79 3.03 122.31 0.3434 -0.0950
Std 23.30 4.15 36.31 0.47 1.65 2.27 181.86 0.4914 0.1539
Min 5.56 4.06 2.83 0.21 1.69 1.00 15.65 -0.0364 -0.2954
Max 93.55 18.21 136.25 2.06 7.63 7.53 710.13 1.8821 0.2702
Panel E.- Industrials
Mean 33.76 15.76 34.03 0.95 2.93 5.78 135.76 0.4323 -0.0258
Std 47.60 18.57 67.02 0.37 1.07 7.86 261.33 1.2003 0.1419
Min 6.09 2.52 2.92 0.53 2.08 1.00 13.28 -0.2614 -0.2535
Max 171.11 68.28 243.58 1.89 5.89 29.05 951.46 4.2090 0.1946
Panel F.- Telecommunications
Mean 8.23 5.35 6.55 0.77 3.34 1.61 25.53 0.0773 -0.0400
Std 3.44 1.39 4.62 0.91 4.03 0.94 15.66 0.1971 0.1296
Min 3.70 3.45 1.80 -0.31 1.70 1.00 7.36 -0.3286 -0.2135
Max 13.89 7.55 15.32 3.25 15.44 3.32 51.22 0.4239 0.1484
Panel G.- Utilities
Mean 11.98 5.37 10.97 0.85 2.28 2.39 38.84 0.1974 -0.0844
Std 5.65 2.25 6.65 0.21 0.47 1.54 20.52 0.1133 0.1361
Min 6.24 2.06 3.69 0.54 1.67 1.00 19.12 0.0299 -0.2424
Max 26.82 8.88 26.49 1.16 3.06 4.72 84.67 0.4038 0.1206
Panel H.- Others (Health Care, Oil and Gas, and Technology)
Mean 15.89 8.31 17.76 1.01 3.64 2.61 79.77 0.0508 -0.0257
Std 21.05 8.58 29.65 0.76 2.37 2.53 133.39 0.0902 0.1629
Min 2.67 1.92 1.74 0.31 1.31 1.00 5.54 -0.0625 -0.2453
Max 52.53 22.72 70.34 2.27 7.43 6.85 315.95 0.1885 0.1663
Panel I.- OVERALL
Mean 16.59 7.79 17.91 1.03 3.79 2.88 81.68 0.1832 -0.0648
Std 23.86 8.62 35.95 0.84 5.03 3.65 180.67 0.5433 0.1521
Min 2.19 1.21 1.34 -0.31 1.31 1.00 5.28 -0.3286 -0.3855
Max 171.11 68.28 243.58 6.17 42.41 29.05 1050.67 4.2090 0.2890
Summary statistics for the 1-year EDF measures: the mean, median, standard deviation, skewness,
kurtosis, minimum, maximum, mean of the dierenced time series, and 1st lag autocorrelation coecient
for the dierenced time series. The sample consists of biweekly EDF data for 75 European rms provided
by Moody's, covering from 14/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010.
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A.3. Actual intensity estimates
Appendix A.3 contains the maximum Likelihood estimates for the actual intensity pro-
cesses in Section 2.6. The Table A.3 exhibits the results for 75 European companies
with available Expected Default Frequencies (EDF). The sample period covers from
14/June/2006 until 31/March/2010.
132
Appendix A. Risk-Neutral and actual estimates
T
ab
le
A
.3
.:
A
ct
ua
l
in
te
ns
it
y
es
ti
m
at
es
M
ax
im
u
m
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
es
ti
m
at
es
fo
r
th
e
ac
tu
al
in
te
n
si
ty
p
ro
ce
ss
d
es
cr
ib
ed
in
S
ec
ti
on
6.
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
p
ar
en
th
es
is
.

P ,

P
an
d

ar
e
th
e
m
ea
n
-r
ev
er
si
o
n
,
lo
n
g-
ru
n
m
ea
n
an
d
in
st
an
ta
n
eo
u
s
v
ol
at
il
it
y
of
d
ef
au
lt
in
te
n
si
ty
p
ro
ce
ss

P ,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
F
in
al
ly
,

3
y
a
n
d

5
y
a
re
th
e
m
is
p
ri
ci
n
g
v
o
la
ti
li
ti
es
fo
r
E
D
F
w
it
h
m
at
u
ri
ti
es
3-
an
d
5-
y
ea
rs
.
D
at
a
sa
m
p
le
sp
an
s
fr
om
14
/J
u
n
e/
20
06
u
n
ti
l
31
/M
ar
ch
/2
0
10
.
F
ir
m

P

P

P


3
y

5
y
L
og
L
k
F
ir
m

P

P

P


3
y

5
y
L
og
L
k
A
ng
lo
A
m
er
n
pl
c
0
45
16
-4
47
30
1
12
31
0
00
01
0
00
08
20
35
79
Fo
rt
um
O
yj
0
33
50
-3
49
48
0
78
06
0
00
00
0
00
05
22
00
54
(0
03
06
)
(0
20
11
)
(0
00
51
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
02
72
)
(0
20
13
)
(0
00
49
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
C
r
A
gr
ic
ol
e
SA
0
36
59
-3
05
44
0
88
18
0
00
06
0
01
58
17
13
11
Fr
an
ce
T
el
ec
om
0
19
46
-2
42
42
0
77
03
0
00
00
0
00
06
22
01
91
(0
03
54
)
(0
27
90
)
(0
03
52
)
(0
00
07
)
(0
07
07
)
(0
00
92
)
(0
06
37
)
(0
00
55
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
A
C
C
O
R
0
20
05
-2
70
79
0
83
96
0
00
00
0
00
07
21
03
71
G
as
N
at
SD
G
SA
0
40
33
-4
22
47
0
98
58
0
00
01
0
00
06
21
17
43
(0
01
46
)
(0
10
30
)
(0
01
12
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
03
50
)
(0
24
01
)
(0
00
75
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
A
de
cc
o
S
A
0
48
04
-5
09
94
1
30
18
0
00
01
0
00
08
20
29
89
C
as
in
o
G
ui
ch
ar
d
P
er
ra
ch
on
0
16
83
-2
41
24
0
88
44
0
00
00
0
00
08
21
00
17
(0
02
40
)
(0
15
82
)
(0
00
43
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
01
17
)
(0
08
61
)
(0
00
94
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
A
eg
on
N
V
0
16
63
-1
53
62
0
80
88
0
00
08
0
01
59
16
50
96
H
an
no
ve
r
R
uc
k
A
G
0
64
67
-5
41
75
1
78
74
0
00
06
0
00
02
16
46
61
(0
01
89
)
(0
14
15
)
(0
03
27
)
(0
00
14
)
(0
04
79
)
(0
04
87
)
(0
31
48
)
(0
05
16
)
(0
00
20
)
(0
00
00
)
K
on
in
kl
ijk
e
A
ho
ld
N
V
0
50
41
-4
75
10
1
07
21
0
00
04
0
00
00
19
38
10
Ib
er
dr
ol
a
S
A
0
42
13
-4
38
68
0
92
68
0
00
01
0
00
07
21
03
62
(0
04
58
)
(0
35
58
)
(0
04
54
)
(0
00
16
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
03
40
)
(0
23
01
)
(0
00
78
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
A
K
Z
O
N
ob
el
N
V
0
10
43
-1
93
07
0
88
46
0
00
00
0
00
05
22
49
68
K
on
in
kl
ijk
e
D
SM
N
V
0
11
94
-1
97
19
0
79
71
0
00
00
0
00
05
22
45
84
(0
00
94
)
(0
08
05
)
(0
01
70
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
00
99
)
(0
07
74
)
(0
01
44
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
A
L
ST
O
M
0
53
63
-6
22
76
1
18
81
0
00
06
0
00
21
16
77
07
K
on
in
kl
ijk
e
K
P
N
N
V
0
09
17
-1
95
03
1
07
27
0
00
00
0
00
04
22
40
00
(0
05
13
)
(0
36
01
)
(0
04
46
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
00
33
)
(0
00
83
)
(0
07
38
)
(0
01
92
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
A
ss
ic
ur
az
io
ni
G
en
er
al
i
S
p
A
0
01
62
-0
91
04
1
19
95
0
00
04
0
00
01
19
22
90
L
in
de
A
G
0
24
32
-2
96
99
0
71
26
0
00
00
0
00
02
24
53
48
(0
00
13
)
(0
03
60
)
(0
03
90
)
(0
00
17
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
03
28
)
(0
27
28
)
(0
00
97
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
00
)
A
vi
va
pl
c
0
45
37
-3
90
30
1
72
34
0
00
09
0
00
04
15
70
60
L
an
xe
ss
0
45
01
-4
57
37
1
35
49
0
00
02
0
00
12
18
68
86
(0
03
23
)
(0
18
15
)
(0
03
26
)
(0
00
19
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
04
23
)
(0
25
75
)
(0
00
85
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
02
)
A
X
A
0
45
17
-5
15
79
2
14
20
0
00
01
0
00
18
18
12
19
M
E
T
R
O
A
G
0
34
07
-4
23
10
1
40
97
0
00
00
0
00
05
21
26
88
(0
02
12
)
(0
12
75
)
(0
01
69
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
12
)
(0
02
60
)
(0
17
05
)
(0
00
90
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
00
)
E
nB
W
E
ne
rg
ie
B
ad
en
W
ue
rt
te
m
be
rg
A
G
0
15
16
-2
27
10
0
68
67
0
00
00
0
00
07
21
47
50
M
ar
ks
&
Sp
en
ce
r
p
l
c
0
17
75
-2
36
30
0
87
28
0
00
00
0
00
09
20
81
91
(0
01
00
)
(0
07
62
)
(0
01
41
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
01
42
)
(0
09
72
)
(0
00
89
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
B
A
E
Sy
s
P
L
C
0
34
86
-3
72
11
0
80
13
0
00
01
0
00
04
21
63
15
B
ca
M
on
te
de
i
P
as
ch
i
di
Si
en
a
S
p
A
0
19
88
-2
19
03
0
88
27
0
00
04
0
01
57
17
79
11
(0
03
51
)
(0
27
34
)
(0
01
25
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
02
36
)
(0
16
67
)
(0
02
53
)
(0
00
34
)
(0
13
54
)
B
co
B
ilb
ao
V
iz
ca
ya
A
rg
en
ta
ri
a
S
A
0
04
89
-1
22
33
0
84
51
0
00
00
0
00
07
21
19
26
N
at
l
G
ri
d
P
lc
0
12
79
-2
06
83
0
74
90
0
00
00
0
00
07
21
53
00
(0
00
54
)
(0
05
57
)
(0
02
51
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
00
93
)
(0
07
35
)
(0
01
43
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
B
ay
M
ot
or
en
W
er
ke
A
G
0
06
23
-1
39
59
0
78
25
0
00
00
0
00
08
20
94
40
N
ex
t
pl
c
0
38
20
-3
94
60
1
16
72
0
00
05
0
00
00
19
43
45
(0
00
61
)
(0
06
04
)
(0
02
32
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
01
77
)
(0
13
04
)
(0
03
28
)
(0
00
13
)
(0
00
00
)
B
N
P
P
ar
ib
as
0
18
25
-2
76
79
1
65
55
0
00
00
0
00
12
19
61
31
H
el
le
ni
c
T
el
ec
om
O
rg
SA
0
12
41
-1
95
02
0
75
81
0
00
00
0
00
11
20
18
50
(0
01
85
)
(0
11
85
)
(0
01
13
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
02
)
(0
01
06
)
(0
07
99
)
(0
01
49
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
B
ri
t
T
el
ec
om
P
L
C
0
43
35
-4
30
67
1
19
37
0
00
01
0
00
10
20
15
32
K
on
in
kl
ijk
e
P
hi
lip
s
E
le
ct
rs
N
V
0
09
04
-1
87
44
0
83
32
0
00
00
0
00
05
21
58
91
(0
04
81
)
(0
31
41
)
(0
00
77
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
00
71
)
(0
07
01
)
(0
02
36
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
B
ay
er
A
G
0
09
43
-1
85
08
0
80
11
0
00
00
0
00
03
23
36
15
P
P
R
0
42
13
-4
46
16
1
24
20
0
00
01
0
00
08
20
11
64
(0
00
82
)
(0
07
76
)
(0
02
03
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
02
17
)
(0
13
95
)
(0
00
52
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
C
ar
re
fo
ur
0
38
91
-3
88
26
0
97
14
0
00
04
0
00
01
19
77
60
R
oy
al
B
k
Sc
ot
la
nd
pl
c
0
39
68
-4
04
53
1
53
98
0
00
28
0
00
68
14
04
04
(0
02
48
)
(0
19
29
)
(0
01
36
)
(0
00
03
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
02
44
)
(0
20
12
)
(0
00
58
)
(0
00
04
)
(0
00
20
)
C
om
m
er
zb
an
k
A
G
0
31
08
-3
50
63
1
18
52
0
01
01
0
01
97
10
60
08
R
ep
so
l
Y
P
F
SA
0
13
27
-1
99
57
0
69
99
0
00
00
0
00
05
22
51
37
(0
02
44
)
(0
27
77
)
(0
05
22
)
(0
03
00
)
(0
06
54
)
(0
01
25
)
(0
09
84
)
(0
01
46
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
00
)
C
om
pa
ss
G
p
P
L
C
0
11
42
-1
98
42
0
79
24
0
00
00
0
00
04
22
26
81
R
ol
ls
R
oy
ce
pl
c
0
29
15
-3
42
55
0
87
58
0
00
06
0
01
56
17
06
46
(0
01
03
)
(0
08
91
)
(0
01
95
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
03
44
)
(0
28
04
)
(0
04
01
)
(0
00
09
)
(0
06
51
)
D
eu
ts
ch
e
B
k
A
G
0
72
78
-5
29
45
1
29
13
0
00
09
0
00
19
14
42
08
R
W
E
A
G
0
20
83
-2
38
34
0
97
36
0
00
04
0
00
00
18
26
23
(0
01
84
)
(0
11
15
)
(0
00
17
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
00
38
)
(0
01
83
)
(0
04
17
)
(0
00
16
)
(0
00
00
)
D
eu
ts
ch
e
P
os
t
A
G
0
31
45
-2
63
06
0
83
34
0
03
68
0
04
96
83
5
83
J
Sa
in
sb
ur
y
P
L
C
0
10
07
-1
94
19
0
91
77
0
00
00
0
00
04
22
13
93
(0
02
58
)
(0
21
63
)
(0
02
64
)
(0
03
13
)
(0
12
26
)
(0
00
94
)
(0
08
47
)
(0
01
90
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
D
eu
ts
ch
e
T
el
ek
om
A
G
0
07
90
-1
44
93
0
67
88
0
00
00
0
00
07
22
01
93
Sv
en
sk
a
C
el
lu
lo
sa
A
B
SC
A
0
23
16
-2
80
96
0
77
84
0
00
00
0
00
04
22
29
19
(0
00
70
)
(0
06
02
)
(0
01
83
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
01
85
)
(0
13
88
)
(0
00
73
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
E
ur
pn
A
er
o
D
ef
en
ce
&
Sp
ac
e
C
o
E
ad
s
N
V
0
48
51
-4
13
78
0
89
09
0
00
25
0
00
02
15
56
89
Si
em
en
s
A
G
0
18
55
-3
79
72
1
80
32
0
00
00
0
00
05
21
00
92
(0
02
51
)
(0
15
53
)
(0
02
15
)
(0
00
32
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
01
56
)
(0
12
16
)
(0
02
32
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
02
)
E
D
P
E
ne
rg
ia
s
de
P
or
tu
ga
l
SA
0
47
58
-4
65
12
0
96
29
0
00
01
0
00
07
20
19
51
So
ci
et
e
G
en
er
al
e
0
25
86
-2
45
15
1
20
72
0
00
14
0
00
02
16
56
10
(0
04
74
)
(0
32
85
)
(0
01
08
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
00
56
)
(0
03
86
)
(0
01
51
)
(0
00
17
)
(0
00
00
)
E
O
N
A
G
0
47
22
-4
86
89
1
08
78
0
00
00
0
00
07
21
14
64
C
ie
de
St
G
ob
ai
n
0
26
45
-2
98
46
0
91
06
0
00
00
0
00
07
21
29
57
(0
02
34
)
(0
15
31
)
(0
00
47
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
01
52
)
(0
10
15
)
(0
00
44
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
B
co
E
sp
ir
it
o
Sa
nt
o
S
A
0
49
30
-4
58
02
1
77
39
0
00
06
0
00
01
18
11
88
St
m
ic
ro
el
ec
tr
on
ic
s
N
V
0
42
45
-4
38
79
1
27
03
0
00
02
0
00
09
18
60
55
(0
03
43
)
(0
23
00
)
(0
04
41
)
(0
00
15
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
03
59
)
(0
23
12
)
(0
00
80
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
E
di
so
n
S
p
A
0
19
40
-2
72
25
0
92
33
0
00
01
0
00
06
21
15
47
T
ec
hn
ip
0
39
55
-4
12
06
0
75
75
0
00
22
0
00
28
13
95
27
(0
01
43
)
(0
10
67
)
(0
01
05
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
03
06
)
(0
22
40
)
(0
02
09
)
(0
00
02
)
(0
00
36
)
F
in
m
ec
ca
ni
ca
S
p
A
0
44
78
-4
81
00
1
06
21
0
00
00
0
00
09
20
33
81
T
el
en
or
A
SA
0
36
69
-4
24
85
1
54
34
0
00
01
0
00
08
19
90
64
(0
01
58
)
(0
10
18
)
(0
00
44
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
(0
03
39
)
(0
21
98
)
(0
00
84
)
(0
00
00
)
(0
00
01
)
133
Appendix A. Risk-Neutral and actual estimates
T
ab
le
A
.3
(C
on
t.
).
:
A
ct
ua
l
in
te
ns
it
y
es
ti
m
at
es
F
ir
m

P

P

P


3
y

5
y
L
og
L
k
F
ir
m

P

P

P


3
y

5
y
L
og
L
k
T
el
ec
om
It
al
ia
Sp
A
0.
09
86
-1
.6
16
5
0.
82
61
0.
00
00
0.
00
09
21
45
.9
4
V
eo
lia
E
nv
ir
on
ne
m
en
t
0.
36
28
-3
.7
62
4
1.
13
33
0.
00
01
0.
00
15
18
68
.0
6
(0
.0
07
2)
(0
.0
54
8)
(0
.0
09
4)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
27
3)
(0
.1
61
0)
(0
.0
07
2)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
2)
T
el
ek
om
A
us
tr
ia
A
G
0.
33
45
-3
.9
93
0
1.
57
34
0.
00
01
0.
00
09
20
52
.8
7
V
in
ci
0.
11
13
-1
.7
96
9
0.
71
81
0.
00
00
0.
00
06
21
74
.5
1
(0
.0
23
7)
(0
.1
48
9)
(0
.0
05
8)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
2)
(0
.0
11
1)
(0
.0
89
5)
(0
.0
15
8)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
T
el
ia
So
ne
ra
A
B
0.
23
23
-2
.8
33
2
0.
92
39
0.
00
00
0.
00
04
22
63
.1
5
V
iv
en
di
0.
10
07
-1
.7
61
5
0.
65
82
0.
00
00
0.
00
04
22
61
.0
5
(0
.0
26
0)
(0
.2
05
1)
(0
.0
07
8)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
09
8)
(0
.0
87
7)
(0
.0
22
4)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
T
N
T
N
,V
,
0.
24
68
-2
.9
29
2
0.
84
37
0.
00
00
0.
00
05
21
93
.1
8
A
B
V
ol
vo
0.
53
26
-5
.2
67
7
1.
24
14
0.
00
02
0.
00
11
19
05
.5
1
(0
.0
26
3)
(0
.1
87
2)
(0
.0
09
1)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
48
6)
(0
.3
05
7)
(0
.0
09
1)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
T
ot
al
SA
0.
36
47
-3
.9
45
3
0.
67
32
0.
00
00
0.
00
03
24
64
.7
8
V
od
af
on
e
G
p
P
L
C
0.
19
93
-2
.5
64
1
0.
89
95
0.
00
00
0.
00
05
21
99
.4
8
(0
.0
35
7)
(0
.2
90
5)
(0
.0
05
5)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
16
1)
(0
.1
24
7)
(0
.0
07
2)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
T
es
co
P
L
C
0.
39
50
-4
.3
52
2
1.
62
90
0.
00
01
0.
00
00
24
28
.0
1
W
ol
te
rs
K
lu
w
er
N
V
0.
27
34
-3
.5
76
3
1.
63
09
0.
00
02
0.
00
01
19
57
.8
5
(0
.0
68
9)
(0
.4
71
9)
(0
.0
20
8)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
44
4)
(0
.3
08
1)
(0
.0
37
6)
(0
.0
00
5)
(0
.0
00
0)
U
B
S
A
G
0.
24
24
-2
.0
47
2
1.
05
23
0.
00
12
0.
00
05
15
25
.8
4
W
P
P
20
05
L
td
0.
28
64
-3
.5
41
1
1.
02
96
0.
00
01
0.
00
06
20
46
.2
4
(0
.0
09
4)
(0
.0
67
2)
(0
.0
02
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
26
6)
(0
.1
85
7)
(0
.0
11
4)
(0
.0
00
0)
(0
.0
00
1)
X
st
ra
ta
P
lc
0.
65
40
-6
.8
75
0
1.
69
46
0.
02
32
0.
04
17
10
52
.5
6
(0
.0
56
5)
(0
.4
24
3)
(0
.0
54
5)
(0
.0
10
1)
(0
.1
19
0)
134
Appendix A. Risk-Neutral and actual estimates
A.4. Panel data model
Appendix A.4 contains a panel data model version of the Tables 2.7 and 2.10. The
sample period covers from 14/June/2006 until 31/March/2010.
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Table A.4.: Panel regression for distress risk premia
Dependent variable DRPi;t
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
All period <09/Aug/2007  09/Aug/2007 15/Sep/2008 All period <09/Aug/2007  09/Aug/2007 15/Sep/2008
<15/Sep/2008 <15/Sep/2008
Bid Ask5yi;t 1.1970*** 0.4740** 0.9040*** 1.2010*** 1.1376*** 0.4549* 1.0262*** 1.1180***
ESTOXX50t 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000
VIXt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 SD/E Rt 0.0009 0.0005 0.0011 0.0007 0.0013 0.0004 0.0012 0.0000
EONIAt 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
E RIBOR OISt 0.0004 0.0026*** 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0026** 0.0005 0.0001
SLOPEt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0005 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0005
SOVPC1t 0.0004*** 0.0021** 0.0013** 0.0003** 0.0004*** 0.0018* 0.0015*** 0.0003**
SOVPC2t 0.0001 0.0060** 0.0048*** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0067** 0.0044*** 0.0002
Financial  Bid Ask5yi;t 0.5377 0.3212 0.4882* 0.9221
Financial  ESTOXX50t 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000
Financial  VIXt 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001
Financial   SD/E Rt 0.0021 0.0000 0.0009 0.0047
Financial  EONIAt 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004** 0.0005
Financial  E RIBOR OISt 0.0008 0.0001 0.0004 0.0016
Financial  SLOPEt 0.0006 0.0004 0.0012*** 0.0003
Financial  SOVPC1t 0.0000 0.0009 0.0009** 0.0001
Financial  SOVPC2t 0.0001 0.0040* 0.0016** 0.0001
Firm dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial dummy No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 8415 2550 2380 3485 8415 2550 2380 3485
R2 Adj 0.2504 0.1780 0.4397 0.2410 0.2572 0.1815 0.4478 0.2534
OLS regressions of distress risk premium against dierent macro-nancial variables. The table reports
the estimated OLS coecients and their signicance, according to Petersen (2009) to correct the fact
that the residuals may be correlated across rms or across time. The date 09/Aug/2007 refers to the
day that BNP Paribas froze three investment funds, and 15/Sep/2008 refers to the date that Lehman
Brothers led for bankruptcy. The sample period covers from 14/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010. *, **, and
*** denote the signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table A.5.: Panel regression for jump-at-default risk premia
Dependent variable JADi;t
Model (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
All period <09/Aug/2007  09/Aug/2007 15/Sep/2008 All period <09/Aug/2007  09/Aug/2007 15/Sep/2008
<15/Sep/2008 <15/Sep/2008
Bid Ask5yi;t 2220.8849*** 1008.7847** 2927.3078* 1977.7244*** 2126.4277*** 1032.9614** 3392.9802* 1860.7841***
ESTOXX50t 0.0009 0.0001 0.0033 0.0029 0.0011 0.0001 0.0037 0.0029
VIXt 0.0477 0.0053 0.0317 0.0748 0.0514 0.0122 0.0195 0.0838
USD/EURt 2.9486 0.9929 1.1659 0.6171 2.1388 1.0185 0.2410 0.0062
EONIAt 0.1938 0.2908 0.0258 0.0350 0.1972 0.3438 0.1847 0.0476
EURIBOR OISt 2.4607 2.9776* 1.3765 1.2671 2.5519 1.8168 1.8221 1.3557
SLOPEt 0.2346 0.7239 2.5280 1.6357 0.6559 0.6228 3.4041 1.2927
SOVPC1t 0.2586 5.3859*** 2.8341 0.1784 0.3189 3.9610* 2.4945 0.2410
SOVPC2t 0.0319 8.6093* 18.0645*** 0.2440 0.0271 9.3976* 17.7297*** 0.2324
Financial  Bid Ask5yi;t 760.8589 383.8721 2060.4151 1203.4123
Financial  ESTOXX50t 0.0011 0.0002 0.0014 0.0006
Financial  VIXt 0.0197 0.0366*** 0.0627*** 0.0517
Financial  USD/EURt 3.7231 0.0735 6.1137* 4.1128
Financial  EONIAt 0.0336 0.2506 0.8492*** 0.0217
Financial  EURIBOR OISt 0.5567 5.8520** 1.9535 0.7858
Financial  SLOPEt 2.1834** 0.6011 3.6342** 1.7816
Financial  SOVPC1t 0.2920*** 7.7782** 2.5063 0.2961***
Financial  SOVPC2t 0.0141 4.0558 0.2023 0.0654
Firm dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial dummy No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 7421 2250 2100 3071 7421 2250 2100 3071
R2 Adj 0.0561 0.0804 0.1546 0.0686 0.0587 0.0894 0.1606 0.0732
OLS regressions of jump-at-default risk premia against dierent macro-nancial variables. The table
reports the estimated OLS coecients and their signicance, according to Petersen (2009) to correct
the fact that the residuals may be correlated across rms or across time. The date 09/Aug/2007 refers
to the day that BNP Paribas froze three investment funds, and 15/Sep/2008 refers to the date that
Lehman Brothers led for bankruptcy. The sample period covers from 14/Jun/2006 to 31/Mar/2010.
*, **, and *** denote the signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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